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Abstract: Cross-national differences in regulation have become the most significant 
barrier to international trade. My dissertation attempts to explain why states sometimes 
choose to reduce these regulatory trade barriers but at other times choose to maintain or 
increase them. To do this, I examine the international negotiation over regulatory trade 
barriers in three in-depth case studies, one from each of the three main areas of the 
international trade in goods: manufacturing, agriculture, and high-technology. The first 
investigates consumer safety, labor-related domestic content, and environmental 
regulations in the trade in automobiles in North America and the European Union. The 
second analyzes mad-cow safety regulations and the trade in beef between the United 
States and Japan. The third examines intellectual property regulations and the trade in 
pharmaceuticals between the United States and India. 
 I contend that the best way to explain this variation is by examining the 
motivations of three sets of actors (businesses, activists, and government officials) and 
the political bargaining between those three groups. Businesses seek to reduce regulatory 
barriers when those barriers raise production costs or inhibit market access. They may 
however choose to end that pursuit if those regulations are cheap to comply with or 
pursuing their reduction carries major reputational risk. Activists defend regulatory 
barriers when they perceive those regulations to be the sole effective means to address a 
societal problem they are concerned about. They may accept a reduction in regulatory 
barriers if those barriers have low salience or their opposition is bought out through 
private standards, corporate social responsibility, or some other arrangement in which 
businesses are not directly regulated by government. Government officials choose 
whether to side with businesses or activist groups based on their relative prioritization of 
trade and regulatory independence, their staffing, and whom they identify as their core 
constituency.  
 Businesses are likely to succeed at reducing a regulatory trade barrier when they 
can link their desire for that reduction with broader concerns about economic 
competitiveness while activist organizations are likely to succeed at defending regulatory 
trade barriers when they can link their desire for maintaining or increasing that barrier 
with preventing needless death.  
 This dissertation thus adds to the current understanding of international political 
economy by demonstrating that multinational corporations have less political power than 
is commonly assumed and by augmenting traditional explanations of trade politics based 
on economic cleavages through analyzing activists’ engagement in trade politics now that 
trade politics significantly affects regulations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction- The Centrality of Regulation to Trade Politics 
 
Airbags, Antibiotics in Pork, and the Newest Generation of Cancer Drugs 
 American and European airbags are different.1 European airbags are tested based 
on the assumption that vehicle occupants are wearing their seat belts. If occupants are 
wearing seat belts, automakers know where the occupant’s head will be in a crash. This 
assumption leads to a smaller, more focused airbag. Conversely, given that many 
Americans do not wear their seat belts, American airbags are tested based on the 
assumption that the occupants are not wearing seat belts. This assumption necessitates to 
a larger airbag. For most automakers, it is prohibitively costly to design an airbag that 
meets safety requirements in both places. Thus automakers must have two production 
lines for airbags or have only one production line but forgo sales in a major market.  
 Another regulatory difference involves what is known as the baby head test.2 In 
the United States, safety specifications revolve around just one idea: protect the people 
inside the vehicle. In the EU however, because they have denser cities and a much higher 
percentage of accidents involve pedestrians, automobiles must be designed and tested to 
reduce injury both to the vehicle’s passengers and any pedestrian struck by the vehicle. 
One test within the constellation of regulations that accompany this goal involves 
launching a ball into the hood of a car to simulate a small child being struck by the car, 
i.e. the baby head test. The United States does not have such a test. These differences 
mean that vehicles have to be produced one way for one market and a different way for 
another. Here then are two regulatory differences that drive up the cost of trade for 
automakers in the two most lucrative auto markets in the world. 
                                                
1 National Public Radio. “Why Cars From Europe and the US Just Can’t Get Along.” April 18, 2014. 
2 Ibid. 
3 The Economist. “Empire of the Pig.” December 20, 2014.  2 Ibid. 
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 The amount of pork that Chinese consumers eat is staggering. The average 
Chinese person consumers nearly 90 pounds of pork per year, with the country as a whole 
consuming nearly half a billion pigs annually, and the number is growing as living 
standards and demand for meat expand.3 U.S. pork producers are some of the most 
efficient in the world, producing 23 billion pounds of pork annually, and would love to 
gain significant market share in this most lucrative of export opportunities.4 But many of 
them cannot. American pork producers give their swine ractopamine, an antibiotic that 
has the side effect of promoting accelerated growth; China bans ractopamine.5 Here then 
is a regulatory barrier inhibiting trade between the world’s most prolific pork eaters and 
the world’s most efficient pork producers, which just so happen to also be the two states 
with the most important economic relationship in the twenty-first century.    
 Pharmaceutical research has now advanced to the point where medications can be 
made not just from synthetic components but also from living cells. These new drugs 
called ‘biologics’ represent some of the most cutting-edge research in the 
pharmaceuticals industry and may soon lead to medicines for maladies that currently 
have little or no effective treatment.6 Just one kind of biologic drug, PD1 inhibitors, has 
generated huge excitement in the medical community due to its heightened efficacy in 
fighting certain cancers.7 These drugs are a generational leap forward from their 
                                                
3 The Economist. “Empire of the Pig.” December 20, 2014.  
4 National Pork Producers’ Council. “Pork Facts.” http://www.nppc.org/pork-facts/ Accessed May 1, 2016. 
5 Gale, Fred. “U.S. Agriculture Trading Relationship With China Grows.” United States Department of 
Agriculture, Economic Research Service. May 4, 2015.  
6 Food And Drug Administration. “What Are Biologics: Questions and Answers.” 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CBER/ucm133077.ht
m Accessed May 1, 2016.  
7 Boseley, Sarah. “Immunotherapy: The Big New Hope For Cancer Treatment.” The Guardian. June 2, 
2015. Dolan, D.E., and Gupta, S. 2014. “PD-1 Pathway Inhibitors: Changing the Landscape of Cancer 
Immunotherapy.” Cancer Control. 21:3. p. 231-237. Science Daily. “FDA Approves Game-Changing 
Immunotherapy Drug to Fight Lung Cancer.” October 2, 2015.  
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predecessors and may do for cancer therapy what AZT did for HIV.8 PD1 inhibitors like 
Merck’s Keytruda are miracles in pill form; they are also wildly expensive.9  Biologics, 
even more than other drugs, can come with astoundingly high costs.10  
 Promoting innovation while controlling costs is the central dilemma of intellectual 
property regulation in pharmaceuticals. Trade-related intellectual property rules have 
generally only applied to synthetic chemical compounds and so covering biologics with 
intellectual property regulations requires new rule-making efforts at the international 
level. Pharmaceutical companies, for obvious reasons, are highly reluctant to produce 
drugs in, or import drugs into, countries in which their intellectual property rights will not 
be upheld. Differences in regulation on intellectual property thus have the power to 
impede the international trade in pharmaceuticals. The tension over these regulatory 
barriers has played out between the United States and other states in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations. The United States wanted to maximize the regulatory 
protections on biologics by granting twelve years of data exclusivity while other states 
wanted five years or less.11 The disagreement over that regulatory protection was perhaps 
the most contentious issue on the entire TPP docket and the very last issue resolved in the 
                                                
8 Most Americans who became infected with HIV just a few years before Magic Johnson have 
unfortunately no longer been with us for two decades now. Many U.S. citizens who became infected 
around the time Magic Johnson did (1991) have been able to continue leading productive, fulfilling lives. 
The sea change occurred as a result of the invention and approval of the first highly effective treatment for 
HIV. That drug was AZT.   
9 Weintraub, Arlene. FiercePharma. September 5, 2014. http://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/updated-
merck-s-melanoma-game-changer-keytruda-likely-to-bolster-drug-pricing-debate Accessed May 1, 2016.  
10 Stockton, Nick. “How Prescription Drugs Get So Wildly Expensive.” Wired. September 23, 2015. 
Johnson, Carolyn and Brady Dennis. “How an $84,000 Drug Got Its Price: ‘Let’s Hold Our Position 
Whatever the Headlines.’” The Washington Post. December 1, 2015. Scannell, Jack. “Four Reasons Drugs 
Are Expensive, Of Which Two are False.” Forbes. October 13, 2015. 
11 Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S., TPP Countries Mull Compromise on Biologics Data Exclusivity.” August 7, 
2015. 
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negotiations.12 In other words, the single biggest regional trade deal every negotiated 
hinged on states’ ability to find agreement on a regulatory trade barrier in 
pharmaceuticals.      
The Practical Significance of Regulatory Trade Barriers  
 The difference in air bag rules, the disagreement over ractopamine in pork, and 
the negotiations over biologics data exclusivity are just three of the many examples of 
cross-national differences in regulation constituting significant impediments to 
international trade. These regulatory trade barriers are everywhere. They affect $5 trillion 
worth of traded goods annually and influence a wide range of policy areas.13 Regulatory 
and other non-tariff trade barriers are becoming so important that the WTO’s 2012 Trade 
Report was entirely dedicated to them; the WTO Director-General stated that these non-
tariff measures “will not follow a path of diminishing relevance like tariffs have done. 
They will not shrink in importance. Regulatory interventions…with inevitable 
consequences for trade flows and investment are here to stay.”14  Not only are regulatory 
barriers important for trade, they also affect nearly everyone’s daily lives. Everyone eats; 
a large portion of the food a person eats has been traded internationally before it is 
consumed. The differences in national regulations affect how safe that food is and how 
much it costs. Everyone wears clothes; the connection between the international trade in 
                                                
12 Mauldin, William. “U.S., Australia Agree on Complicated Compromise on Biologic Drugs.” The Wall 
Street Journal. October 4, 2015. Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S., Australia Float Joint Biologics Text to Other 
Countries For Vetting.” October 4, 2015.  
13 Büthe, Tim and Walter Mattli. 2011. The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the 
World Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 8. 
14 World Trade Organization. World Trade Report 2012. Trade and Public Policies: A Closer Look at Non-
Tariff Measures in the 21st Century. p. 3. This is because the negotiation of reductions in RTB’s requires 
stepping into sensitive domestic political issues. See Susan Aaronson’s work is on how trade policy became 
a key issue for many domestic interest groups that had previously ignored it. 1996. Trade and the American 
Dream: A Social History of Postwar Trade Policy. University of Kentucky Press: Lexington. 2001. Taking 
Trade to the Streets: The Lost History of Public Efforts to Shape Globalization. University of Michigan 
Press: Ann Arbor. 
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textiles and labor standards affects the conditions under which millions of people are 
employed and what it costs a consumer to be properly clothed. Many people take 
medications; including intellectual property regulations in international trade agreements 
influences how quickly innovative new drugs come on to the market as well as whether 
poor people in developing countries have access to needed medicines. Many people drive 
automobiles; the safety and environmental regulations on automobiles affect the chances 
of a person surviving an accident as well as the speed with which global warming 
progresses. In virtually all industries, by inhibiting or promoting firms’ ability to sell their 
goods in multiple markets, regulatory trade barriers impact businesses’ profit margins and 
in turn workers’ pay packets. Regulatory trade barriers have real world consequences for 
just about everyone. This book explains the politics that surrounds those regulatory trade 
barriers.   
The Question and My Answer  
 When the differences between countries’ domestic regulations impede 
international trade, the states involved have three basic options. They can reduce those 
regulatory barriers, they can increase them, or they can do nothing. This dissertation asks 
when are states more likely to do each of these and why.15 I argue that regulatory trade 
barriers are most likely to be reduced when businesses are able to link their desire for that 
reduction with broader societal concerns about economic competitiveness while activist 
organizations are likely to succeed at increasing regulatory trade barriers when they can 
link their desire for maintaining or increasing that barrier with preventing needless death. 
 
 
 
                                                
15 Note that reducing regulatory trade barriers may not be the same thing as reducing regulations. If 
regulations are harmonized upward, that is still a reduction in a trade barrier.  
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How This Study of Regulatory Trade Barriers Advances IPE Scholarship 
Improving on Cleavage-Based Explanations 
Trade politics no longer operates the way that it used to. David Ricardo famously 
argued that trade benefits countries by allowing them to specialize production in the 
goods in which they have the greatest comparative advantage and then trade that good for 
products in which they do not have a comparative advantage.16 Heckscher-Ohlin and then 
Stolper-Samuelson built on this logic and argued that trade would help the owners of a 
society’s abundant factor as that abundance is what drives a country’s comparative 
advantage.17 Therefore, trade would benefit the owners of capital in a capital-intensive 
country like the United States. The political corollary to that is that the owners of a 
society’s abundant factors will be in favor of trade liberalization while the owners of a 
society’s scarce factors are likely to seek trade protection. Thus, in the United States the 
owners of capital are likely to advocate free trade while low-skilled laborers are likely to 
oppose free trade.  
Two of the most famous works on trade politics, Ronald Rogowski’s Commerce 
and Coalitions and Michael Hiscox’s International Trade and Political Conflict both 
build their arguments on the basis of these kinds of cleavages.18 Rogowski assumed that 
there are three political groups in society: land-owners, laborers, and capital owners. Let 
is say that in a given society, capital and labor are relatively abundant but land is 
relatively scarce. An expansion of trade will help laborers and capital owners as they are 
the holders of the abundant resources but hurt landowners as they are the holders of 
                                                
16 Ricardo, David. 1817. On the Principals of Political Economy and Taxation. John Murray: London. 
17 Stolper, Wolfgang and Paul Samuelson. 1941. “Protection and Real Wages.” The Review of Economic 
Studies. 9:1. p. 58-73.  
18 Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. Hiscox, Michael. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict: 
Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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scarce resource. The capital owners and laborers will form a political coalition to push for 
greater trade while landowners will advocate for protectionism. That society will thus 
have an urban-rural political cleavage. Likewise, labor and land being abundant but 
capital being scarce leads to a Red-Green coalition against the capitalists. Michael Hiscox 
added greater nuance to this framework by showing that under conditions of low factor 
mobility (i.e. high asset specificity), these cleavages are more likely to be between 
different industry sectors rather than different social classes. This cleavage-based 
framework has also been employed by others as well.19 At its core, these cleavage-based 
explanations assert that trade generates economic benefits for some slice of society, 
shrinks the benefits that go to other sectors of society, and the political struggle over trade 
amounts to a fight between the economic winners and losers from trade.    
As helpful as these theories are in explaining the trade politics that are unrelated 
to regulation, they struggle to explain the politics of regulatory trade barriers. Because 
they tend to focus on the economic implications of trade, they tend to ignore those 
societal actors that have an interest in trade but are motivated by non-economic policy 
goals. As trade increasingly impacts regulations, these actors have proliferated. 
Additionally, in many disputes over regulatory barriers, some actors such as consumers 
have acted in ways that are at odds with their apparent economic interests, which 
according to the cleavage-based explanations should be the driver of their preferences. It 
would also imply that firms seeking to limit trade would advocate for greater regulatory 
                                                
19 Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crises. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. Frieden, Jeffry. 1991. Debt, Development, and Democracy: 
Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Midford, 
Paul. 1993. “International Trade and Domestic Politics.” International Organization. 47:4. p. 535-564. 
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trade barriers but, as I mentioned earlier, at least since the 1980s, they have not tended to 
do that. 
An additional reason the cleavage-based framework struggles to explain 
regulatory trade barrier developments is that it either ignores the role played by 
government officials or depicts them as the mouthpiece of firms located in their state. 
That is problematic. Understanding the intersection of trade and the environment, for 
example, requires examining environmental NGOs as well as government officials’ 
preferences on environmental regulation. 
Cross-national differences in regulation have become the most prominent issue in 
international trade politics and continue to grow even more important. Thus, the failure to 
explain regulatory trade barriers constitutes a large and expanding blind spot for these 
cleavage-based explanations. Now that trade is inextricably bound up with regulation, the 
politics that surround it are fundamentally new and require a new set of explanations. 
This study provides one of those explanations. 
A Hard Case for Resisting Globalization 
 One of the aspects of this study that is unique is that it demonstrates the 
limitations of the power of globalization to compel policy adjustment in areas in which 
that power should be at its strongest. Globalization-driven policy convergence is 
especially likely to be the case in those policy areas that tangibly and significantly affect 
other states’ commercial opportunities. These impacts on foreigners lead to greater 
pressure from those foreigners on that state to amend its policies to reduce that 
commercial curtailment.  
 This is why trade-related regulations present such an interesting test case for the 
power of globalization. In some ways, it is not surprising that governments’ social 
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welfare, infrastructure, and defense spending policies do not show much convergence. In 
each of these cases, there are powerful reasons for governments to jealously guard their 
autonomy, there are limited commercial gains to that state from adjusting to be more like 
other countries, and there are relatively small commercial impacts on foreigners which 
generates relatively little objection to that policy autonomy.  
 Trade-related policies are a different matter. When a given policy affects another 
state’s commercial opportunities in that country, it very much does lead to pressure to 
adjust that policy. Moreover, because trade liberalization generally gets done 
reciprocally, adjusting that policy holds out the promise of benefiting from greater access 
to that state’s market. As I show in chapter 2, domestic regulations have become the 
central issue in trade politics. Unlike with those policies that generally do not directly 
affect foreigners, the incentives to adjust those regulations ought to be immense. 
Additionally, the generally low salience of most regulations means that making these 
changes should be relatively easy when compared to altering policies in areas like the 
level of social spending. If business-driven globalization dominates anywhere, it ought to 
be in the area of regulatory trade barriers, but even here, the extent of policy stickiness is 
striking. 
 In IPE scholarship, there has been a long-running debate between those who see 
globalization as exerting a great deal of pressure on governments to adjust their policies 
in ways that make them more similar to those in other countries and those who argue that 
states are likely to maintain their policy differences despite the pressures globalization 
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exerts.20 This study lands squarely in the second camp though suggests some 
circumstances under which the first camp may at times be correct. 
Case Selection- A Practically Significant Set of Puzzles 
 The choice of which cases to analyze in this study emerged from a dual set of 
motivations: practical significance and the analytic leverage created by empirical puzzles.  
Practical Significance 
 First, the automotive, beef, and pharmaceuticals industries all have a great deal of 
practical significance. They are all large, important industries in their own right and merit 
attention simply on that consideration.21 As of 2014, the total value of the annual 
international trade in automotive products, food, and pharmaceuticals was $1.4 trillion, 
$1.5 trillion, and $550 billion respectively.22 Each of these industries, at a global level, 
affects millions of workers and billions of consumers.  
 Second, they are varied. Had I chosen three agriculture-related industries, any 
patterns I found might simply have been due to some idiosyncrasy in within that field. I 
wanted to have one industry from agriculture, one from manufacturing, and one that was 
more technologically advanced as those collectively comprise three of the most important 
kinds of internationally traded goods. Given how varied these three industries are, it is 
safe to say that they are at least fairly representative of the types of goods that are traded 
                                                
20 For the first camp, see Rodrik, Dani. 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the 
World Economy. W.W. Norton and Company: New York. Stiglitz, Joseph. 2006. Making Globalization 
Work: The Next Steps to Global Justice. Penguin Books: London. Helleiner, Eric and Andreas Pickel (eds.) 
2005. Economic Nationalism in A Globalizing World. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. Vogel, David, and 
Robert Kagan (eds.) 2004. Dynamics of Regulatory Change: How Globalization Affects National 
Regulatory Policies. University of California Press.  
For the second camp, see Kahler, Miles and David Lake (eds.) 2003. Governance in a Global Economy: 
Political Authority in Transition. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Drezner, Daniel. 2001. 
“Globalization and Policy Convergence.” International Studies Review. 3:1. p. 55, 65-75. 
21 On the appropriateness of selecting cases based on ‘most importance’, see Friedrichs, Jörg, and Friedrich 
Kratochwil. 2009. “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations 
Research and Methodology.” International Organization. Vol. 63. p. 718.  
22 World Trade Organization. Statistics Database. Merchandise Trade by Commodity. Accessed May 1, 
2016. This data is for 2014. 
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internationally. Moreover, each of them is a quintessential industry in its sector. If one 
wants to know how regulatory barriers affect manufacturing, the automotive industry is 
an excellent place to start.23 The same is true for beef in agriculture and pharmaceuticals 
in high technology.  
 Furthermore, each of the three industry studies has their own additional 
advantages. The automotive industry was one of the earliest sectors to be highly affected 
by regulatory barriers and so findings from that industry may preview the dynamics that 
we are likely to see in other sectors as they too become entangled in these barriers. 
Examining the auto industry also allows for an investigation into one the most 
fundamental trends in international trade: the rise of regionalism. Trade in automobiles is 
one of the clearest manifestations of this trend; almost three-quarters of the international 
trade in automobiles is intra-regional.24 Analyzing this industry thus helps illuminate why 
trade liberalization, at least as it pertains to regulation, has progressed at the regional but 
not global level.     
 The beef industry case involving mad-cow regulations and the U.S.-Japan beef 
trade has not yet been thoroughly analyzed by trade scholars. The trade disputes 
surrounding growth hormones and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have already 
received large amounts of scholarly attention.25 If we as scholars want to learn something 
                                                
23 This quintessential-ness is also part of case selection in the pragmatic research tradition. Friedrichs and 
Kratochwil. 2009. “On Acting and Knowing.” p. 718. 
24 Lung, Yannick and Rob van Tulder. 2004. “Introduction: In Search of a Viable Automobile Space.” in 
Cars, Carriers of Regionalism? Carrillo, Jorge, Yannick Lung, and Rob van Tulder (eds.) Palgrave 
MacMillan: New York. p. 10.  
25 On hormones see for example, Mueller, Kristin. 1996. "Hormonal Imbalance: An Analysis of the 
Hormone Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Union." Drake Journal 
of Agricultural Law. Vol. 1. p. 97-111. Bureau, Jean-Christophe, Stephan Marette, Alessandra Schiavina. 
1998. “Non-tariff Trade Barriers and Consumers' Information: The Case of the EU-US Trade Dispute Over 
Beef.” European Review of Agricultural Economics. 25:4. p. 437-462. Kerr, William and Jill Hobbs. 2002. 
“The North American–European Union Dispute Over Beef Produced Using Growth Hormones: A Major 
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that we do not already know, and we believe the already-examined cases were adequately 
analyzed, then the most fruitful intellectual route is to study cases that have not already 
been exhaustively investigated. Chapter 5 does exactly that.  
 The pharmaceuticals case is useful because it tackles regulatory barriers such as 
compulsory licensing that are becoming increasingly prevalent and significant. As 
countries grow older and wealthier, the health care sector is likely to become that much 
more important. Additionally, intellectual property is one of the regulatory areas that 
most clearly pits developing versus developed countries and so examining that issue area 
allows for an exploration of that dynamic as well.  
A Set of Puzzles 
 As Daniel Drezner points out, the paucity of good data appropriate for testing 
hypotheses on regulatory trade barriers make statistical analysis all but impossible; this 
means that case studies and process tracing are the most fruitful research method and are 
thus what I employ throughout this book.26 This work is thus also broadly consistent with 
the ‘analytic narratives’ research methods employed by James Shoch in his analysis of 
political parties’ influence on U.S. trade policy in the 1980s and 1990s and with the 
‘grounded theory’ approach employed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their 
                                                                                                                                            
Test for the New International Trade Regime.” The World Economy. 25:2. p. 283-296. Vogel. 1995. 
Trading Up. p. 154-171. Vogel, David. 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Risks in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 54-62. On 
GMOs see among others, Pollack, Mark and Gregory Shaffer. 2009. When Cooperation Fails: The 
International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Young, 
Alasdair. 2011. “Of Executive Preferences and Societal Constraints: The Domestic Politics of the 
Transatlantic GMO Dispute.” Review of International Political Economy. 18:4. p. 506-529. Drezner. 2007. 
All Politics is Global. p. 149-175. Isaac, Grant and William Kerr. 2003. “Genetically Modified Organisms 
at the World Trade Organization: A Harvest of Trouble.”  Journal of World Trade. 37:6. p. 1083-1095.   
26 Drezner, Daniel. 2007. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton 
University Press: Princeton. p. 25-26. For a defense of and instruction on case studies as a valuable and 
effective research method, see George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press: Cambridge. Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods 
for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. p. 49-88. 
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examination of civil society activists.27 Within the case studies, I rely upon any existing 
public information that I can find; these primarily consist of industry and NGO 
statements, the congressional record, government reports, newspaper articles, and other 
secondary sources.28 
 Each case also constitutes an empirical puzzle for existing explanations of trade 
politics. The automobile case is centered on the puzzle that regulatory trade barriers were 
reduced within Europe and within North America but not reduced between them. The 
explanations that could be used to elucidate the intra-regional reduction such as 
economies of scale or factor-price differences would have predicted inter-regional 
reduction and yet that did not happen.29 Conversely, explanations that could be used to 
illuminate the lack of inter-regional reduction such as differences in regulatory strategy 
should have prevented intra-regional reduction and yet that did not happen either. 
 The beef industry case is centered on the puzzle that even though a number of 
factors that scholars consider important for explaining trade politics outcomes remained 
static throughout the time period examined (2003-2013), the was still significant 
movement in the extent to which regulatory differences impeded the trade in beef 
between the United States and Japan. First, the institutional context these negotiations 
                                                
27 Shoch, James. 2001. Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era. 
University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill. See especially p. 44-46. Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn 
Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University 
Press: Ithaca. p. 5-6. 
28 Again, in terms of style but not content, I am following in Drezner’s footsteps. The majority of the 
material he used for All Politics is Global was publicly available information. This was also the case for 
Buthe and Mattli’s The New Global Rulers and Shoch’s Trading Blows as well as Susan Aaronson’s two 
books. Drezner. 2007. All Politics is Global. Büthe and Mattli. 2011. The New Global Rulers. Shoch. 2001. 
Trading Blows. Aaronson. 1996. Trade and the American Dream. Aaronson. 2001. Taking Trade to the 
Streets.  
29 On the importance of scale economies and factor-price differences in driving firms to promote greater 
internationalism in trade rules, see Chase, Kerry. 2005. Trading Blocs: States, Firms, and Regions in the 
World Economy. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor. See especially p. 2, 15-50.  
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took place in remained the same throughout this time period.30 Examining cases where 
the institutional context is constant does however allow for a more accurate examination 
of non-institutional factors.31 I am not arguing that institutions have no importance, only 
that they are not the sole entities that matter; there are a number of other non-institutional 
factors that also may augment or attenuate trade barriers. Second, the market power of 
each state also did not significantly shift over this time.32 As with institutions, choosing a 
case where this remains constant allows for a clearer examination of other factors. 
                                                
30 At the global level, the entirety of this case takes place after the World Trade Organization’s Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement comes into force in 1995. The SPS is the international agreement that governs 
trade regulations on agricultural products. The central idea behind the SPS is that states have a right to set 
regulations to protect the health of their citizens and the safety of their food supply but the use of these 
regulations as a surreptitious means of protecting domestic producers is unacceptable. The SPS has three 
central provisions. First, if a state bases a regulation on the international standard as defined by a 
designated international non-governmental organization such as the Codex Alimentarius or the World 
Animal Health Organization (OIE), that regulation is considered WTO-compliant. Second, if a state sets 
regulations that are different from the international standard, those regulations must have a scientific basis. 
Third, states’ must use policies that are not more trade-restrictive than is necessary to achieve their 
regulatory goals. At the domestic level, there were no institutional transformations that could account for 
these changes in regulatory trade barriers. 
31 Some scholars have argued quite persuasively that international institutions, most especially the WTO, 
promote liberalization in agriculture. Davis, Christina. 2005. Food Fights over Free Trade: How 
International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. Grant, Jason and Kathryn Boys. 2012. “Agricultural Trade and the GATT/WTO: Does 
Membership Make a Difference?” American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 97:1. p. 1-24. Anania, 
Giovanni, Colin Carter, and Alex McCalla (eds.) 1994. Agricultural Trade Conflicts and GATT: New 
Dimensions in U.S. European Agricultural Trade Relations. Westview Press: Boulder. There is of course 
also a vast literature on how international institutions promote trade liberalization and cooperation more 
generally. Others have effectively shown that domestic institutions also have a significant effect on trade 
policy. Mansfield, Edward, and Helen Milner. 2012. Votes, Vetoes, and the Political Economy of 
International Trade Agreements. Princeton University Press: Princeton. Lohmann, Susanne and Sharyn 
O’Halloran. 1994. “Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.” International 
Organization. 48:4. p. 595-632. Nielson, Daniel. 2003. “Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and 
Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science. 47:3. 
p. 470-491. Garrett, Geoffrey and Peter Lange. 1996. “Internationalization, Institutions and Political 
Change” in Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Robert Keohane and Milner (eds.) Cambridge 
University Press: New York. These four works are particularly instructive though by no means the only 
works in this vein. 
32 On the role of market power, see Simmons, Beth. 2001. “The International Politics of Harmonization: 
The Case of Capital Market Regulation. International Organization. 55:3. p. 589-620. Drezner, Daniel. 
2007. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton. Krasner, Stephen. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto 
Frontier.” World Politics. 43:3. p. 336-366. Grieco, Joseph. 1990. Europe, America, and Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Trade. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. Vogel also argues that market power helps bring about 
the California Effect. Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a 
Global Economy. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. p. 261-263. 
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 The pharmaceuticals industry case is centered on the puzzle that despite similar 
power asymmetries between developing and developed countries throughout the time 
period analyzed, there are highly varied outcomes in the movement of regulatory trade 
barriers. They were significantly reduced in the TRIPS Agreement, reinforced in the 
Doha Declaration, and then a political draw in subsequent WTO negotiations as well as 
in India’s use of TRIPS flexibilities. Additionally, it was also somewhat puzzling that 
developing states agreed to TRIPS in the first place, given that TRIPS was not in their 
interests, and puzzling that the United States backed down in the negotiations over the 
Doha Declaration despite its economic and diplomatic power.  
 In addition to constituting an analytically useful set of puzzles, these three cases 
also provide leverage to study the politics of regulatory barriers because the outcomes 
vary both between cases and within cases. Between the three industry chapters, there are 
11 subcases analyzed in automobiles, 8 in beef, and 4 in pharmaceuticals. The between 
case comparisons generate insights that can be applied to other industries while the 
within case variation allows for detailed process tracing and empirical depth.  
How Regulation Became Central to Trade Politics 
 In Chapter 2, I explain how national regulations became the central to 
international trade politics. By the 1970s, six round of GATT negotiations had reduced 
tariffs to a fraction of what they were in the 1940s. As tariffs receded, non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) became more significant. The Tokyo Round launched in 1973 was the first round 
to address these NTBs.33 The expansion of trade and national regulations combined with 
the increased sophistication of traded products and the heightened level of intra-industry 
trade further raised the significance of regulatory trade barriers. In the 1980s, states 
                                                
33 The Tokyo Round however did not compel GATT members to abide by the codes that were designed to 
curtail these NTBs. 
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becoming more concerned with their export performance and Western businesses pushed 
for trade rules in new areas added to this as well.  
 The Uruguay Round further constrained NTBs, which made regulatory barriers 
more apparent and more important, placed new rules on states’ use of regulations that had 
trade implications, and brought these new rules under a more robust dispute settlement 
process. As trade agreements increasingly impacted regulations, labor unions, 
environmentalists, consumer safety activists, and access to medicine advocates that 
previously were not interested in trade but were interested in regulations became more 
engaged in trade politics. These activists have pushed for specifically national regulations 
that can function to impede trade. Businesses on the other hand have sought to reduce 
these regulatory trade barriers. Finding agreement on these regulatory barriers has been 
impossible in the Doha Round, which has fueled the proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trade deals. 
Summary Preview of My Argument 
 In Chapter 3, I present my main argument in full. I assert that businesses seek to 
reduce regulatory trade barriers when those barriers raise production costs or inhibit 
market access. They may however choose to end that pursuit if those regulations are 
cheap to comply with or pursuing that reduction carries major reputational risk. Activist 
groups defend regulatory barriers when they perceive those regulations to be the sole 
effective means to address a societal problem they are concerned about. They may accept 
a reduction in regulatory barriers if those barriers have low salience or their opposition is 
bought out through private standards, corporate social responsibility, or some other 
arrangement in which businesses are not directly regulated by government. Government 
officials choose whether to side with businesses or activist groups based on their relative 
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prioritization of trade and regulatory independence, their staffing, and whom they 
identify as their core constituency. Concerns about economic competitiveness stack these 
factors in favor of reducing regulatory trade barriers. Concerns about needless death stack 
these factors in favor of maintaining or increasing those barriers. This pattern can be seen 
throughout the cases analyzed in chapters four, five, and six.  
Cars  
 In Chapter 4, I examine environmental, labor, and consumer safety regulations 
and the international trade in automobiles in North America and Europe. I ask why intra-
regional regulatory trade barriers were reduced in Europe and North America but the 
regulatory trade barriers were not reduced between those regions.  
Europe 
 In Europe from 1983 to 1988, environmentalists demanded an increase in 
emissions standards in some EC states as they saw that as the most effective means of 
alleviating the increasingly salient environmental degradation in their states. Automakers 
opposed an increase in emissions standards in these EC states because those standards 
would have amounted to regulatory trade barriers that would have raised their production 
costs and inhibited their market access. Government officials in Denmark and the 
Netherlands sided with environmentalists but officials in France and Italy as well as the 
EC level were more concerned with promoting economic competitiveness and so sided 
with the automakers. These regulatory barriers were thus not allowed to be raised. 
 In Europe in 1989 and 1990, higher emissions standards became much cheaper 
for automakers to comply with and so their opposition to those standards softened. 
Environmentalism had continued to politically strengthen and so the amount of politic 
force pushing for higher standards had increased. Government officials still prioritized 
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advancing the single market and so agreed to prevent regulatory trade barriers related to 
emissions by raising emissions standards to the highest feasible level.34 
North America 
 In the United States in the early 1980s, the United Auto Workers’ Union felt that 
domestic content regulations were the only way to address rising unemployment in the 
auto industry and so pushed for domestic content legislation. Domestic content 
regulations would have raised automakers’ production costs and so they opposed. They 
linked their opposition to concerns about American competitiveness. The Republican-
controlled Senate and White House stood with automakers in opposing domestic content 
regulations and so those regulatory barriers were never raised. 
  In Mexico in the early 1980s, domestic content regulations were making Mexican 
cars uncompetitive in exports markets. This became a much more acute problem as a 
result of the Latin American debt crisis. Automakers lobbied the government to reduce 
them. Additionally, as a result of changes in the Mexican economy, businesses that were 
in favor of trade liberalization became much more powerful over the course of the 
decade. The new leaders of the Mexican government, President de la Madrid and 
President Salinas, had much tighter connections to these businesses than their 
predecessors had been and were willing to marginalize Mexican labor unions from the 
trade policymaking process. This led to the reduction of domestic content regulatory 
barriers.  
 In Canada, businesses also became more favorably disposed toward trade 
liberalization. The MacDonald Commission Report recommended greater trade with the 
United States as an alleviation of Canada’s economic malaise. This gave intellectual and 
                                                
34 This is a good example of a regulatory trade barrier being reduced in such a way that it did not reduce the 
overall level of regulation.  
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political cover to Brian Mulroney, the Conservative Prime Minister, to pursue a free trade 
agreement with the United States even though that contradicted decades of Canadian 
trade policy. Canadian labor unions sat out of those free trade negotiations and so 
facilitated the government and businesses working together to reduce domestic content 
regulatory barriers as part of the free trade deal with the United States. These dynamics in 
all three states continued into the early 1990s, which led to NAFTA entirely removing 
domestic content regulatory barriers between the three states.   
 Meanwhile, environmentalists saw NAFTA as an opportunity to embed 
environmental regulations into trade negotiations. Businesses on the other hand were 
determined to prevent environmental regulatory trade barriers from raising their 
production costs. Unlike with organized labor, Mexican and U.S. officials in both 
countries were at least somewhat sympathetic to the policy goals of environmentalists. To 
prevent the emergence of environmental regulatory barriers, government officials in these 
two states increased enforcement of Mexico’s domestic environmental regulations and 
added language to NAFTA that sanctions states for not enforcing its own environmental 
regulations.  
 Automakers have not called for reduced regulatory differences between the 
United States and Mexico related to consumer safety because those differences have not 
only cheap to comply with, they have actually been a source of profit. Mexican 
Consumers have not pushed for increased regulations either because they are more 
concerned with maintaining access to affordable automobiles that in ensuring that 
vehicles abide by the full range of American safety standards. Given that neither societal 
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interest has become engaged on the issue, government officials have not incentivized to 
attempt to reduce that regulatory difference. 
 Consumer safety advocates in the United States however did become alarmed at 
the difference in safety between American trucks and Mexican trucks that would be 
allowed to enter the United States as a part of NAFTA. Consumer safety advocates were 
able to portray these Mexican trucks as a potentially lethal threat. U.S. officials, 
persuaded by this argument, banned Mexican trucks. It was only after American 
consumer safety advocated were satisfied with Mexican trucks and after American 
businesses hurt by retaliatory sanctions began lobbying on the issue and arguing that this 
regulatory trade barrier was undermining their competitiveness in the Mexican market, 
that U.S. officials lifted that ban.   
Inter-Regional  
 Consumer safety-related regulatory differences between the United States and the 
European Union raised production costs for automakers and so they initially attempted to 
convince government officials to reduce those regulatory differences. Consumer safety 
advocates and national government officials in both place however held that their specific 
regulations were saving lives and were unwilling to potentially jeopardize that for the 
sake of trade and so resolutely opposed the automakers on these regulatory barriers. 
Consumer safety advocates won because they were able to portray those regulatory 
barriers as preventing needless death. 
Beef 
 In Chapter 5, I analyze mad-cow related consumer safety regulations and the trade 
in beef between the United States and Japan. After the first case of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), a.k.a. mad-cow disease, was found in the United States, Japan’s 
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more stringent safety regulations applied to imports of beef from the United States. 
American cattlemen did not want to abide by these regulations because that would raise 
their production costs, but refusing to abide by them cost them access to the Japanese 
market. Japanese consumer safety advocates viewed those anti-BSE regulations as the 
only way to ensure the safety of beef and so robustly defended those regulations. 
American officials at the USDA and at the USTR had strong mandates to promote meat 
industry sales and American exports respectively. At the USDA in particular a number of 
high-ranking officials had direct personal connections with the meat industry as well. U.S 
officials thus sided with American cattlemen and attempted to get Japan to reduce those 
regulatory barriers. Japanese officials at the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Health had badly botched the response to Japan’s first case of BSE in 2001 and so needed 
to win back credibility with consumers on the issue and so resisted reducing those 
regulatory barriers.  
 In negotiations from May 2004 to December 2005, Japanese consumer safety 
activists and American cattlemen continued to hold their respective positions. The 
Japanese and U.S. governments eventually settled on a deal in which U.S. beef exports 
would not have to undergo universal BSE testing as long as those exports were from 
cattle 20 months old or younger at the time of slaughter and all specified risk material 
was removed. This deal nevertheless took some time to reach because these regulations 
were highly salient for Japanese consumer safety advocates who took the details of these 
regulations very seriously and because much of the decision-making process was located 
in an institution, the Food Safety Commission, which was receptive to consumer 
advocate’s arguments.   
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 After a U.S. producer made a serious safety mistake in January 2006, Japanese 
consumer groups were re-energized to push for more stringent BSE regulations. U.S. 
producers and U.S. officials opposed that. Japanese officials ultimately allowed the 
resumption of U.S. beef imports but agreed to new requirements promoted by those 
consumer activists. 
 In 2007, after the World Animal Health Organization improved the United States’ 
risk classification, U.S. beef producers sought to remove all age restrictions on non-
universally tested exports. Japanese consumer groups opposed their removal. Some kind 
of compromise or buy-out might have been possible but U.S. beef producers and the U.S. 
government rejected that approach. Consequently, Japanese government officials sided 
with the consumer activists and so maintained the regulatory barriers.  
 In 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan came to power and, after having harshly 
criticized the Liberal Democratic Party for being too eager to compromise with the U.S. 
on these regulatory trade barriers, could not afford to be seen as doing the same thing, 
especially once a basing dispute over Okinawa became a more contentious issue. This 
combination of factors ensured that the Japanese government would continue to stand 
with the consumer activists and so the regulatory barriers were maintained. 
 Beginning in 2010, the Japanese government took some initial steps to join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which brought exporters into the negotiations over 
Japan’s regulatory barriers on U.S. beef. The United States had concluded a free trade 
deal with South Korea that same year. Japanese businesses feared that this trade 
agreement would make them less competitive in the American market relative to their 
South Korean rivals if they did could not enter into a free trade agreement with the 
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United States. They therefore lobbied the Japanese government to enter into the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.   
 Additionally, once regulatory barriers in beef became embedded in a larger 
constellation of trade issues, the Ministry of Industry (MITI), which has traditionally 
been less protectionist than the Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF), became the leading 
player in formulating Japan’s trade policy rather than MAFF. 
 As importantly, the mood in Japan regarding the country’s BSE countermeasures 
had begun to shift. The number of BSE cases worldwide had fallen from 37,000 to just 
29.35 By this time, most middle class urban consumers were accepting of American beef. 
The diminishing consumer hostility to relaxing the regulatory trade barriers on American 
beef imports was essential in giving the Japanese government the political space to agree 
to those relaxations. Even with Japanese export-oriented businesses pushing for the TPP, 
the government would have found it very difficult to relax those regulatory trade barriers 
on beef had the general public still been aroused in opposition. In 2013, the Japanese 
government announced that it would increase the age-exception to universal testing to 30 
months, which in effect greatly reduced the regulatory barriers impeding American 
cattlemen’s access to the Japanese market. 
Drugs 
 In Chapter 6, I analyze intellectual property (IP) regulations and the trade in 
pharmaceuticals involving the United States and India. As developing countries’ IP 
regulations became more injurious to Western drug firms’ interests, they became much 
more highly motivated to reduce those regulatory trade barriers in IP. Activists, who 
might have fought against these firms’ efforts, were not yet significantly engaged in IP 
                                                
35 Yomiuri Shimbun. “Restrictions On U.S. Beef To Be Eased.” September 6, 2012. 
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politics. With businesses promoting the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and with activists largely silent, government 
officials in the United States and India faced one-sided incentives and so gave businesses 
what they were asking for: significantly reduced regulatory trade barriers related to 
intellectual property.     
 In the second half of the 1990s, the AIDS epidemic grew into a public health 
nightmare, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the relative newness of the disease, 
practically all of the effective HIV drugs were patented and thus expensive. Poor people 
were dying of a disease for which effective medicines existed but which were far too 
expensive for them to afford. Public health advocates began to take a much closer look at 
the connection between IP regulations and the cost of medicines and concluded that the 
high IP regulations mandated by TRIPS were the main drivers behind the expense of the 
medicines and thus complicit in widespread death. Drug companies compounded this 
imagery when they sued the South African government over measures it had taken to 
stem the AIDS crisis. Even after the drug companies dropped the suit, developing 
countries and access to medicine advocates wanted states to have more flexibility under 
TRIPS to institute different IP regulations. For a variety of reasons, the U.S. government, 
which normally would have been expected to oppose any increase in regulatory barriers 
on IP in pharmaceuticals, relented and accepted the Doha Declaration which strengthened 
developing states ability to implemented different IP regulations, most notably 
compulsory licenses.36 
                                                
36 The United States did this because: 1) the relationship between U.S. government officials was highly 
strained at the time, albeit temporarily, 2) the 2001 anthrax scare led the U.S. to threaten to use a 
compulsory license to protect public health, which rhetorically undermined their arguments against 
developing countries doing the same thing, 3) the United States government was determined to launch a 
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 The Doha Declaration was a big victory for access to medicine advocates and 
developing countries but it did not settle three issues: 1) which diseases a compulsory 
license could be issued for, 2) what kind of exceptions to make for states that did not 
have production capacity, and 3) whether non-violation complaints could move forward. 
On which diseases to cover, the language in Doha was never clarified to either side’s 
benefit. On states’ without production capacity, the same but no greater flexibilities were 
granted to them as to other states. On non-violation complaints, there has been a rolling 
temporary moratorium. In sum, the regulatory barriers on these issues remained static 
through a mix of constructive ambiguity and stalemate. 
 Under the provisions of TRIPS, India had to implement TRIPS-compliant IP 
regulations beginning in 2005. India has found a number of creative policy means to 
relax their IP regulations. They used a narrow set of patentability requirements and gave 
greater policy access for patent opponents and so limited which drugs could get patented. 
They also employed novel injunction policies as well as compulsory licenses to control 
drug prices. All of these measures made India’s IP regulations differ significantly from 
the high IP standards that the U.S. wanted. All of these measures were also technically 
TRIPS-compliant. Still, India has been judicious in its use of these measures, employing 
them much less than they otherwise could have in order to maintain amicable relations 
with U.S. drug firms and U.S. businesses more generally. 
Implications of This Work For Businesses, Activists, and Government Officials 
 In Chapter 7, I discuss six broader implications this study has for International 
Political Economy scholarship. It questions cleavage-based explanations. It qualifies the 
                                                                                                                                            
new trade round at Doha to demonstrate continued American resolve after 9/11, 4) the heightened salience 
of the connection between IP and public health had led other U.S. government agencies, which often had a 
less pro-IP position than the USTR, to become involved in the issue.  
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California Effect.37 It highlights the growing importance of national courts in 
international trade politics. It helps explain the rise of regionalism. It clarifies the trade 
policy options that developing countries have moving forward. It underscores activists’ 
political power. Finally, it points to emerging vectors in the U.S.-China relationship. I 
then apply lessons from these cases to other cases and other industries. 
 I offer political recommendations for the businesses, NGOs, and government 
officials examined in this work based upon the political trajectory seen in the case 
studies. In automobiles, U.S. automakers should accept the limited currency provisions in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as good enough while using that deal’s provisions to 
challenge Japan’s investment and distribution regulatory trade barriers but should delay, 
if not refrain altogether from, challenging Japan’s consumer safety regulations in 
automobiles. Consumer safety advocates in automobiles should emphasize sovereignty 
concerns and highlight the differing safety levels created by disparate regulatory regimes, 
thus emphasizing how each jurisdiction’s regulations prevent unnecessary deaths. 
Environmentalists should seek regulatory improvements that have low compliance costs 
and should emphasize how higher environmental regulations can actually boost economic 
competitiveness frame to promote their goals. Labor unions should challenge businesses’ 
use of the competitiveness frame and be creative in their efforts related to personnel and 
institutional jurisdiction. Auto regulators in Europe and the United States should work to 
establish safety equivalency on as many auto parts as they can and reduce regulatory 
barriers on an ad-hoc basis where they find such equivalency.  
                                                
37 The California Effect is David Vogel’s argument on how trade, rather than creating a race to the bottom, 
can encourage states to raise their environmental and consumer safety standards. The California Effect is 
discussed in more detail on pages 102-104.  
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 Food activists should broaden their scope beyond GMOs and also focus on the 
meat industry’s affect on heart disease, its climate change impact, and its systemic 
exploitation of workers. For their part, meat industry firms should improve their business 
practices sooner rather than later. The USDA should assist the meat industry in making 
these reforms and adopt a more pro-consumer stance.  
 Pharmaceutical firms should emphasize their contribution to economic 
competitiveness and should use personal stories in order to utilize the preventing needless 
death frame to advance their goals. They should also set up a pharmaceuticals bar 
association to internally clamp down on the most flagrantly greedy behavior in order to 
protect the reputation of the industry as a whole. Access to medicine advocates should try 
to demonstrate that a system not based on stringent intellectual property rights can 
actually promote innovation. They should also attempt to drive a wedge between drug 
companies and other businesses by arguing that the high cost of patented prescription 
drugs undermines their competitiveness. Finally, officials in the United States Trade 
Representatives Office should become more transparent and more inclusive by bringing 
NGOs as well as businesses into their negotiating process and by making negotiating 
texts public during negotiations. That could make the entire policymaking process, and 
trade policy as a whole, more legitimate in the eyes of the public. Given the centrality of 
regulation to international trade politics today and the public’s sensitivity on many 
regulations, maintaining that legitimacy is more vital now than ever.
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 28 
Chapter 2: How Regulations Became the Crux of Trade Politics 
 (Reprinted with permission from Journal of World Trade, Vol. 50, No. 1. 2016) 
 
Introduction    
 Today, the principal barrier to trade is the difference between states’ regulations. 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and most 
other contemporary trade deals are about those regulatory barriers more than anything 
else. That was not always the case. The centrality of regulation in trade negotiations is a 
relatively new phenomenon, emerging only over approximately the last quarter century. 
Since they emerged, scholars have analyzed a myriad of economic, legal, and political 
aspects of this important developing trend. There is no dearth of scholarship on this issue. 
Still, to date and perhaps surprisingly, there is not an article-length political history 
explaining how cross-national differences in regulation became the primary barriers to 
trade and the central focus of contemporary trade agreements. This chapter contributes to 
IPE scholarship by doing just that. While it does not deeply delve into any single aspect 
of regulatory trade barriers, many of which are well covered in other works, it does 
provide a concise, unified explanation of how regulatory trade barriers came to be so 
important. It thus provides IPE scholars, political scientists, economic historians, 
international law scholars, economists, and public officials with a brief, useful account of 
how the trade world we live in came to be. Tracing this political history helps illuminate 
not only how we arrived at our current state of affairs but also how incorporating 
regulation changes trade politics and how increasing trade influences states’ regulations.   
The 1970s- Trade Politics Starts to Move Past Tariffs 
 By the 1970s, six rounds of GATT negotiations reduced tariffs to a small fraction 
of what they were in the 1940s. As tariffs receded, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) became 
more significant. The Tokyo Round launched in 1973 continued to reduce tariffs but also 
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addressed many of these NTBs. It established a series of ‘codes’ that bound signatories’ 
use of NTBs. GATT members were not compelled to sign these codes. Explicating codes 
but making them optional was an attempt to promote trade without undermining 
countries’ policy flexibility. While understandable in theory, in practice not forcing states 
to accept the codes as the price of GATT membership meant the Tokyo Round agreement 
amounted to ‘follow these rules…..unless you don’t want to.’ Not surprisingly, many 
states, especially developing ones, did not follow them. Many developed states did sign 
on to these agreements however. That they were following these codes but developing 
states were not was part of developed states’ rising cries of unfair trade in the 1980s.  
 The inclusion of NTBs in trade negotiations, even in a less than universally 
binding way, led the U.S. Congress to demand greater review of those negotiations. 
When only tariffs were involved, Congress specified a range in which the Executive was 
allowed to reciprocally reduce tariffs with other states; once trade negotiations had the 
potential to limit non-tariff barriers, Congress wanted to place greater checks on 
Presidential prerogative. Congress did this for three reasons. First, negotiating NTBs, 
especially those related to regulation, requires trade-offs that are less straightforward than 
when the main agenda item is tariffs. When the agenda involves non-tariff barriers it 
becomes less clear what an equivalent concession even is. Does Country A cutting its 
subsidies to industry X fully compensate Country B for relaxing its rules on item Y? This 
made it more difficult for Congress to know beforehand what the United States would be 
conceding and so made them more reluctant to give the president carte blanche at the 
outset. Second, negotiating NTBs meant potentially negotiating away domestically 
agreed upon law. This too increased Congressional reluctance to take an institutional 
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backseat because a new trade deal would affect domestic law. Third, Congress received 
the request for negotiating authority on NTBs during the Watergate scandal in 1974. It 
goes without saying that in that context Congress was not eager to expand Executive 
authority. These considerations led Congress to demand, and win, influence at both the 
front end (giving the President fast-track authority) and at the back end (the ability to 
vote up or down on the implementing legislation) in the Trade Act of 1974. In other 
words, the inclusion of non-tariff barriers in trade negotiations is the principal reason why 
we have the fast-track procedure that governs American trade policymaking today. 
 Meanwhile, for the first time, developing countries were gaining meaningful 
involvement in trade negotiations. While they were given special treatment in previous 
GATT rounds, they had little voice in the negotiations and so liberalization excluded 
agriculture and textiles, two sectors where developing countries had their greatest 
comparative advantage. The erosion of tariffs on manufactured goods made this 
exclusion increasingly glaring. The inclusion of NTBs in trade negotiations threatened to 
constrain these states development policies; subsidies, local content rules, and 
government procurement policies were at the heart of developing countries’ efforts to 
support their infant industries. Angry at the exclusion of their voice and priorities from 
the negotiations and worried by the potential limits to their policy autonomy that trade 
rules on NTBs might impose, developing states blocked the ratification of the Tokyo 
Round until richer countries agreed to relax the agreement’s requirements and pass the 
‘enabling clause’, which allowed developed countries to create preferential trading 
schemes with developing countries.1   
 
                                                
1 Deese, David. 2008. World Trade Politics: Power, Principles, and Leadership. Routledge: NY. p. 88-89.  
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The Expansion and Changing Relationship Between Trade and Regulation  
 By the early 1980s, trade was increasing at a remarkable pace. As trade accounted 
for more of the global economy, more firms were now engaging in trade and thus more 
firms had an interest in other states’ regulations. Meanwhile, as states grew richer, they 
engaged in health, environmental, and safety regulation to a greater extent. Later, 
developed states’ attempts to promote greater competition in their economies required 
more rather than less regulation.2 Moreover, the champions of deregulation tended not to 
focus on health and safety regulations they perceived to be particularly valued by society. 
For example, Thatcher’s deregulation program did not take aim at consumer protection 
policies.3  Increasing trade created greater demand for regulation as a cushion against 
social dislocations generated by that increased trade.4  
 Changes in the nature of traded products meant the expansions of regulation and 
trade began to intertwine. In earlier periods, basic commodities like wheat and steel were 
the primary traded goods. When trade primarily involved commodities, the ability to sell 
that good was mostly a matter of cost. Tariffs were central to costs. As traded products 
grew more complex, considerations beyond costs and thus beyond tariff levels took on 
added significance.5  
 
 
                                                
2 Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political 
Economy 106 (5): 997-1032. Vogel, Steve. 2007. “Why Freer Markets Need More Rules” in Creating 
Competitive Markets: The Politics of Regulatory Reform. 2007. Landy, Marc, Martin Levin, and Martin 
Shapiro (eds.) Brookings Institution Press: Washington. p. 25-42.  
3 Trumbull, Gunnar. 2012. Strength in Numbers: The Political Power of Weak Interests. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge. p. 62. 
4 Rodrik. 1998. “Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” 997-1032. 
5 This paragraph draws on Devereaux, Charan, Robert Lawrence, and Michael Watkins. 2006. Case Studies 
in  U.S. Trade Negotiations Volume 2: Resolving Disputes. Institute for International Economics: 
Washington. p. 6-7. 
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Regulatory Trade Barriers are Particularly Troublesome for Intra-Industry Trade    
 Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s trade became less inter-industry and more 
intra-industry.6 The shift to intra-industry trade meant firms engaged in intra-industry 
trade were both exporters and importers and so would oppose tariffs because they would 
raise production costs by making imported inputs more expensive.7  
 Among NTBs, cross-national differences in regulation are particularly harmful to 
intra-industry trade because they undermine both factors that generate the benefits of 
intra-industry trade: product differentiation and economies of scale. One of the primary 
ways intra-industry trade benefits consumers is by expanding the array of available 
products. By making it impossible to purchase products that are available elsewhere, 
regulatory trade barriers limit consumers’ choices. For example, European carmakers 
would like to sell certain models of subcompact cars they believe would be popular 
among urban drivers in America but are prevented from doing so by regulatory 
differences between the U.S. and EU.8 Furthermore, by forcing producers to maintain 
multiple production lines to meet different states’ standards, regulatory differences also 
reduce businesses’ ability to leverage economies of scale and raise costs for consumers.  
 Regulatory barriers also posed problems for intra-firm trade. Global supply chains 
meant firms’ production must abide by multiple states’ regulations. If the costs of 
complying with these different rules outweigh the savings from locating production steps 
in disparate locales, global supply chains stop making economic sense. 
 
                                                
6 Madeira, Mary. 2014. “The New Politics of the New Trade: The Political Economy of Intra-Industry 
Trade” in Handbook of the International Political Economy of Trade. Deese, David (ed.) Edward Elgar: 
Northampton. p. 113-134. 
7 Marvel, Howard and Edward Ray. 1987. “Intraindustry Trade: Sources and Effects on Protection.” 
Journal of Political Economy. 95:6. p. 1278-1291.  
8 National Public Radio. “Why Cars From Europe and the US Just Can’t Get Along.” April 18, 2014. 
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Europe Leads the Way in Splicing Trade and Regulation  
 The combined implications of increasing intra-industry trade and the Bretton 
Woods Compromise tensions first emerged in Europe.9 By the late 1960s, intra-
continental tariffs had been eliminated and so EC authorities began to target NTBs, 
including regulatory barriers; throughout the 1970s, that diplomatic effort continually 
crashed on the rocks of national regulatory differences.10 Moreover, expansion of 
regulations meant the obstacles seemed to be ever increasing.11  
 In the same year that the Tokyo Round moved the GATT toward a framework for 
dealing with NTBs (1979), the EC made a significant advance in dealing with regulatory 
barriers: the Cassis de Dijon decision and subsequent expansion of mutual recognition. 
One of the plethora of regulatory differences between European states was a German rule 
mandating all liqueurs have at least twenty-five percent alcohol; the idea was that lower 
alcohol beverages facilitated excessive consumption (beer and wine were exempted from 
this rule).12 A French producer of a twenty percent alcohol liqueur known as Cassis de 
Dijon wanted to export to Germany but was blocked from doing so, and so in 1979 the 
French government took the case to the European Court of Justice, which ruled in 
France’s favor. What made this ruling important was not that it untangled specialized 
liqueur sales across the Rhine but instead that it established the doctrine of mutual 
recognition. Rather than force the European Community to elaborate innumerable and 
politically impossible common rules on all traded products, European states were now 
obliged to allow the importation of any product that had been legally produced in another 
                                                
9 The Bretton Woods Compromise was the idea that economic liberalization should be promoted but only 
to the extent that it did not impinge on states’ sovereignty in economic policymaking.  
10 Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge. p. 27-28.  
11 Ibid. p. 28-29. 
12 This paragraph draws on Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 30-35. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 34 
member state. Exceptions would only be made if the regulatory barrier was instituted to 
achieve a legitimate public policy objective and that it used the available regulatory 
means that least restricted trade.13  
 Mutual recognition was supplemented by the ‘new approach’ to regulation, which 
augmented EU states’ and citizens’ confidence in their neighbors’ regulations by adding 
agreed-upon minimum requirements.14 The hope was that mutual recognition along with 
the new approach would promote trade without forcing states to alter their policies. 
Despite the innovativeness of mutual recognition, differences in regulation continued to 
dog intra-European trade relations throughout the early 1980s.  
 To alleviate these regulatory barriers, EC states signed the Single European Act in 
1986, setting 1992 as a goal for completing the common market. The SEA helped remove 
regulatory barriers by changing requirements for EC-wide rulings from unanimous to a 
qualified majority and by expanding the EC’s regulatory authority into consumer safety, 
health, and environmental policy.15 After the SEA, and certainly after the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), regulation was primarily Brussels’ prerogative. To the extent that 
regulation is made on a continent-wide basis, regulation stops being an intra-continent 
trade barrier. Thus, European integration represents one end of the spectrum in dealing 
with regulatory trade barriers: delegate regulatory authority to a supra-national 
government to the benefit of trade at the cost of sovereignty.  
 While it reduced regulatory barriers between EC states, integration did nothing to 
reduce regulatory barriers European firms faced abroad. In fact, because it raised 
                                                
13 On mutual recognition, see Schmidt, Susanne (ed.) 2007. Special Issue of the Journal of European 
Public Policy. “Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of Governance.” 14:5. p. 667–825. 
14 Holmes, Peter. 2006. “Trade and ‘Domestic’ Policies: The European Mix.” Journal of European Public 
Policy. p. 818-822.   
15 Weiler, J.H.H. 1991. “The Transformation of Europe.” Yale Law Journal. 100:8. p. 2403-2483.  
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regulations, in many ways it served to increase regulatory barriers between Europe and 
the rest of the world. To expand global exports, a more comprehensive attenuation of 
regulatory barriers was needed. Firms in other states, and thus those states’ governments, 
were increasingly paying attention to these barriers. For a variety of reasons, states had 
long sought to export more than they imported; this desire took on greater significance in 
the 1980s and thus elevated the importance of regulatory trade barriers. 
Everybody Wants to Be An Exporter  
 Since the 1950s, East Asian states had made export promotion a core component 
of their development strategies. By the 1980s, other developing states were turning away 
from the ISI development model and starting to follow the example of those East Asian 
states. This export-oriented development strategy could work only if their goods could be 
purchased in developed countries. Thus, developed countries’ growing product 
regulations, by threatening to cut off market access, presented a portentous hurdle to 
those countries’ attempts to develop.  
 Western businesses and governments were also becoming more interested in 
exports. Much as the increasing interconnections of global markets undermined ISI, 
forcing developing states, particularly in Latin America, to seek export led-growth, it also 
contributed to the crisis of Keynesianism in Europe and so pushed those governments to 
promote exports. By the late 1970s, leading businesses had become so internationally 
oriented that when faced with an economic downturn, their response was not to push for 
protectionism as their forebears had done in the late 1920s but instead push for greater 
trade liberalization.16 Instead of attempting to solidify their domestic market share, they 
                                                
16 Milner, Helen. 1988. Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton.  
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pursued increased sales in foreign markets.17 The perceived need to win global market 
share and the increasing interconnections of the global economy gave American 
businesses a powerful rhetorical tool in their quest to alter regulations: competitiveness.18 
The language of competitiveness allowed businesses to argue that the U.S. government 
should do more to aid American businesses and that domestic regulations had to be 
reduced, not just because they hurt firms’ profits but also because they were making 
America itself sclerotic in the global economy.19 In Great Britain and Germany, the 
deregulatory aspects of competitiveness also fell on receptive ears in the Thatcher and 
Kohl administrations. 
 That the U.S. was experiencing higher trade deficits than its policymakers 
considered healthy aided this framing’s persuasiveness; in addition to promoting a greater 
use of trade protectionism, a second perceived solution was to promote exports to states 
where American firms had not traditionally had much market share.20 This was especially 
the case apropos Japan for two reasons. First, imports from Japan were rising, 
contributing to the U.S. trade deficit, and were particularly salient in economically and 
culturally important sectors such as automobiles.21 Second, the Japanese government 
often used regulations to exclude foreign firms.22 Their Agriculture Minister’s claim that 
American beef was inappropriate for Japanese consumers because they have longer 
                                                
17 Milner, Helen, and David Yoffie. 1989. “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy 
and A Theory of Corporate Trade Demands.” International Organization. 43:2. p. 239-272. 
18 During this time. large firms began lobbying the U.S. federal government on all business-related issues 
more actively. Waterhouse, Benjamin. 2014. Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to 
NAFTA. Princeton University Press: Princeton. On regulatory reform, see p. 174-200.   
19 Aaronson. 2001. Taking Trade to the Streets. p. 101-106.  
20 Shoch, James. 2001. Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era. 
University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill. 81-83, 98-107. Destler, I.M. 2005. American Trade 
Politics, 4th Edition. Petersen Institute: Washington. p. 81-83.  
21 Shoch. 2001. Trading Blows. p. 78. 
22 Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies. 
18:1. p. 119-154.  
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intestines is something of a classic example in Japanese trade obstructionism.23 Japan’s 
liberalization of other trade policies such as quotas and tariffs made these regulatory 
barriers more significant and more apparent.24 The increased preoccupation with exports 
meant businesses and the governments that represented them wanted to ensure they had 
full access to other countries’ markets and thus had a greater interest in the extent to 
which those countries’ regulations inhibited market access.25  
Western Business Pushes for Trade Rules in New Areas, Developing Countries Resist  
 With the extent to which regulation limited trade becoming obvious to businesses 
and governments inclined to consider other states’ regulations protectionist, businesses 
began to pressure their governments to attempt to reduce those regulatory barriers. 
Monsanto was one of the first corporations to recognize how its revenue was being hurt 
by foreign regulations. In the late 1970s, Monsanto was losing millions of dollars 
annually because Hungary was violating its patents.26 At first, Monsanto’s attempts to 
insert intellectual property into U.S. trade policy met with limited success. According to 
Jim Enyart, the Monsanto representative who was the point man in this effort, “at the 
time everyone said ‘oh gee, patents are highly technical, very esoteric things. What do 
they have to do with trade’…the minute you would say ‘patents’ everybody’s eyes would 
glaze over.”27 Still, Monsanto was able to resolve its Hungarian difficulties with 
Congressional help and, joined soon thereafter by Pfizer and IBM, was able to bring 
intellectual property into U.S. trade policy and get it onto the Uruguay Round agenda in 
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1986.28 These three companies found allies among other corporations based in the United 
States and Europe.29 U.S. and European corporations also wanted to see liberalization in 
services and investment.30 The array of national regulations in banking and services 
constituted an enormous trade barrier for them.31 Developing countries had a decidedly 
different perspective on bringing these new policy areas, and thus negotiations over 
sensitive domestic regulations, into trade talks.32  
 Developing countries’ involvement in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) was 
considerably deeper than it had been in previous rounds, including the Tokyo Round. On 
the one hand, many developing states were hostile to including services, investment, and 
intellectual property rights in a new GATT Round and were concerned that NTB rules 
would become obligatory.33 On the other hand, if a new GATT round could liberalize 
agriculture and textiles and the services and investment provisions could be watered 
down, then perhaps a more institutionalized and open trading system would benefit them. 
They also feared that if a multilateral agreement could not be reached, Western countries, 
and especially the United States, would pursue trade liberalization bilaterally and 
regionally, thus denying those developing countries the benefits of increased market 
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access; likewise, they hoped that a stronger WTO could curtail the United States’ 
increasing penchant for using unilateral trade sanctions such as anti-dumping measures.34  
 The Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994) that created the WTO produced an 
ambitious agreement built upon compromises between developed and developing 
countries. Developing countries won concessions in the reduction of export subsidies and 
quantitative restrictions in agriculture, abolition of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement in 
textiles, tighter rules on safeguards measures, and softening of trade-related investment 
rules. Developed states won inclusion of services under the GATS Agreement, inclusion 
of intellectual property based on developed-country standards under the TRIPS 
Agreement, and strengthening of the dispute settlement mechanism and greater 
compulsion to follow GATT/WTO rules such as the Tokyo Round agreements on NTBs. 
The final Uruguay Round Agreement (the Marrakesh Agreement) also fundamentally 
changed how trade and national regulation coexisted.   
What the Uruguay Round Did for Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 The Uruguay Round was a watershed in setting the rules that govern trade and 
regulation. The GATT dispute mechanism lacked significant enforcement capabilities; 
one of the most conspicuous weaknesses was that panel rulings had to be unanimous 
meaning that even the state being accused of violating trade rules could veto adverse 
decisions. In contrast, the WTO dispute settlement understanding cannot be blocked by 
the accused, proceeds more quickly, possesses a greater ability to enforce decisions by 
sanctioning retaliation, and has more formalized panel proceedings.35 The WTO also 
more fully restricted the use of non-regulatory NTBs. This, combined with further 
reduction in tariffs, means trade barriers other than regulation are more stringently 
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constrained and thus further raises the salience of regulatory barriers. In many ways, after 
the Uruguay Round, regulation became the last game in the trade barrier town. It was not 
silent on regulations either. While it did not mandate regulatory harmonization, it did 
strengthen the Tokyo Round codes pertaining to food and agriculture (SPS) and 
manufactured goods (TBT) by making them requirements of WTO membership.  
 The central idea behind the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) and the 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT) is that states have a right to set regulations 
for legitimate purposes, but the use of these regulations as disguised protectionism is 
unacceptable. The SPS and the TBT have three central provisions. First, if a state bases a 
regulation on the international standard as defined by a designated standard setting body 
such as ISO or the OIE, that regulation is considered WTO-compliant. Second, if a state 
sets regulations that differ from the international standard, those regulations must have a 
scientific basis. Third, states’ must use policies that are no more trade-restrictive than 
necessary to achieve their regulatory goals.  
 Once again, the framers of the global economic order were attempting to 
encourage trade while respecting national sovereignty. This was a laudable goal but 
meant there was enough policy wiggle room for states to continue enacting regulations 
that had profound impacts on trade and yet at the same time there was sufficient juridical 
structure in the WTO for other states to now challenge those regulations as illegal under 
international law if those regulations imposed costs on them. Up to this point, this chapter 
has been about how regulation became part of trade politics. This tension between policy 
space and trade promoting rules that came to a head with the creation of the WTO in 
1994 is how trade became central to regulation politics.  
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 Had the increasing connection between trade and regulation somehow gone 
unnoticed by civil society activists, the politics at the intersection of trade and regulation 
might have remained technocratic to the point of vapidity for all but the corporate 
lawyers and academic super-specialists, but that was not to be the case. While the 
Uruguay Round negotiations were indeed dominated by business, during roughly the 
same time period, non-business civil society actors started becoming interested in and 
involved in trade policy to a greater degree. Their attempt to gain greater influence over 
trade policymaking is one of the most important trends in global economic politics over 
the last three decades. 
 Prior to the 1980s, Western civil society groups had little interest in and little 
influence in trade policy.36 In the 1980s, these activists started viewing influencing trade 
as integral to achieving their policy goals. The idea that trade could be used for non-trade 
goals was not new; the central point of 17th and 18th-century mercantilism was that trade 
could be used to aggrandize the state. Even in modern times, governments sometimes 
attempted to use trade to advance geostrategic goals. What was new was that civil society 
groups more fully realized that they too could use trade to pursue their labor, 
environmental, and consumer safety policy goals.  
Labor Finds a Party and Starts to Focus to Regulations   
 Organized labor was the first non-business civil society group to recognize the 
growing impact trade was having on regulations, specifically labor standards. In the 
United States, the political geography of the early 1970s dampened unions’ ability to gain 
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trade protection. Import-competing industries and unionized workers were concentrated 
in the Midwest and Northeast and were generally represented by Republicans while 
export-oriented industries and less unionized workers were concentrated in Southern 
districts represented by Democrats.37  
 The political upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s led the two parties to switch 
positions on trade. By 1980, Republicans’ geographic base was in the export-oriented 
South and interior West while Democrats largely controlled the protectionist Midwest 
and Northeast. This shift meant Republicans now favored trade expansion and labor 
regulation rollback. For unions, trade liberalization and deregulation were no longer 
separate battles but linked tools in the Reagan Administration’s arsenal for weakening 
labor. Furthermore, the ascendant rhetorical frame of competitiveness alarmed labor as 
much as it pleased business because it suggested that workers had to bear the costs of 
America adjusting to a post-industrial economic landscape.38  
 Labor unions believed they were locked in a global contest for jobs with 
developing country workers and argued that the deplorable conditions that these workers 
were forced to work under constituted an unfair advantage for businesses that operated 
there and thus unfairly harmed American workers. In 1984, labor activists were able to 
use this rhetoric to get trade concessions for developing states linked to labor standards.39 
They feared that even if firms did not move operations to those countries, they could 
bully workers and governments into accepting their policy and wage preferences by 
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threatening to do so. Human rights activists joined labor unions in their crusade to link 
labor and trade, with the most dramatic example being their drive for trade sanctions 
against apartheid South Africa.40  
The Expansion of Consumer Skepticism   
 Consumer activists too were becoming more skeptical of multinational firms. The 
modern consumer movement grew out of citizens’ perception that firms had failed to 
supply goods of sufficient quality and that governments had, at best, failed in their duty 
to regulate and, at worst, had colluded with business at consumers’ expense. The U.S. 
consumer movement won regulatory protections against what they saw as businesses’ 
depredations; their victories included the Fair Package and Labeling Act, the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, and the Consumer Product Safety Act as well as 
numerous local and state ordinances.41 The 1960s and 1970s also saw an expansion of 
consumer mobilization efforts in Europe that yielded significant political victories such 
as the establishment of the Office of Fair Trading and the National Consumer Council in 
Britain, implementation of quality contracts in France, and the establishment of an 
information-based consumer protection system in Germany.42 In Japan, though producer 
interests continued to dominate, consumer groups did gain more consistent influence in 
regulatory policymaking through the creation of consumer affairs divisions in 
government as well as the enactment of the Consumer Protection Basic Law.43  
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  In the 1980s, consumer groups began to recognize the extent to which trade 
policy impacted their regulatory goals. This added suspicion of imports to their already 
acute qualms about business. It was precisely these fears that led the European 
Community in 1985 to ban hormones in beef, a move that inhibited American beef 
exports to Europe; this was the first time consumer organizations’ political activism led 
to a trade dispute.44 The Single European Act (1986) further augmented the power of 
European consumer organizations by strengthening the European Parliament, which was 
more open to the concerns of non-business interests than the other major EC 
institutions.45 Meanwhile, consumer groups in Japan and the United States were gaining 
greater influence in their country’s trade policies as well.  
 Much of these groups’ demands rested upon a subtle distinction, that how a 
product is made is just as important as the characteristics of the product. One of the two 
principal pillars undergirding post-war trade rules was ‘national treatment’, the idea that a 
state could not treat an imported good differently than a domestic one. The legal language 
used by the GATT and later the WTO is that governments are not allowed to discriminate 
against ‘like products.’ For most of the GATT’s history, the definition of like products 
was based on characteristics of the product and thus straightforward; a soccer ball is a 
soccer ball. As civil society groups became more engaged in trade politics, they advanced 
a new definitional framework- process characteristics. To a labor standards activist, a 
soccer ball is not a soccer ball if one of those balls is made by a worker toiling under 
deplorable conditions; because the process by which those two balls are made differ in 
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their consequences for labor rights, they are not ‘like products’ and so a state may 
discriminate against the morally odious product. In the Tuna-Dolphin case, the GATT 
established that, for the most part, only product-based regulatory barriers are legal.   
Environmentalists Become Interested in Trade Policy  
 In the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalists in the U.S. and Europe focused 
primarily on domestic issues. Even when the environment was discussed at the 
international level, such as at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the focus was on 
organizing state action to combat pollution. In the late 1980s, these activists became 
influential actors in trade politics.  
 European integration brought environmental activists into EC trade debates, 
especially after the Single European Act.46 At roughly the same time, environmental 
activists in the U.S. began to take a greater interest in trade policy based on three beliefs: 
the potential efficacy of trade sanctions, the GATTzilla menace, and the race to the 
bottom. The first belief was that, under the right conditions, trade sanctions could be used 
to protect the environment. They could be applied unilaterally through regulations that 
granted access to the U.S. market based on meeting environmental production standards 
or could be used to enforce multilateral environmental treaties such as the Montreal 
Protocol. The second belief was that, under the wrong circumstances, trade obligations 
could run roughshod over states’ efforts to protect their environments. This fear was 
stoked by the Tuna-Dolphin GATT case in 1991 that aided environmental activists in 
depicting the GATT as a ‘GATTzilla’ come to eat Flipper and destroy the great 
outdoors.47 Third, many environmentalists believed that even when not being pushed by 
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an institution like the GATT/WTO, trade could encourage a race to the bottom.48 The 
idea was that if environmental regulations placed costs on businesses and businesses were 
free to relocate, they would move to states with lax environmental regulations. This 
would create an incentive for states to relax their existing environmental rules, or at the 
very least give them pause before enacting new regulations. The efficacy of sanctions, the 
bias or not of international trade institutions, and the existence or not of races to the 
bottom are all beyond the scope of this work, but the important thing for the purposes of 
this discussion, is to recognize that these beliefs led environmental activists to engage in 
trade politics to a greater extent than they had before.  
NAFTA and BSE Solidify Civil Society-Demanded Regulations as Trade Issues 
 The NAFTA debate was a pivotal moment for including labor and environmental 
rules in U.S. trade policy. For labor, the prospect of competing with developing country 
workers with little regulatory protection crystallized when the U.S. government began 
negotiating NAFTA, America’s first free trade deal with a developing country. For 
environmentalists, NAFTA’s implications were more ambivalent with some groups in 
support and others opposed. Both sets of activists were able to attract more attention to 
their trade priorities in NAFTA than in the simultaneously occurring Uruguay Round 
because NAFTA was more salient, involved neighboring countries, and was more 
intuitive; as the AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer put it, “GATT is something nobody 
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understands and NAFTA is something everybody understands.”49 Much of the opposition 
to NAFTA was not explicitly protectionist per se, only concerned that NAFTA could 
undermine Americans’ regulatory preferences. Ecological economists Hermann Daly and 
Robert Goodland summarized this point best saying “protecting hard won social gains 
from blind standards lowering competition, that is what we are interested in- not the 
protection of some inefficient entrepreneur who wants to grow mangoes in Sweden.”50  
 Labor and environmental activists succeeded in expanding the scope of what was 
considered a ‘trade’ issue. They forced Presidents Bush and Clinton to accept that labor 
and environmental standards had to be part of NAFTA negotiations. These groups were 
able to put their concerns at the center of the opposition to NAFTA.51 NAFTA did 
eventually include side agreements on the environment and labor standards that were 
stringent enough to gain at least some support from environmental groups though still not 
enough to satisfy labor.  
 The inclusion, or not, of these kinds of side agreements in future negotiations 
became a point of contention between the two parties. Republicans and their business 
allies resented that these policy areas, which they still did not consider to be ‘real’ trade 
issues, had been included in NAFTA and were determined to prevent them from 
contaminating future trade deals. Democrats, conversely, considered their inclusion the 
new normal; they would take a dim view of any future agreements that did not include 
such provisions. Thus, adding regulation to the trade policy mix activated the partisan 
polarization that was starting to ossify American politics more broadly. Though NAFTA 
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indelibly added environmental and labor regulations to the trade policy docket, it did not 
raise consumer protection regulations to the same level of trade salience. It took an epic 
governmental failure two years later across the Atlantic to do that.  
 In March 1996, the British government announced that, contrary to what it had 
been saying for nearly a decade, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) also known as 
mad-cow disease which had been found in a large number of British cows, could in fact 
be transmitted to humans and cause a deadly, incurable virus, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease.52 Europeans who had consumed British beef in the previous 5 years, the 
disease’s incubation period, could potentially have been infected. A political firestorm 
ensued. Fear and indignation were widespread.53 Because the UK government so 
spectacularly failed in its obligations to protect consumers, and because the increase in 
trade engendered by European integration had exposed consumers across Europe to 
potentially fatal British beef, the mad cow crisis badly damaged the notion that 
Europeans were better off federalizing regulation and trade policy. The collective 
experience of the mad cow crisis was so searing that trade liberalization in regards to 
food safety became viewed with deep suspicion.54 The fallout from the BSE crisis 
directly contributed to European consumers’ rejection of allowing BST, a hormone given 
to milk cows, and genetically modified crops from being sold in Europe.55 Both of these 
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decisions created serious trade disputes with the United States because both of those 
products were allowed in America.  
Civil Society and Trade: The Current State of Play  
 Consumers protection groups do not have the same financial resources as 
businesses associations. Nevertheless, when they become engaged on an issue, they can 
be a powerful lobbying force because they deliver legitimacy by disseminating trusted 
information and representing respected broad-based groups. Consumer groups have an 
image of defending ordinary citizens. Who, aside from cat-stroking Bond villains, could 
possibly be against protecting consumers? This framing is so powerful that when 
businesses oppose consumer advocates’ demands, they are forced to justify their position 
as being better for consumers than the consumer advocates’ position.56  
 Developed-country consumer advocates contend that without government 
regulation, international businesses will make substandard products to increase profits. 
Moreover, developed states and their citizens generally view developing countries’ 
regulations as flimsy, non-existent, or unenforced.57 They demand products sold in 
developed-country markets meet their standards, not the standards used in developing 
countries. Those demands and the regulations that emanate from them can inhibit trade. 
The difficulty in resolving the tension between consumer protection and trade is 
exemplified by an increasingly employed regulation: labeling requirements. 
 Labeling requirements have long been one of the main thrusts of consumer 
protection regulation. In the 1980s, these labels began to have significant trade impacts. 
GATT rules meant states were bound to employ regulatory means that least distorted 
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trade. GATT panels have often cited labeling as a preferred option because it is presumed 
to be less protectionist than an outright ban. On the one hand, it could be said that 
governments began to use labels as means of encouraging consumption of domestically 
produced items over imports; for example, the German government used its labeling 
requirements to compel a British sausage manufacturer to label their product not as 
sausage but as “pork-filled offal tubes.”58 Conversely, governments can respond that they 
are merely helping consumers. Parsing out which is the real motivation can be difficult. 
Consumer advocates and governments think they are protecting the public; foreign 
export-oriented producers think this kind of consumer advocacy is a smokescreen for 
protectionism.  
 As with consumer advocates’ wishes, the intent and appropriateness of trade 
demands made by labor activists is deeply contested. Amongst the American public, 
respondents generally favor more rather than less inclusion of labor standards in trade 
agreements.59 Every major piece of trade legislation since NAFTA has been accompanied 
by a debate on whether and how to attach such standards to trade deals. In 2007, 
Republicans and Democrats settled on a set of basic principles on environmental, labor, 
and intellectual property rights in trade negotiations known as the May 10th Agreement; 
still, on the details, there remains significant disagreement between the parties.  
 Notwithstanding this disagreement, the parties have been able to collaborate in 
using trade sanctions to punish other states’ human rights abuses.60 Human rights 
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continue to be the primary emphasis in the trade-labor rights positions taken by the EU.61  
While Europe and the United States have tried to connect labor standards and trade, 
developing countries have adamantly opposed it.62 Low-cost labor is frequently their 
primary comparative advantage and so they tend to see these connections as 
protectionism dressed in new rhetorical garb.  
 Finally, the growing recognition of climate change heightened the salience of the 
connection between trade and the environment. Environmentalists remain concerned by 
the impact increased trade may have on environmental protection but that does not mean 
that they oppose all trade liberalization; for most activists, the challenge is not to limit 
trade but instead to ensure that trade accommodates environmental goals. The European 
Union has sought to include environmental standards in its trade positions.63 In the 
United States, inclusion of environmental provisions in trade agreements has divided the 
parties in a similar way to labor rules. Underlying all of these demands for trade-
encompassing protections for consumers, laborers, and the environment is a strong 
preference for domestic rather than international regulation; not only do developed states’ 
citizens not trust developing countries’ regulations, they also consistently prefer their 
own country’s regulations over those of other developed countries.64  
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International Businesses Want International Rules 
     Multinational corporations on the other hand want just the opposite, international 
standards rather than a new rule for every state. Since the 1980s, international businesses 
have pushed their governments to reduce the extent to which national regulations inhibit 
their ability to profit from trade. Again, it was in Europe where this trend took place first. 
Businesses formed the vanguard in reducing regulatory barriers, both with respect to 
promoting mutual recognition and the Single European Act.65 
 Internationally-oriented European and American businesses worked together to 
promote the Uruguay Round. They were the main supporters of strengthening procedures 
used to address NTBs. The new SPS Agreement for example was a boon for international 
firms in three ways. First, it promoted the use of international standards set by 
organizations such as the Codex Alimentarius. The rule that regulations matching Codex 
standards would be considered WTO-compliant generated a powerful incentive for states 
to adopt Codex standards. The more states that adopt Codex standards, the more uniform 
regulations are across different states, and thus the fewer regulatory barriers blocking 
businesses from lucrative trade. Second, by forcing regulations that differed from 
standards set by these bodies to be based on science, the new SPS and TBT Agreements 
constrained states’ ability to create blatantly protectionist regulatory barriers.66 They also 
helped export-oriented businesses by alleviating the acute difficulties that regulatory 
barriers present for intra-industry trade. Third, business controls the lion’s share of 
representation at Codex; the more decisions that can be made at a forum dominated by 
business, the more influence business has over those regulations.67  
                                                
65 Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. p. 314-378.  
66 Obviously, where the science is contested, this mechanism is weaker at reducing regulatory barriers.  
67 Braithwaite and Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulations. p. 407-408.  
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 Internationally-oriented businesses have been the leading proponents of 
preferential trade agreements. They seek these reductions to take advantage of economies 
of scale and the efficiency gains from locating disparate production steps in different 
states. The Canadian debate over a free trade agreement with the United States pitted 
environmental and consumer activists opposed to what they saw as American regulatory 
imperialism against Canadian businesses eager to gain access to the massive U.S. 
market.68 North American businesses strongly supported the successor of the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA.69 
 In all of these cases, international firms pushed back against labor, consumer 
protection, and environmental activists opposed to trade liberalization. Businesses have 
not en masse rushed to locations with lower environmental and consumer protection 
regulations nor have they uniformly pushed for reduced standards in their home states.70 
Instead, they fought against those groups’ demands for specifically national regulations 
that force firms to maintain two production lines at great cost or forgo sales in a lucrative 
market. Businesses like to portray these regulatory differences as unnecessary red tape. 
When they push for regulatory trade barrier reduction, they find examples of seemingly 
pointless regulatory differences such as Canada’s unique deodorant rules that force 
Proctor and Gamble’s North Carolina factory to maintain separate production just for the 
Canadian market, and ask, tongue in cheek, whether “Canadian underarms [are] so 
                                                
68 Aaronson. 2001. Taking Trade to the Streets. 110-115. Hart, Michael, Bill Dymond, and Colin Robertson 
(eds.) 1994. Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiation. UBC Press: Vancouver.  
69 Lusztig, Michael. 2004. The Limits of Protectionism: Building Coalitions for Free Trade. University of 
Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh. p. 78-102.  
70 Porter, Michael. 1998. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. MacMillan: NY. Vogel. 1995. Trading 
Up. There are a number of other works that also demonstrate the rarity of businesses fleeing to jurisdictions 
with more lax standards. For a review of these, see Drezner. 2007. All Politics is Global. p. 14-17.  
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different that we need two sets of regulations?”71 Civil society groups respond with 
examples of national regulations that must be maintained to protect the citizenry.  
 The new, more robust WTO rules have heightened the drama of this regulatory 
struggle between businesses and advocacy groups by raising the stakes for all parties with 
an interest in the connection between trade and regulation. Under the GATT, even if a 
state was found to have violated GATT rules, the lack of enforcement capabilities meant 
such a ruling could often be prevented from having any material costs on that state. In 
contrast, the new WTO rules can force a state to change its regulations or face retaliation.  
Developing Countries and the WTO 
 The WTO and its rules were far-reaching in their implications for developing 
countries. The Uruguay Round left them disillusioned with trade rules. Though there was 
agricultural liberalization, developing countries- with sound justification- believed that 
agriculture in the Global North received far too much protection.72 They perceived the 
new WTO rules, especially the TRIPS, GATS, and TRIMS agreements, as limiting their 
regulatory flexibility to an even greater extent than they had initially feared and also 
believed that developed states were implementing their concessions in agriculture and 
textiles as slowly as possible.73 Given their belief that the Uruguay Round resulted in an 
agreement biased against them, and given that they were facing greater domestic 
difficulty in implementing it than they expected, developing countries were reluctant to 
agree to another WTO round that would expand still further the list of regulatory areas 
                                                
71 Jayson Myers, President of the Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters, in McKenna, Barrie. “In Cross-
Border Trade Rules, A Whiff of Pointlessness.” The Globe and Mail (Canada). February 14, 2011. 
72 Davis. 2005. Food Fights over Free Trade. p. 1-13. 
73 Smythe, Elizabeth. 2014. “Food is Different.” in Handbook of the International Political Economy of 
Trade. Deese, David (ed.) Edward Elgar: Northampton. p. 478-479. Trebilcock and Howse. 2005. The 
Regulation of International Trade. 472. Rivoli, Pietra. 2009. The Travels of A T-Shirt in the Global 
Economy, 2nd Edition. John Wiley: Hoboken. p. 170. 
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where they would be constrained by trade.74 Thus, in 1999 when President Clinton 
announced that labor and environmental regulations should be part of the trade regime 
and that sanctions should be used to enforce high standards in those areas, developing 
countries walked out, refusing to allow the launch of another WTO round.  
 Despite this rebuff, developed countries hoped to launch a new round in order to 
realize further trade gains. They recognized that agriculture remained highly protected 
and so agreed that a new round, the Doha Round launched in 2001, should focus on 
agriculture and other development-related issues. In return for concessions on these 
issues, the EU, and to a lesser degree the United States, demanded further regulatory 
constraints in four areas known as the Singapore issues: government procurement, 
investment, competition policy, and trade facilitation. Developing countries refused to 
include the first three in the negotiations.75 Given this blockage, the EU and Japan 
perceived that they would receive almost nothing in return and so had little incentive to 
make difficult agricultural reforms.76 The Doha Round has dragged on for over 14 years 
thus far and shows little sign of reaching a breakthrough on any issue other than the Bali 
Agreement on relatively minor trade facilitation rules. A major reason the Doha Round 
has failed is that it attempted to reduce regulatory trade barriers at a global level.  
Regulation and Trade Regionalism  
 The increasing centrality of regulation in trade negotiations thwarts 
multilateralism and thus promotes regionalism. In the post-Cold War era, regional trade 
agreements have proliferated at a remarkable rate. Given the glacial pace of progress in 
                                                
74 Liang, Wei. 2014. “Looking Back, Looking Forward: Multilateral and Regional Trade Governance.” in 
Handbook of the International Political Economy of Trade. Deese, David (ed.) Edward Elgar: 
Northampton. p. 401. 
75 Gallagher, Kevin. 2008. “Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round.” Review of 
International Political Economy. 15:1. p. 62-85.   
76 Liang. 2014. “Looking Back, Looking Forward: Multilateral and Regional Trade Governance.” p. 401.  
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the Doha Round, developed states have pursued trade liberalization at the bilateral and 
regional levels. By not diluting their bargaining power in the way that a multilateral 
negotiation would, bilateral and regional agreements provide states with large markets a 
greater opportunity to graft their regulatory preferences onto smaller states. The 
regulatory changes that these smaller states have been coaxed into making are more 
stringent than those mandated by WTO stipulations and so are often referred to as WTO-
plus or TRIPS-plus. Regulation is more central to these trade negotiations than it has 
been for any previous iteration of trade agreements, regional or multilateral. Two of the 
most significant manifestations of regulatory barrier negotiation combining with trade 
regionalism are the current negotiations taking place regarding the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).   
 The politics of the TPP primarily revolve around regulation. To wit, public health 
advocates have squared off against tobacco producers over Southeast Asian states’ 
regulation concerning tobacco.77 Unions remain skeptical that the labor standards 
components of the final agreement will meet their expectations.78 There is serious 
concern that the TPP would undermine various countries’ financial regulations. In 
Malaysia, there is apprehension over whether the TPP’s government procurement chapter 
will invalidate the country’s efforts to assist underprivileged minorities.79 Consumer 
groups worry that food safety regulations will be weakened.80 The intellectual property 
                                                
77 Kelsey, Jane. 2013. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Gold-Plated Gift to the Global 
Tobacco Industry?” American Journal of Law and Medicine. Vol. 39. 237-264. Stumberg, Robert. 
“Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA.” American Journal of Law and Medicine. Vol. 
39. p. 382-441. 
78 AFL-CIO. “Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement.” AFL-CIO Official Website.  
79 Hookway, James. “U.S. Trade Aspirations Could Spark Backlash in Malaysia.” The Wall Street Journal. 
April 26, 2014.  
80 Public Citizen. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Undermining Food Safety.” http://www.citizen.org/tpp-
food-safety-facts.  
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provisions that have been made public reflect the regulatory preferences of the 
pharmaceutical and entertainment industries, to the dismay of access to medicine 
advocates.81 Conversely, business organizations argue that regulatory harmonization is 
amongst the TPP’s biggest benefits.82  
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce highlights regulatory convergence as the single 
largest benefit of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).83 Civil 
society groups are more ambivalent toward TTIP than toward the TPP. Organized labor is 
more receptive to the TTIP than it is to the TPP.84 Some consumer advocates contend that 
regulatory cooperation is acceptable, especially if harmonization is upward, while others 
remain concerned that mutual recognition will lower standards.85 This greater comfort 
with the TTIP than the TPP can be accounted for with two explanations. First, TTIP 
negotiations are not as far along as the TPP and thus have not reached the same level of 
salience. Second, the U.S. and the EU are at similar level of development and generally 
have the same level of regulatory protection; the same cannot be said for many of the 
United States’ TPP negotiating partners. American labor and consumer activists trust 
European regulations far more than they trust Vietnamese regulations.   
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Conclusion 
 As tariffs and other non-regulatory measures secularly fell, the extent to which 
cross-national differences in regulation impeded trade became more clearer, especially to 
multinational firms. Once regulations became the subject of trade negotiations in the 
1980s, civil society groups with a vested interested in those regulations became involved 
in trade politics to a greater degree than ever before. Cross-national differences in 
regulation are the centerpiece issues in trade politics today. This is likely to continue 
being the case for the foreseeable future.  
 This political history reveals several dynamics that drive the international 
negotiation over regulatory trade barriers. First, the erosion of non-regulatory trade 
barriers has made regulatory trade barriers more apparent and more significant. Second, 
there have been significant divisions between developed and developing states regarding 
trade and regulation. Developed countries have often led the way in pursuing regulatory 
trade barrier reductions but developing countries have been wary of being locked into 
adopting developed countries’ regulatory preferences. Third, businesses have been a 
major driving force behind efforts to reduce regulatory trade barriers. Fourth, the 
incorporation of politically sensitive domestic regulations into trade negotiations led 
environmental, labor, and consumer advocacy groups to engage in trade politics to a 
greater extent. Fifth, the sensitivity of these regulations made reaching agreement in 
multilateral trade agreements more difficult and so contributed to the trend toward 
regionalism that has become so prevalent in global trade politics. Sixth, the intent of a 
regulatory trade barrier is often in the eye of the beholder; one group’s vital domestic 
regulation meant to protect citizens is another’s disguised protectionism meant to coddle 
underperforming but politically connected businesses. 
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Chapter 3- Competitiveness and Death: 
Explaining the Negotiations over Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 
Introduction 
 When the differences between countries’ domestic regulations impede 
international trade, the states involved have three basic options. They can reduce those 
regulatory barriers, they can increase them, or they can do nothing. This chapter explains 
when states are more likely to do each of these and why. My explanation involves 
examining the motivations of and interactions between three sets of actors: businesses, 
activist groups, and government officials. I argue that businesses are likely to succeed at 
reducing a regulatory trade barrier when they can link their desire for that reduction with 
broader concerns about economic competitiveness while activist organizations are likely 
to succeed at increasing regulatory trade barriers when they can link their desire for 
maintaining or increasing that barrier with preventing needless death.  
 In this chapter, I explain why the negotiations around regulatory trade barriers are 
in essence bargains between businesses and activists. I first discuss why businesses seek 
to reduce regulatory trade barriers and what can get them to end that pursuit. I then 
examine why activist groups seek to increase or defend regulatory barriers and what can 
get them to accept a reduction in those regulatory barriers. I investigate government 
officials’ two primary roles in regulatory trade bargaining, that of the champion and that 
of the marginalizer. I then discuss which political entities are likely to prevail in this 
bargain and why and in so doing lay the theoretical expectations for later chapters.  
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Business  
Why They Seek to Lower Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 Businesses’ initial growth occurs within a specific regulatory context.1 Successful 
businesses learn how to operate profitably within the rules that define that context.2 As 
firms grow still further, they increasingly seek out foreign markets and conduct business 
internationally. As they do this, they begin operating in regulatory contexts that may 
differ significantly from the one they are accustomed to. The multiplicity of regulations 
can be burdensome even if they are skilled at handling regulation. In pharmaceuticals, for 
example, the need to separately file for market access in disparate countries can add 
hundreds of millions of dollars in costs and consume valuable patent time, thus depriving 
the firm of significant revenue.3 The skills that firms have built to meet their home 
government’s regulatory demands may no longer be very useful in meeting their host 
government’s demands. Those businesses have stopped running a regulatory race and 
have started competing in a regulatory decathlon.   
 These regulatory barriers may threaten to deny businesses access to a lucrative 
market, thus undermining their global competitiveness. At the very least, these barriers 
can force firms to have multiple production lines. Sometimes these regulatory barriers 
can force businesses to engage in bizarre, efficiency-destroying behaviors. For example, a 
combination of tariff barriers and regulatory differences forces Mercedes-Benz and 
                                                
1 For a deeper theoretical treatment of firms as social constructs rooted in the context of their early ascent, 
see Prahalad, Coimbatore and Yves Doz. 1987. The Multi-National Mission: Balancing Local Demands 
and Global Vision. Free Press: New York. See also, Zysman, John. 1994. “How Institutions Create 
Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth.” Industrial and Corporate Change. 3:1. p. 243-283.  
2 Since this project is concerned with businesses’ approach to regulatory trade barriers, it largely bypassed 
the voluminous literature on corporate political activity more broadly except where it specifically relates to 
regulatory barriers. For a useful review of that corporate political activity literature, see Hillman, Amy, 
Gerald Keim, and Douglas Schuler. 2004. “Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda.” 
Journal of Management. 30:6. p. 837-857.   
3 Bach, David and Abraham Newman. 2010. “Governing Lipitor and Lipstick: Capacity, Sequencing, and 
Power in Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics.” Review of International Political Economy. 17:4. p. 675. 
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Freightliner to build their cargo-vans in Germany, take them off the assembly line, test 
drive them in Germany, partially disassemble them, ship them to the United States, and 
then reassemble them there.4 Obviously, there is zero business rationale for constructing a 
vehicle twice before it goes to the dealer.  
 This is not to say that business leaders see themselves as having no social 
responsibilities, but even the most responsible businessman will become frustrated when 
faced with a dizzying array of rule differences. There is no need to assume bad faith or 
dastardly motives on the part of business to recognize that, if given the choice, they 
would rather meet one standard than six.  
 For different reasons, both socially responsible and socially irresponsible 
businesses worry about the effects different standards can have on their competitiveness 
and so want one standard. The responsible ones want it to be a single high standard so 
that less scrupulous businesses do not gain a competitive advantage as well as to generate 
greater confidence in their particular industry and their firm.5 For example, European 
businesses that were forced to maintain public disclosure statements on environmental 
protection fought for and won requirements through the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) that forced non-EU businesses to maintain similar statements as 
well.6 Less responsible firms want a single standard set at a low level in order to avoid 
increased production costs. For example the shipping firms that value costs over safety, 
labor, and environmental standards have supported a flag-of-convenience system that 
                                                
4 Ewing, Jack. “Carmakers Are Central Voice in U.S.-Europe Trade Talks.” The New York Times. July 14, 
2014.  
5 See DeSombre, Elizabeth. 2000. Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, 
Environmentalists, and U.S. Power. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.    
6 Mattli, Walter and Ngaire Woods. 2009. “In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global 
Politics” in The Politics of Global Regulation Mattli, Walter and Ngaire Woods (eds.) Princeton University 
Press: Princeton. p. 35. Braithwaite and Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. p. 265-266.  
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amounted to a very low level of regulation.7 They may disagree on whether it should be a 
high or low standard, but both kinds of businesses want a single standard.  
 Businesses’ desire to reduce regulatory trade barriers has grown over the last 
several decades. As noted in Chapter 2, regulatory barriers have become the central 
impediment to international trade, and the extent to which they raise costs for businesses 
has increased. Both large and small businesses’ competitiveness can be undermined by 
regulatory trade barriers.  
 Firms in many industries have grown larger and more multinational as evidenced 
by expanding global value chains and production networks, increased foreign direct 
investment, and more extensive intra-firm trade.8 This in turn means they have a greater 
interest in multiple states’ regulations. As firms have come to rely on greater economies 
of scale and cumulative learning effects, the ability to gain access to many national 
markets became more important.9 These regulatory barriers also hamper small firms 
because the cost of complying with regulations often comprises a greater percentage of 
their overall costs. This is why, when the U.S. government created greater regulatory 
trade barriers in toys with the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, some 
smaller foreign toymakers were forced to pull out of the United States completely.10   
                                                
7 See Murphy. 2004. The Structure of Regulatory Competition. p. 45-71.  
8 On the expansion of global value chains, see the OECD, WTO, and World Bank joint report “Global 
Value Chains: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for Policy” prepared for the G20 Summit, July 
19, 2014. For a scholarly treatment of the subject, see Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy 
Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” The Review of International Political 
Economy. 12:1. p. 78-104. On the increase intra-firm trade, see Lanz, Ranier, and Sebastien Miroudot. 
2011. “Intra-Firm Trade: Patterns, Determinants, and Policy Implications.” OECD Trade Policy Paper No. 
114. OECD Publishing.  
9 Milner, Helen, and David Yoffie. 1989. “Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy 
and A Theory of Corporate Trade Demands.” International Organization. 43:2. p. 240-241, 245-246. 
10 Layton, Lyndsey and Annys Shin. “Toymakers Assail Cost of New Law.” The Washington Post. 
December 21, 2008. 
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 The increasingly capital-intensive nature of businesses’ production investments as 
well as the increasing imperative to market differentiated products further heightens the 
importance of economies of scale in trade and thus regulatory trade barriers.11 High 
multinational asset specificity (i.e. possessing resources that are multinational in 
character but specifically geared toward one kind of economic endeavor) also pushes 
firms to press for reducing regulatory trade barriers.12 The increasingly international 
nature of commerce, the greater need for economies of scale, and the more extensive 
capital-intensity mean that more businesses have exactly this kind of high multinational 
asset specificity.    
 Additionally, unlike their more nationally-based predecessors from earlier periods 
that, when faced with economic headwinds, sought protectionism from governments, 
contemporary businesses, due to their much more extensively international character, are 
instead more likely to ask for government assistance in gaining access to foreign 
markets.13 A good example of this was when Kodak, which was facing stiff competition 
from its Japanese archrival Fuji, instead of pushing for the U.S. government to grant it 
trade protection to help it strengthen its grip on the U.S. market, instead chose to lobby 
the U.S. government to reduce trade barriers that were impeding its ability to compete in 
the Japanese market.14 This same dynamic played out in the semiconductor trade as 
                                                
11 Hanson, David. 2010. Limits to Free Trade: Non-Tariff Barriers in the European Union, Japan, and The 
United States. Edward Elgar: Northampton. p. 3-4. 
12 Murphy, Dale. 2004. The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies in a 
Global Economy. Oxford University Press: New York. p. 18-19.  
13 Milner, Helen. 1988. Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
14 On this case, see Devereaux, Charan, Robert Lawrence, and Michael Watkins. 2006. Case Studies in  
U.S. Trade Negotiations Volume 1: Resolving Disputes. Institute for International Economics. p. 143-173. 
See also Baron, D. 1997. “Integrated Strategy in International Trade Disputes: the Kodak-Fujifilm Case.” 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. Vol. 6. p. 291-346.  
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well.15 The upshot to this approach is that businesses in the contemporary era pressure 
their home governments to get other countries to reduce regulatory barriers instead of 
pressuring that home government to increase its own regulatory barriers.  
 Finally, even when import-competing business seek protectionism, they are much 
more likely to ask for non-regulatory means of protectionism because those measures 
offer the same benefit without limiting businesses’ flexibility as new regulations would. 
For example, when American sugar producers demand protection from Australian 
competition, they do not ask Congress for a special regulation on how sugar must be 
produced but instead lobby to maintain a trade scheme built on tariff rate quotas and 
market allotments.16  
 When faced with regulatory differences, businesses have been in the vanguard in 
reducing regulatory barriers. Food industry firms have been the primary supporters of the 
Codex Alimentarius’ efforts to reduce regulatory barriers in food.17 The Motion Picture 
Association of America has been the biggest promoter of coordinating international 
copyright regulations.18 Pfizer led the charge to harmonize international regulations on 
intellectual property in pharmaceuticals.19 A timber firm, the Ecological Trading 
Company, and B&Q, the British version of Lowes, were the early business leaders 
pushing for green certification schemes and the creation of the Forestry Stewardship 
                                                
15 Cortell, Andrew. 1997. “Centralization, Access, and Influence: The Reagan Administration and the 
Semiconductor Industry Trade Complaints.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and 
Administration. 10:3. p. 261-285.   
16 On the sugar program, see United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. “Sugar 
and Sweeteners: Policy.” http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-sweeteners/policy.aspx. Accessed 
March 15, 2016. 
17 Braithwaite and Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulations. p. 401, 407-408.  
18 See Wang, Shujen. 2003. “Recontextualizing Copyright: Piracy, Hollywood, the State, and 
Globalization.” Cinema Journal. 43:1. 
19 Braithwaite, John and Peter Drahos. 2002. Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy. 
New Press: New York. p. 68-71.  
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Council, which has coordinated international regulations on timber.20 Chemical 
companies like Dow and Dupont have consistently pushed for reducing regulatory 
barriers in the chemicals.21 These are just of few of the many examples of this trend. 
 In sum, many modern firms have operations in many states, have large economies 
of scale, are capital intensive, and have high multinational asset specificity. They 
therefore push for a reduction in regulatory trade barriers because those barriers make 
them less competitive by A) raising production costs and B) inhibiting market access.  
The Considerations That May Provoke Business Apathy on Regulatory Trade Barriers  
 Though businesses have often pursued reduced regulatory barriers, they have not 
done so always and everywhere. Several considerations may convince them to simply 
accept a difference in regulation that raises the cost of trade. The regulation may be easy 
to handle. The Canadian requirement that new cars come with owners’ manuals in 
English and French is straightforward, reasonable, and cheap to comply with. Attempting 
to reduce these kinds of regulatory differences is a waste of resources and risks making 
that business appear implacable and extreme. Also, the consequences of regulatory 
changes in the context of international trade are often unclear.22 If a business cannot 
confidently say that a regulatory change will improve its competitiveness, there is no 
                                                
20 Conroy, Michael. 2007. Branded! How the ‘Certification Revolution’ is Transforming Global 
Corporations. New Society Publishers. Gabriola Island, BC. p. 63-79. 
21 On this point, see Brickman, Ronald, Shelia Jasanoff, and Thomas Ilgen. 1985. Controlling Chemicals: 
The Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. For a more 
recent analysis of how chemical firms have dealt with the regulations that emanate from societal demands 
for greater environmental protection, see Grant, Wyn. 2007. “Government Environmental Policy and the 
Chemical Industry.” in Galambos, Louis, Takashi Hikino, and Vera Zamagni (eds.) The Global Chemical 
Industry in the Age of the Petrochemical Revolution. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 114-137.   
22 Woll, Cornelia and Alvaro Artigas. “When Trade Liberalization Turns Into Regulatory Reform: The 
Impact on Business-Government Relations In International Trade Politics.” Regulation and Governance. p. 
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reason for it to pursue that change. This may be especially true for large multinational 
firms as a regulatory change may help one aspect of its business while hurting another.23 
 Pushing for a reduction in a regulatory trade barrier also risks generating a 
backlash if that reduction is seen to be undermining a highly valued public policy goal. 
Given firms’ growing reliance on brands to differentiate and sell their products, 
reputational damage is becoming a profound risk for businesses.24 Similarly, businesses 
may view a particular regulation as so firmly entrenched that political resources expended 
in trying to reduce that regulatory barriers are wasted. There is no point in attempting the 
impossible. 
 Sometimes, the existing regulatory framework, even if not the ideal solution from 
a business perspective, is good enough to elicit acceptance from business.25 An example 
of this is the Safe Harbor Arrangement that governed early iterations of e-commerce 
between the United States and Europe; while American businesses would have preferred 
regulatory harmonization based on U.S.-law, the Safe Harbor Arrangement was 
acceptable to U.S. businesses because it reduced data privacy regulatory barriers, just on 
a firm-by-firm basis.26   
 All of these factors mean that in many instances, businesses will lead the charge 
to reduce regulatory trade barriers but in many other instances they will remain 
undecided or apathetic when faced with trade-impeding cross-national regulatory 
                                                
23 On intra-firm disagreements, see Shaffer, Brian and Amy Hillman. 2000. “The Development of 
Business-Government Strategies By Diversified Firms.” Strategic Management Journal. 21:2. p. 175-190.  
24 Tucker, A. 2008. “Trade Associations As Industry Reputation Agents: A Model of Reputational Trust.” 
Business and Politics. 10:1. p. 1-26. Coen, David. “Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play 
Regulatory Games in European Utility Markets.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions. 18:3. p. 375-398.  
25 Coen, Grant, and Wilson. 2010. “Political Science: Perspectives on Business and Government.” p. 14. 
26 On the Safe Harbor Arrangement, see Farrell, Henry. 2003. “Constructing the International Foundations 
of E-Commerce: The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Arrangement.” International Organization. 57:2. p. 277-306.  
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differences. To summarize, firms choose not to push for regulatory barrier reduction 
because A) those regulatory differences are cheap to comply with or B) attempting to 
reduce those barriers would have severe reputational consequences.  
Business Motivations for Seeking Reduced Regulatory Barriers 
 
 
Factors That Weaken Businesses’ Motivation to Seek Reduced Regulatory Barriers 
 
 
Activist Groups  
Why They Seek to Raise Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 Just as businesses grow in specific political and regulatory contexts, the same is 
true for activist organizations. What gets many citizens to advocate for greater 
environmental protection is the sense that the air and water around them need cleaning 
up. These kinds of concerns were central to promoting the environmental movements in 
the United States and Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. What gets many citizens involved 
in consumer advocacy is the perception that some product they have purchased 
endangered them, and did so because the company that made it was malfeasant. It was 
that kind of concern that facilitated the rise of the consumer movements in the U.S. and 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Labor unions focus on local and national grievances.27 
Activist organizations exist to lobby the government for greater regulatory protection.  
 National governments’ leadership in regulatory matters means that citizens who 
care about a given regulation, or lack thereof, have an incentive to organize nationally.28 
                                                
27 On the connection between unions’ local goals and the international politics, see McCallum, Jack. 2013. 
Global Unions, Local Power: The New Spirit of Transnational Labor Organizing. ILR Press: Ithaca, NY.   
28 On the growth of the regulatory state in the United States, Europe, Latin America, and China, see Levi-
Faur, David (ed.) 2011. Handbook on the Politics of Regulation. Edward Elgar: New York. 
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The smog in Los Angeles in the 1960s was so thick that it was practically chewy. The 
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland was so polluted that it literally caught on fire multiple 
times. The entity with the power to do something about those problems was the U.S. 
federal government.29 Environmental protection in other states also tends to be built on 
national-level laws.30 The same is true for regulation on consumer protection and labor. 
This dynamic is not a product of a bygone era. As new technologies arise today they 
create similar calls for regulation. Almost as soon as firms started employing nano-scale 
particles and compounds in the first decade of the 21st century, activist groups became 
concerned about the risks they posed and lobbied governments to tightly regulate them.31  
 The chief environmental, consumer, and labor regulations that exist are not 
promulgated by the United Nations or other supranational organizations. Contrary to the 
visions of black helicopters that populate some American conservatives’ nightmares, the 
UN and other international organizations have little power to regulate on the ground 
except where they have the cooperation of national governments. States take the lead in 
regulation. This means that the chief targets of regulation-promoting activist groups are 
national-level government officials.32 Even when activists go ‘beyond borders,’ their 
                                                
29 On the environmental movement at this time, see Hays, Samuel. 1989. Beauty, Health, and Permanence: 
Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
30 See McCormick, John. 1991. Reclaiming Paradise: The Global Environmental Movement. Indiana 
University Press: Bloomington. See especially p. 125-148. Conca, Ken and Geoffrey Dabelko (eds.) 2010. 
Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of Global Environmental Politics, 4th Edition. Westview Press: 
Boulder, CO.  
31 See Friends of the Earth. 2006. “Nanomaterials, Sunscreens, and Cosmetics: Small Ingredients, Big 
Risks.” Friends of the Earth. 2008. “Out of the Laboratories and on to Our Plates: Nanotechnology in Food 
and Agriculture.” On the emerging regulation of these nano-technologies, see Bowman, Diana, and Graeme 
Hodge. 2009. “Counting on Codes: An Examination of Transnational Codes as a Regulatory Governance 
Mechanism for Nanotechnologies.” Regulation and Governance. Vol. 3. p. 145-164.  
32 In the EU, these may also be EU-level given that many regulations are promulgated at that level.  
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primary aims are usually to change national laws.33 For example, when European and 
Japanese environmentalists wanted to increase regulatory barriers on tropical timber to 
protect the rainforest, their primary target was the Malaysian government.34 
 This is a crucial point: given national government’s central place in modern 
politics, activist groups that exist to promote regulation do so largely at the national level. 
Each of these state’s laws are different. This means that even though these activist groups 
are not really trying to create trade barriers, that is de facto exactly what they do as a 
byproduct of their demand that those national government officials increase regulation. 
Four factors increase the extent to which these activist-promoted regulations impede 
international trade.  
 1) Regulations are often the most effective, enforceable means for activists to 
promote their causes. Consumer information campaigns rely on a series of assumptions: 
that consumers will receive the information, that they will understand the information, 
and that they will act on that information. All of these assumptions can, and quite often 
do, fail.35 Very few consumers are willing to pay more for goods produced in socially 
responsible ways.36 Activists also generally lack the resources to monitor or enforce 
firms’ compliance with civil regulations and private standards.37 Campaigns to get 
consumers to punish irresponsible firms via the market may work in some cases, but the 
                                                
33 See Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. p. 12-13. There are of course exceptions to this 
such as when these organizations lobby the UN directly.   
34 Keck and Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders. p. 150-164.  
35 See Hadden, Susan. 1991. “Regulating Product Risks Through Consumer Information.” Journal of Social 
Issues. 47:1. p. 93-105.  
36 Doane, Deborah. 2005. “The Myth of CSR: The Problem With Assuming that Companies Can Do Well 
While Also Doing Good is That Markets Don’t Really Work That Way.” Stanford Social Innovation 
Review. Mattli and Woods. 2009. “In Whose Benefit? p. 41.  
37 Vogel, David. 2009. “Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct” in Mattli, Walter and Ngaire 
Woods (eds.). The Politics of Global Regulation. Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
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rarity of that success means that activists often need to get government officials to force 
businesses to change their behavior if they want to see that change occur.  
 2) Activists are generally suspicious of business. They led the opposition to 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment precisely because they feared that it would 
empower businesses and that businesses would use that power to advance their interests 
in profit over the wellbeing of citizens.38 Consumer watchdog organizations exist to ferret 
out the incompetencies and misdeeds of businesses.39 Some environmental activists have 
adopted adversarial positions against business, focusing on naming and shaming rather 
than collaboration.40 Doctors Without Borders and other access to medicine advocates 
contend that pharmaceutical companies are so obsessed with profit that they will readily 
sacrifice the lives of millions of poor people.41 If business cannot be trusted to behave 
ethically on its own, then it logically follows that it must be forced to do so through 
government enforced regulation.  
 3) Raising the level of regulatory protection by emulating the state with the 
highest protection or convincing multiple states to adopt the same regulations would not 
create as many regulatory barriers, but this happen infrequently. That is because activists 
tend to distrust foreign standards at least as much, if not more than, those of their own 
country.42 For example, most Americans want to ban unpasteurized milk even though 
                                                
38 Walter, Andrew. 2001. “NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, Seattle, and Beyond.” Global Governance. p. 51-73.  
39 See Rao, Hayagreeva. 1998. “Caveat Emptor: The Construction of Nonprofit Consumer Watchdog 
Organizations.” American Journal of Sociology. 103:4.  p. 914. 
40 Newell, Peter. “Environmental NGOs, TNCs, and the Question of Governance” in The International 
Political Economy of the Environment. Dimitris Stevis (ed.) p. 95-99.  
41 Sell, Susan, and Aseem Prakash. 2004. “Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and 
NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 48. p. 163. Doctors 
Without Borders. “TPP Trade Deal Moves Toward Completion, Threatening Access to Medicine For 
Millions.” June 12, 2015.  
42 Vogel 1995. Trading Up. p. 196-197.  
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Europeans generally accept it, and Europeans want to ban hormones in beef that raise 
considerably less alarm in the U.S.43 This consumer distrust extends to other regulations 
as well. When asked about U.S. and German regulations in data privacy, food safety, 
environmental protection, and automobile safety, citizens of both states trusted their own 
country’s regulations more than the others.44  
 Citizens of developed countries are especially mistrustful of the rules in 
developing countries. Developed country citizens’ views on China are a good example of 
this.45 When asked what percentage of Chinese imports they believed violate U.S. safety 
standards, the mean U.S. citizen’s guess was 45 percent, and 74 percent of respondents 
reported being very or somewhat concerned about the safety of food imports from 
China.46 This skepticism toward China can be found in Europe as well.47 This dynamic is 
one of the reasons, though certainly not the only one, why OECD countries tend to 
liberalize trade among themselves, especially intra-industry trade, to a greater extent than 
they do with the Global South.48 
 4) Activists often do not prioritize trade expansion or believe that threatening to 
curtail trade is an effective way to promote their policy goals. Environmentalists have 
often associated trade liberalization with environmental degradation even though the 
                                                
43 Food Demand Survey. Oklahoma State University, Department of Agricultural Economics. 2:9. January 
16, 2015. p. 4. Deike, John. “Europe Installs Raw Milk Vending Machines While U.S. Rules Unpasteurized 
Dairy Illegal.” EcoWatch. March 11, 2014.   
44 Pew Research Center. “Support in Principle for U.S.-E.U. Trade Pact: But Some Americans and 
Germans Wary of TTIP Details.” April 9, 2014. 
45 On foreign confidence in China’s food safety system, see Wang, H. Holly, Robin Zhang, and David 
Ortega. 2013. “Chinese Food Safety Situation in a Globalized World Market.” Journal of Chinese 
Economics. 1:1. p. 114-124. 
46 Gallup/USA Today Poll, July 2007. Gallup Poll, August 2007. Both Retrieved August 17, 2015 from the 
iPOLL Databank, The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.  
47 Watts, Jonathan. “Made in China: Tainted Food, Fake Drugs, And Dodgy Paint.” The Guardian. July 5, 
2007. 
48 On this greater intra-OECD trade liberalization in intra-industry trade, see Madiera, Mary Anne. 2014. 
“The New Politics of the New Trade: the Political Economy of Intra-Industry Trade” in Handbook of the 
International Political Economy of Trade. David Deese (ed.) Edward Elgar: Northampton. p. 113-134.   
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evidence on that association is mixed.49 When they have advocated for linking trade with 
environmental goals, they have generally tried to use the threat of trade reduction as 
leverage to compel compliance with those goals.50 Examples of this include the 
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species agreement, the 
International Whaling Commission, and the Montreal Protocol.51 Activists have 
successfully inserted human rights clauses in the EU’s trade agreements.52 Unions, labor 
activists, and consumer organizations have employed similar tactics.53  
 An activist group’s trade views also play a role. If a group generally views trade 
positively, then a small attenuation in a regulation may seem to be a reasonably small 
price to pay. If a group already views trade negatively however, reducing that regulatory 
trade barrier is a foolhardy sacrifice that serves only to facilitate an additional hardship in 
the form of liberalized trade. 
 Consumer groups are a particularly interesting manifestation of activist 
organizations not valuing trade because they generally represent a group that, at least 
superficially, should support trade liberalization. After all, one of trade’s biggest benefits 
is that it lowers prices, which benefits consumers. Why then do consumer groups often 
advocate for greater regulation at the cost of trade? This paradox can be explained by 
                                                
49 For an overview of this mixed evidence see Van Alstine, James, and Eric Neumayer. 2008. “The 
Environmental Kuznets Curve” in Handbook on Trade and the Environment. Kevin Gallagher (ed.) Edward 
Elgar Press: Northampton, MA. p. 49-59. Copeland, Brian. 2008. “The Pollution Haven Hypothesis” in 
Handbook on Trade and the Environment. Kevin Gallagher (ed.) Edward Elgar Press: Northampton, MA. 
p. 60-70.   
50 Esty, Daniel. 1994. Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future. p. 137-154. Trebilcock 
and Howse. 2005. The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd Edition. p. 507-511. Vogel. 1995. Trading 
Up. p. 125-136. Vogel, David. 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating health, Safety, and 
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Gunnar Trumbull’s research on narratives. Trumbull argues that consumer advocacy 
groups rely on two main kinds of arguments: ‘narratives of access’ that call on the state to 
increase consumers’ access to certain goods and ‘narratives of protection’ that call on the 
state to protect consumers from the dangers posed by certain goods.54  
 Consumer advocacy organizations have historically rested on a foundation of 
affluence and have been primarily concerned with those issues that motivate their 
relatively well-off members.55 For these consumers, their affluence means that access to 
goods is generally less of a perceived problem that the potential dangers of substandard 
goods.56 Given this, with regards to international trade, consumer advocacy groups tend 
to be much more interested in narratives of protection than narratives of access. These 
narratives of protection lead them to ask for more specifically national regulation.  
 These factors lead activists to seek specifically national, or in the case of the EU, 
regional regulations regardless of the consequences for trade. To give just a few 
examples, U.S. consumer groups have demanded country-of-origin labeling which in 
effect, even if not in intent, disproportionately harms Canadian meat suppliers.57 
Greenpeace’s campaign against phthalates (chemicals that make plastic toys softer) led to 
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University Press: Cambridge, MA. p. 26-29, 124-150. 
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Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 74 
the creation of more stringent toy safety regulations in Europe, which created regulatory 
barriers in the toy industry between the U.S. and EU.58 Greenhouse gas regulations 
backed by European environmentalists have created regulatory trade barriers in 
refrigerators.59 American renewable and low-carbon fuel standards act as a regulatory 
barrier against Canadian energy exports derived from oil sands.60  
 To summarize, activist organization push for a regulatory barrier increase because 
A) they perceive a need to redress some societal problem and cannot achieve their goals 
through non-regulatory means, or B) they prefer to use trade curtailment over trade 
liberalization to promote their policy goals.  
The Factors That May Provoke Activist Apathy on Regulatory Trade Barriers 
 Like businesses, activist groups’ positions on regulatory barriers are shaped not 
only by their material interests, but also by their historical memories, their ideologies, and 
the way they define themselves.61 Activist groups often seek increased regulatory barriers 
but sometimes they choose to not care about a particular regulatory barrier. One reason 
they may do this is if that issue has low salience.62 Anthony Downs’ view that “most 
people are almost totally uninformed about most public issues” is bleak, but that does not 
make it entirely untrue.63  
 Activist groups have limited resources. If few of their members care about an 
issue or it does not fit the group’s mandate, then that group is unlikely to expend 
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62 Mattli and Woods. 2009. “In Whose Benefit? p. 4, 21.  
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resources defending that barrier. For example, prior to the 1970s, shipping regulations 
were not particularly salient for environmentalists and so they did very little lobbying on 
that issue. However, the growth in the size of ships as well as the increase in the number 
of ships combined with several high-profile spills elevated the salience of those 
regulations and so environmentalists began seeking more stringent shipping regulations.64 
Similarly, the salience of labor standards gained greater salience with the expansion and 
heightened publicity of the anti-sweatshop campaign in the 1990s.65 In both cases, the 
extent to which activists demanded regulatory changes that amounted to trade barriers 
was connected to the salience of those regulations. 
 The salience of a regulation depends on how tangible the regulations are and how 
direct the connection is between ordinary citizens’ daily lives and the regulation in 
question. If citizens cannot easily understand the regulation and cannot easily estimate 
how that regulation might affect them, that regulation is likely to remain un-politicized. 
For example, when U.S. and EU-based stock markets moved to reduce the regulatory 
differences between their accounting standards, activist groups took little if any notice 
and said nothing, mostly because accounting standards regulations are almost 
incomprehensibly technical to those who do not already work for accounting firms.66  
 This can be compounded when regulations are made at the international level. 
Because the process of making regulations in international forums is even further 
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removed from the public eye, the ability of a given regulation to gain salience may be 
undermined.67 On the other hand, some institutions that have traditionally not had much 
public involvement such as the Codex Alimentarius have been making special efforts 
over the last several years to more fully include NGOs in the policymaking process.68   
 How an NGO and the society it is embedded in perceive risk can also affect 
which risks must be regulated against and which can be tolerated.69 NGOs and societies 
that adopt more group and hierarchy-based orientations are often more predisposed to 
risk mitigation through regulation than those that adopt more individualistic 
perspectives.70 Relatedly, much also depends on just how adversarial the particular NGO 
is to business. Friends of the Earth, Public Citizen, and Greenpeace have been much more 
adversarial toward business than the National Wildlife Federation and the Environmental 
Defense Fund.71 Some activist groups are willing to work with business. Other NGOs 
consider that approach ‘greenwashing,’ i.e. a thin public relations veil that delivers 
undeserved legitimacy to activities that are still fundamentally dirty.72  
 An NGO’s acquiescence to regulatory trade barrier reduction can also be 
purchased. When businesses work with NGOs to promote reform through codes of 
conduct or private regimes, that often leads those NGOs to not press for government 
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regulation.73 Indeed, what defines a private regime is that is not state-enforced.74 These 
private regimes have grown considerably over the last two decades.75 Some examples of 
these kinds of NGO-business partnerships that avoid government-enforced regulations 
include the Fair Labor Association, the Marine Stewardship Council, and the Fairtrade 
Labeling Organization.76  
 Importantly, it is activist pressure that pushes businesses to agree to these. Issue 
areas where there is significant NGO activity comprise a huge share of all private 
standard regimes.77 Firms that engage in self-regulation are similarly attempting to pre-
empt state regulation.78 Sometimes the self-regulatory schemes are little more than flimsy 
shams designed to serve as public relations campaigns. One example of this was the 
chemical industry’s Responsible Care scheme after a major accident in Bhopal, India.79 
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In other instances, such as in the self-regulation done by Body Shop and Levi-Strauss, 
self-regulation can actually be quite robust.80 
 Activists’ acquiescence can also be bought by business agreeing to accept a 
higher level of regulation in exchange for a unified standard. This kind of buy-out is 
especially likely to occur in areas where businesses care more about the multiplicity of 
regulation than the level of regulation and where what constitutes an upward movement 
in regulatory protection is clear to all parties. The movement in regulatory trade barriers 
on automobile emissions covered in the auto industry chapter later in this book 
demonstrates this kind dynamic.  
 Finally, activists’ acceptance may also be purchased through those activities that 
are referred to as corporate social responsibility (CSR). The CSR activities of today have 
moved beyond the philanthropic gestures of the past and have taken on a more political 
character in that firms now often provide public goods and contribute directly toward 
society’s achievement of regulatory goals.81 Importantly, as with private standards, in 
most cases these activities are not idealistic attempts to promote the common good. 
Scholars have found that it is activists’ demands that are the primary stimuli that provoke 
businesses into implementing CSR strategies.82 In other words, CSR is a way of buying 
off activist groups. One example of this was when Swedish food retailers were able to 
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prevent environmentalists NGOs from undermining their sale of imported seafood by 
agreeing to sell only those seafood products that had been caught in sustainable ways.83  
 It is also worth pointing out that a successful buy-out of activist organizations 
usually amounts to a de facto buy-out of government officials as well. Government 
officials respond to pressure. If environmentalists accept a regulatory barrier reduction, 
why should the EPA stop it?    
 Activists are able to demand these buy-outs by presenting businesses with a 
choice: accept regulatory changes that increase trade costs or face significant reputational 
damage. This is exactly what Global Witness, an NGO that works on resource extraction 
in war zones, was able to do to DeBeers.84 It was able to get DeBeers to accept 
responsibility for keeping conflict diamonds out of the supply chain rather that foist that 
responsibility onto regulators. By acquiescing to NGO demands, DeBeers was largely 
able to avoid severe reputational damage and was able to shape the regulatory agreement 
known as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in ways that alleviated the extent 
to which the agreement raised trade costs.85  
 NGOs can also do this is by forcing firms to desist with some form of 
international commerce that the activist group, through a public relations campaign, has 
made too risky for their reputation. This is how the Free Burma Coalition, through a 
series of protests and lawsuits, was able to get Adidas and Costco to stop doing business 
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in Myanmar.86 They can also pressure a company to join a certification scheme in which 
the firm’s reputation is safeguarded so long as it meets the requirements of a third party 
that will vouchsafe its good character.87  
 All of these mechanisms rely on leveraging a firm’s concern for its reputation. 
These strategies are thus especially effective in situations where a company relies on its 
brand and where there is a direct connection between its production methods and 
consumption.88 A low-profile intermediate supplier may be somewhat less vulnerable, but 
a high-profile scandal involving a well-known brand can cost that firm a lot more than 
the cost associated with simply changing their production practices. Two of the most 
well-known chocolate brands are Hershey’s and Cadbury’s. When reports of forced child 
labor on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast surfaced in 2000, they were quick to work with 
NGOs to end labor abuses in their industry.89  The absolute last thing Hershey’s and 
Cadbury’s want people thinking about when they purchase chocolate is a child in slavery 
harvesting their bars’ main ingredient.  
  Activist groups that employ these strategies in an attempt to win a buy-out are 
aided by the fact that attempting to silence activist groups can easily backfire. For 
example, when Boise Cascade Lumber Company tried to have the IRS revoke the tax-
exempt status of the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) and then attempted to intimidate 
                                                
86 Spar, Deborah and Lane LaMure. 2003. “The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs on 
Global Business.” California Management Review. 45:3. p. 78.  
87 Bartley, Tim. 2011. “Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation” in Handbook on the Politics of 
Regulation. David Levi-Faur (ed.) Edward Elgar: New York. p. 441-452. Conroy. 2007. Branded. 
88 Conroy. 2007. Branded. p. 6-10.  
89 Schrage, Elliot and Anthony Ewing. 2005. “The Cocoa Industry and Child Labour” Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship. p. 99-112. 
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its funders with lawsuits, those moves only served to increase the profile and funding of 
the RAN.90  
 On the other hand, activist organizations do have to give up total control over the 
regulatory process if they want businesses to participate. An early environmental labeling 
push (Green Seal) excluded businesses, which meant that Consumers Union loved it, but 
also meant that firms such as Proctor and Gamble openly opposed it.91 
 The key point here is that businesses and activist groups may become politically 
engaged over a regulatory trade barrier but can also be convinced to remain politically 
inert on that issue. Should one of these sets of actors remain apathetic on a given 
regulatory issue, it becomes much easier for the other to dominate the policy 
entrepreneurship on that issue.  To summarize, activist groups choose not to resist a 
regulatory trade barrier reduction because A) the regulatory barrier is of such low 
salience that it does not justify expending resources to defend it, or B) the activist group’s 
opposition is bought out by business through private standards, self-regulation, corporate 
social responsibility, or a higher international regulatory standard.  
Activists’ Motivation to Defend Regulatory Trade Barriers 
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90 Conroy. 2007. Branded. p. 53-55, 242.  
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1. Perceive Problem That Cannot Be Addressed in Non-Regulatory Way 
2. Prefer Trade Curtailment to Trade Liberalization as a Policy Tool 
 
1. Low Salience 
2. Acquiescence is Bought Off Through Private Standards, CSR, or 
Higher International Regulatory Standard 
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Marginalizers and Champions- Government Officials in Regulatory Trade Politics  
 If government officials are involved in negotiations over a regulatory trade 
barrier, it means that business and activist groups both care about that barrier and were 
not able to reach agreement on some sort of private standard or other buy-out. At this 
point, business and activists are both likely to be lobbying the government for policy 
support. Each of them is attempting to convince government officials to marginalize the 
other. In fact, because activists and businesses are often so suspicious of each other, in 
many cases they would rather seek assistance from government first and cooperate with 
the other only as a last resort.92  
 Faced with these cross-pressures, government officials have three basic choices. 
First, they can champion business and marginalize activists. Second, they can champion 
activists and marginalize business. Third, they can refuse to take sides and instead 
encourage a buy-out. Government officials may of course seek to promote the interests of 
domestic firms.93 It was for this very reason that the U.S. Federal Reserve supported 
more stringent capital regulations in the Basel Accord while the Securities and Exchange 
Commission opposed more stringent capital requirements on securities under the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions.94 On the other hand, government 
officials may oppose businesses, even powerful domestic firms, if defending that 
business has severe reputational consequences. For example, even though Nestle is a 
                                                
92 Not only do NGOs and businesses frequently mistrust each other, they face other risks from collaboration 
as well. Business may become more vulnerable to NGOs while NGOs risk being perceived as sell-outs. 
Abbott and Snidal. 2009. “The Governance Triangle.” p. 61, 71, 80. 
93 Singer, David. 2004. “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization.” 
International Organization. 58:3. p. 543. 
94 Ibid. p. 545-549.    
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Swiss company, Switzerland’s government voted in favor of the WHO infant milk 
formula code of conduct out of concern for its international reputation.95  
 The relative political power of business and NGOs can have a significant impact 
on the incentives faced by a government official. Summarizing the literature on business 
representation in Washington, Coen, Grant, and Wilson note that “no group in the United 
States- certainly not the groups such as unions or public interest groups- that might be 
expected to clash with business commands anything like equal resources.”96 On the other 
hand, activist groups provide information, deliver legitimacy, and in some cases mete out 
electoral rewards and punishment. Still, despite these pressures, government officials are 
more than just blind ropes following wherever they are tugged hardest. There are four 
major sources of government officials’ agency: institutional indeterminacy, competing 
imperatives, expertise and staffing decisions, and government officials’ beliefs about 
their role and the proper approach to regulation.  
Domestic Institutional Indeterminacy 
 Government officials are not locked in place by their institutions.97 Institutional 
arrangements characterized by opaque and closed decision-making forums seem tailor-
made for industry capture. On the other hand, should government officials want to 
marginalize businesses, these kinds of institutions provide a means to do that. Promoting 
regulatory governance through networks is particularly prone to this given that those 
                                                
95 Sikkink, Kathryn. 1986. “Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the 
WHO/UNICEF Code.” International Organization. Vol. 40. p. 815-840. Keck and Sikkink. p. 29.  
96 Coen, David, Wyn Grant, and Graham Wilson. 2010. “Political Science: Perspectives on Business and 
Government” in The Oxford Handbook of Business and Government. Coen, David, Wyn Grant, and 
Graham Wilson (eds.) Oxford University Press: New York. p. 10-11.  
97 This paragraph draws Mattli and Woods. 2009. “In Whose Benefit? See especially p. 15-16. 
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networks tend to also inhibit broader policy participation.98 Conversely, institutional 
arrangements characterized by transparent decision making and open access are assumed 
to be friendlier to NGOs. However, many access points may in fact give businesses more 
opportunities to shape regulations to their benefit.99  
 Domestic institutions vary in other ways that may hinder or promote reducing 
regulatory barriers. First, they vary in their ability to provide timely information to key 
stakeholders, which affects how effective those stakeholders, usually businesses, can be 
in attempting to shape regulations being forged in international regulatory organizations 
such as ISO.100 This is helpful in explaining why firms whose home states have 
hierarchical institutions are generally more successful when lobbying standards bodies, 
but it does not explain whether government officials will be actively helpful to them in 
their attempt to reduce regulatory trade barriers or will oppose them. Second, there is the 
issue of equality in institution’s regulatory capacity. When one state has a highly 
developed regulatory capacity it is more likely to impose its regulations on products from 
other states that do not, but more likely to engage in regulatory cooperation with other 
states that have a similar level of regulatory capacity.101  
Competing Imperatives 
 One of the reasons why government officials’ behavior in regulation and trade 
cannot be easily predicted is that, within the realm of regulatory trade politics, they are 
often attempting to balance imperatives that run headlong into each other. South African 
                                                
98 Kahler, Miles and David Lake. 2009. “Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little 
Supranationalism.” in Mattli, Walter and Ngaire Woods (eds.). The Politics of Global Regulation. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 268-273.  
99 See Shapiro, Martin. 2001. “Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and 
Governance.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. Vol. 8. p. 369-377.  
100 Büthe, Tim and Walter Mattli. 2011. The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the 
World Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton. See especially p. 42-59.   
101 Bach, David and Abraham Newman. 2010. “Governing Lipitor and Lipstick: Capacity, Sequencing, and 
Power in Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics.” Review of International Political Economy. 17:4. p. 665-695.  
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officials for instance have struggled with how to best balance the need to attract foreign 
capital in order to promote employment growth and black economic empowerment while 
also increasing labor standards.102 
  Within governments there are often contradictory impulses toward business. 
American politicians have routinely advocated reducing the regulatory burden on 
business and yet the tradition of adversarial legalism pushes the entire governing 
structure towards conflict with businesses over regulations.103 Another example of these 
impulses is the desire within many industrialized countries to both promote market 
competition but accompany that promotion with even more detailed and comprehensive 
regulations to govern commercial activity within those markets.104  
Expertise and Staffing Decisions 
 Bureaucracies may develop their own systems of information gathering and 
expertise creation apart from the regulated interest.105 The type of people that a 
bureaucracy hires has significant implications for this. The U.S. Forest Service generally 
hires and promotes scientists whereas the U.S. Park Service hires few scientists; this 
                                                
102 Aaronson, Susan, and Jamie Zimmerman. 2007. Trade Imbalance: The Struggle to Weigh Human Rights 
Concerns in Trade Policymaking. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 78-84.   
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Regulatory Provisions in Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreements.” Competition and Change. 14:1. p. 48-79. 
Levi-Faur, David. 2005. “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism.” The Annual of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences. Vol. 598. p. 12-32.  
105 Moran, Michael. 2010. “The Rise of the Regulatory State” in The Oxford Handbook of Business and 
Government. Coen, David, Wyn Grant, and Graham Wilson (eds.) Oxford University Press: New York. p. 
395. 
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difference leads those two departments to have different cultures and take dissimilar 
positions on how best to manage wilderness areas.106  
 Hiring practices can have significant implications for government agencies’ 
positions on trade. A good example is the USTR’s staffing on issues that relate to 
intellectual property. The USTR hires people from IP-intensive businesses while those 
same businesses hire USTR alumni in what appears to be an epitome of a revolving 
door.107 The two lead negotiators of the intellectual property provisions in the 2004 US-
Australia Free Trade Agreement both received senior positions with pharmaceutical 
companies within three months after the agreement was signed.108  
 Perhaps the best demonstration of this revolving door is Kira Alvarez.109 Alvarez 
was the lead intellectual property negotiator for the USTR in the US-Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, and the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA). Alvarez then worked for the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly 
implementing their government affairs strategy on intellectual property. She then worked 
for Time Warner and later was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s co-chair on global 
intellectual property. She then went back to the USTR to be its chief negotiator on 
intellectual property enforcement. After that, she went back to the pharmaceutical 
industry again, taking a job with AbbVie.  
 The policy access given to IP-intensive businesses reinforces these hiring 
practices. For example, when the USTR held a meeting on Intellectual Property within 
                                                
106 Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. Basic 
Books: Boston. p. 63-64. 
107 Lee, Timothy. “Here’s Why Obama’s Trade Negotiators Push the Interests of Hollywood and Drug 
Companies.” The Washington Post. November 26, 2013. 
108 Garnaut, John, and Marian Wilkinson. “Plum Jobs for US Trade Deal Advisers.” Sydney Morning 
Herald. July 27, 2004. 
109 All of this information on Kira Alvarez can be found on her LinkedIn page.  
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the TPP negotiations at 11am on February 1, 2011 in Winder Room 305 of its 
headquarters, the attendees included Shawn Brown, Matthew McGrath, Ralph Ives (via 
phone), Claude Burcky, Trevor Gunn, Doug Nelson (all representatives of IP-intensive 
businesses) but did not include any representatives of access to medicines activists or 
public health organizations.110  
 The practice of ‘cleared advisers’ on this issue shows a similar pattern. Cleared 
advisers are people who are allowed to view confidential negotiating documents. Firms 
have had many of their representatives named cleared advisers; however, when asked 
about cleared advisers from non-business groups, a USTR spokesperson could not name 
a single cleared adviser from a public interest group or activist NGO.111 There is nothing 
illegal or corrupt in this relationship between the USTR and IP-intensive firms but it is 
without question a cozy relationship. It is not surprising then that the policy preferences 
of these firms enjoy serious clout within the USTR.  
Beliefs and Self-Identity 
 How government officials define their role can have a great deal of influence in 
terms of which constituencies they value most, who is supposed to be helped by a 
regulation, and what the proper relationship between business and government ought to 
be. Compared to their Swedish counterparts, American officials in the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration tend to be much more legalistic and have a much more 
adversarial relationship with business.112  
                                                
110 This list of attendees was emailed from Trevor Gunn to the other meeting participants email accounts 
with his gphaonline.org email account on Saturday, January 22, 2011 6:43 PM. This email was released 
under a FOIA request made by IPWatch.  
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 They also can define for themselves what their job actually is. USDA officials for 
example resisted being put in charge of nutritional assistance programs, i.e. food 
stamps.113 In the 1980s European Court of Justice judges sought to include themselves in 
adjudicating disputes over intra-European non-tariff trade barriers.114 These role 
definitions can be significant drivers of government officials’ decisions on regulatory 
trade barriers.115 The USTR for example has generally had a culture that prized free trade 
and so has been more apt to promote the interests of American exporters than look for 
ways to create barriers to foreign imports.116  
 Government officials may choose to do businesses’ bidding if they believe that 
pleasing business is a prerequisite for the economic well being of their constituents.117 
They may also simply have an ideological commitment to free trade.118  There is an 
international component to this as well. The internationalization of epistemic 
communities through networks and interpersonal communication can promote common 
understandings of regulatory issues and thus lead government officials to work toward 
reducing regulatory trade barriers.119 On the other hand, cross-national differences in 
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institutional arrangements and cultural beliefs about the underlying regulatory issues can 
thwart efforts to reduce regulatory barriers even in areas such as software patents where 
other considerations suggests there should be policy convergence.120  
 To summarize, government officials side with business and marginalize activists 
from the policymaking process on that issue if A) they care more about commercial 
expansion than regulatory independence, B) their staffing favors business, and/or C) they 
identify business as a core constituency. On the other hand, government officials side 
with activists if A) they care more about regulatory independence than trade generation, 
B) their staffing favors activists, and/or C) they identify NGOs as a core constituency.  
What Motivates Government Officials to Side With Businesses 
 
 
 
 
 
What Motivates Government Officials to Side With Activists 
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1. Care more about trade than regulatory independence 
2. Staffing and expertise favor business 
3. Identify business as a core constituency 
1. Care more about regulatory independence than trade 
2. Staffing and expertise favor activists 
3. Identify NGOs as a core constituency 
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Table 3.1- Summary of Motivations 
 
The Sequencing of Regulatory Trade Barrier Negotiations 
 On many occasions, the political negotiation over a given regulatory trade barrier 
is begun by business. In these scenarios, if the Motivation Set A outweighs Motivation 
Set B, businesses will seek to reduce regulatory trade barriers. Once businesses seek to do 
this, activist groups’ motivations determine whether they will resist this reduction or not. 
If Motivation Set D is equal to or greater than Motivation Set C, activist groups will not 
resist the regulatory barrier reduction. If Motivation Set C outweighs Motivation Set D, 
they will resist that regulatory trade barrier reduction. If that happens, at this point, 
government officials’ position becomes the determining factor. If Motivation Set E 
outweighs Motivation Set F, government officials will side with business and reduce the 
regulatory barrier. If Motivation Set F outweighs Motivation Set E, government officials 
will side with the activist groups and maintain the regulatory barrier. If government 
officials hold the two Motivation Sets roughly equal to each other, they will promote a 
buy-out between business and activists. On other occasions, the political negotiation over 
a given regulatory trade barrier is begun by activists. In these scenarios, the ordering of 
businesses and activists is simply reversed. These series of choices and the regulatory 
Set A: Business- Seek Reduction  Set B: Business- Inert  
1. Raise Production Costs   1. Reputational Consequences 
2. Inhibit Market Access   2. Firm Culture and Leader Values 
 
Set C: Activists Seek Increase  Set D: Activists- Inert  
1. Perceived Regulations as Sole Means 1. Low Salience 
2. Prefer Trade Leverage Over Expansion     2. Acquiescence Purchased 
 
Set E: Govt. Officials W/ Business  Set F- Govt. Officials W/ Activists 
1. Care More About Trade   1. Care More About Reg. Ind. 
2. Staffing Favors Business   2. Staffing Favors Activists 
3. Identify Business as Core Constituency 3. Identify NGOs as Core Constituency 
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trade barrier outcomes associated with those choices are encapsulated by the following 
flow-charts.  
If Business Moves First- Figure 3.1 
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Figure 3.2-When Activists Move First 
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Competitiveness and Death: Explaining Who Wins and Why 
 Businesses are likely to succeed at reducing a regulatory trade barrier when they 
can link their desire for that reduction with broader concerns about economic 
competitiveness. Activist organizations are likely to succeed at increasing regulatory 
trade barriers when they can link their desire for maintaining or increasing that barrier 
with preventing needless death. The reason each of these is true is that they augment that 
group’s motivation to engage in the political fight, weaken the other side’s resolve, and 
present government officials with a situation in which the overwhelming majority of 
incentives and ideas flow in one direction.  
Competitiveness 
 As I discussed earlier, businesses become motivated to lobby on regulatory trade 
barriers when those barriers raise production costs and/or inhibit market access, both of 
which directly undermine businesses’ competitiveness. The factors that reduce this 
motivation, cheap compliance and reputational concerns are also related to 
competitiveness. Cheap compliance means that regulatory barrier has little to no effect on 
that firm’s competitiveness while reputational concerns mean that despite the financial 
costs of a particular regulatory barrier, attempting to reduce that barrier could besmirch 
that firm’s reputation and thus do even more damage to that business’ competitiveness. In 
other words, those regulatory barriers related to competitiveness are the ones on which 
businesses will lobby the hardest.  
 This pattern occurs throughout the cases that are analyzed in the following 
chapters. In the early 1980s, the Big Three auto firms (Ford, GM, and Chrysler) fought 
hard to reduce labor-backed domestic content regulatory trade barriers precisely because 
those regulatory barriers were making them less competitive vis-à-vis Japanese 
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automakers. In Europe, the companies like Fiat and Peugeot that specialized in small cars 
fought hard against increased environmental regulatory barriers because those barriers 
threatened to annihilate their competitiveness in states like Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and Germany. They relaxed their opposition only after a series of developments made 
increasing environmental regulations no longer a throttle on their competitiveness. In the 
mid-2000s, U.S. beef producers stridently resisted Japanese safety-related regulatory 
barriers on beef because those barriers effectively prohibited them from competing in the 
Japanese market and because acquiescing to Japanese demands could have made their 
products less price-competitive against other forms of meat such as chicken and fish. 
Western pharmaceuticals firms became highly engaged in attempting to reduce 
developing countries’ intellectual property-related regulatory barriers precisely because 
those barriers were corroding their international competitiveness.  
 Crucially, competitiveness concerns are also significant drivers of government 
officials choosing to side with business in reducing regulatory trade barriers. When 
businesses can link their request for reduced regulatory barriers with broader concerns 
about the competitiveness of the country as a whole, reducing those barriers no longer 
appears to be a favor to business. Instead, it is a proactive, jobs-creating, economy-
boosting decision. Not only does it smoothly portray doing what is best for business as 
doing what is best for country, it also rhetorically delegitimizes opposing that reduction. 
If a regulatory barrier is perceived to be a matter of competitiveness, defending that 
barrier makes the country less economically competitive. No one wants their country to 
be less competitive.  
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 An additional reason why the narrative of competitiveness is effective is that 
many people, including government officials, continue to see economics as a 
fundamentally competitive activity. Economists would disagree, pointing to the 
innumerable ways in which economic activity is a positive-sum endeavor. That does not 
change the fact that many people, including government officials, find the language of 
competitiveness with regards to international economics to be intuitively appealing. 
 Furthermore, when competitiveness gains salience on the political agenda, it is 
often during a time of acute economic distress. Concerns about competitiveness during 
these times thus take on an air of crisis that government must do something about. 
Relatedly, government officials are more capable of reducing regulatory barriers during 
these times because moments of economic distress create policy windows in which 
altering trade policy becomes easier.121 
   The case studies analyzed in subsequent chapters demonstrate this pattern as well. 
Worries about continued economic malaise were a significant driver of European 
Community officials’ attempt to reduce intra-continental regulatory barriers in 
automobiles in the 1980s. Concerns that Korean firms would gain a competitive edge 
over Japanese firms in terms of exports to America was one of the reasons why Japanese 
government officials were willing to reduce the regulatory barriers in the U.S.-Japan beef 
trade in 2013. U.S. government officials connected stringent intellectual property rights 
with American firms’ competitiveness during the negotiation of the Uruguay Round and 
so were eager to reduce the regulatory barriers between developed and developing 
countries. These same competitiveness-based motivations led U.S. government officials 
to work with the Big Three automakers to marginalize labor unions and reduce domestic 
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content regulatory barriers. The most significant reductions in regulatory trade barriers in 
the cases analyzed in this book were all accompanied by competitiveness concerns. That, 
more than anything else, explains when regulatory trade barriers get reduced. 
Death 
 As I discussed earlier, activist groups may remain inert on a particular regulatory 
trade barrier if that regulatory barrier has low salience or their opposition can be bought 
off through private standards, corporate social responsibility, or some other arrangement 
in which businesses are not directly regulated by government. When activist groups 
perceive a regulation as being necessary to prevent needless death, neither of those is 
likely. To state the obvious, death grabs attention and concerns citizens as few, if any, 
other things do. Death raises the salience of an issue. It is clear. It is tangible. It motivates 
people. This is especially the case when the timeline and the casual connection between 
the regulatory mistake and the needless death are short.  
 Death does not just motivate activist groups. It also shifts the political terrain in 
ways that fundamentally increase activists’ chance of lobbying success. Not only does 
death motivate activists, it can cow businesses by presenting them with severe 
reputational risks and so weakens the political force that might oppose activists’ call for 
greater regulatory barriers.   
 At a basic level, the government’s core responsibilities all revolve around prevent 
unnecessary deaths among the population. It is why we have armies, health care systems, 
government-funded cancer research, policemen, firemen, food inspection, building codes, 
water treatment facilities, a National Weather Service, bridge standards, and consumer 
safety warnings. Preventing death is what government does. The birth of modern 
regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries centered on food and drug 
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safety because business ineptitude, and in some cases mendacity, led to people dying. 
Activist groups, and citizens more generally, are unlikely to accept the notion that the 
government should stand by and do nothing when, through regulation, it could prevent 
needless death.  
 Government officials are people too. At least in decently run places, those 
officials do not want their citizens to die needlessly either and so their motivation to 
maintain those regulations is also increased. The pressure that activists can bring to bear 
on these issues is unlikely to be lost on those government officials. Furthermore, on 
regulations that pertain to preventing death, those government officials are more likely to 
value regulatory independence over trade and, given the engagement of activist groups, 
are more likely to identify NGOs as their core constituency. In summation then, when a 
regulatory trade barrier is perceived to pertain to preventing needless death, activists get 
motivated, businesses get quiet, and government officials get involved. 
 The case studies analyzed in subsequent chapters bear out this pattern. Regulatory 
barriers in automobiles were reduced within Europe and within North America. However, 
the primary barriers that were reduced were related to emissions in the case of Europe 
and domestic content in the case of North America. Neither of those had to do with 
preventing death. The primary regulatory barriers between the regions, safety differences, 
have been maintained. They have everything to do with preventing death. Consumer 
advocacy groups and government officials on both sides of the Atlantic have fought to 
maintain those regulatory barriers.  
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as mad-cow disease, is a 
neurological disease in cows. When humans consume beef from cows infected with BSE, 
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they may get variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s Disease (CJD). CJD is fatal and has no known 
cure. When Japanese consumer groups were defending Japan’s stringent anti-BSE 
countermeasures, they were doing so to prevent needless deaths. It was only when BSE 
became more fully contained, and the concerns about BSE and needless death subsided 
that Japanese consumer groups and government officials were more willing to reduce 
regulatory trade barriers in the U.S.-Japan beef trade.  
 The AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa was death on a massive scale. Access to 
medicine advocates held that stringent intellectual property regulations as enforced by the 
TRIPS Agreement were making drugs too expensive for AIDS victims and so causing 
needless death. These activists along with developing country officials fought vigorously 
to solidify policy space in the Doha Declaration and so increase regulatory trade barriers 
related to intellectual property by increasing international regulatory diversity in the 
policy area. 
 In the cases analyzed in this book, the most resilient stasis in regulatory trade 
barriers and the most significant increases in those barriers were distinguished by serious 
concerns that relaxing those regulatory barriers would lead to needless death. That, more 
than anything else, explains when regulatory trade barriers get maintained or increased. 
Alternative Explanations 
Cleavage-Based Theory 
There are of course a number of theories that already exist which seek to explain 
trade politics, however; they all struggle to fully capture the dynamics that surround 
regulatory trade barriers. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the cleavage-based explanations 
struggle to explain trade politics that involve regulations. As I have showed in chapter 2, 
cross-national differences in regulation have become the most prominent issue in 
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international trade politics and continue to grow even more important. Thus, the failure to 
explain regulatory trade barriers constitutes a large and expanding blind spot for the 
standard cleavage-based explanations. 
Business Dominates 
 Second, there is the prominent explanation that large corporations that are able to 
effectively lobby governments drive international trade policy.122 We might call this the 
business dominates hypothesis. The imagery of a businessman puppeteering government 
officials to deliver special privileges through protectionism goes back to one of the 
earliest political science works on trade, Schattschneider’s Politics, Pressures, and the 
Tariff.123 In its modern manifestations, especially among anti-globalization activists, this 
explanation ignores the fact that government officials are capable of telling business ‘no’ 
when they want to.124 This argument has also been cast in a class-based context by some 
scholars who argue that the business class has effectively imposed its neoliberal views 
and promoted commerce over non-commercial public policy goals.125  
 In many instances, government officials do adopt positions that help business, but 
it is an unhelpful exaggeration of businesses’ political power to assume that must happen. 
This is especially the case because activist organizations can exert significant pressure on 
                                                
122 For example, see Stiglitz. 2006. Making Globalization Work. Stiglitz, Joseph. 2002. Globalization and 
Its Discontents. W.W. Norton and Co.: New York. See also Braithwaite, John and Peter Drahos. 2000. 
Global Business Regulation. Cambridge University Press: New York. See especially page 27. To be fair, 
Braithwaite and Drahos do not reductively suggests that businesses are the only actors that have influence, 
but they do generally argue that businesses are the most powerful societal actors in shaping global trade 
regulations. 
123 Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
124 For examples of this, see Korten, David. 2001. When Corporations Rule The World, 2nd Edition. 
Kumarian Press: New York. Wallach, Lori, and Michelle Sforza. 1999. The WTO: Five Years of Reasons to 
Resist Corporate Globalization. Seven Stories Press: New York. Beder, Sharon. 2006. Suiting Themselves: 
How Corporations Drive the Global Agenda. Routledge: New York. See especially pages 109-172. Klein, 
Naomi. 2009. No Logo, 10th Anniversary Edition. Picador Press: New York. Brinkman, Joseph and June 
Brinkman. 2013. Corporate Pharaohs: A Vicious Circle of Globalization. XLIBRIS Press: New York. 
125 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. 2002. Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle Over European Integration. 
Routledge: London. Bieling, Hans-Jurgen. 2007. “The Other Side of the Coin: Conceptualizing the 
Relationship Between Business and the State in the Age of Globalisation.” Business and Politics. 9:3.  
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government officials as well. One example of this was in the collapse of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI). Businesses wanted the MAI very much but the trade 
negotiators from the United States and European Union were forced to abandon the MAI 
when activist organizations were able to successfully portray it as a giveaway to big 
business.126 
 In some ways, regulatory barriers might even be seen as an easy case for this 
hypothesis because businesses are often seen as the primary drivers of regulatory politics 
as well.127 Because regulatory trade barriers should be an easy set of cases for the 
business dominates hypothesis, its failure to adequately explain them, as I will show in 
the case studies to come, constitutes particularly damaging counter-evidence against it.  
Disguised Protectionism 
 A third argument is that regulatory trade barriers are nothing more than clever 
means of protecting domestic businesses from foreign competition.128 The WTO limits 
tariffs and other non-regulatory trade barriers to such an extent that when a government 
wants to protect a domestic business from international competition, cleverly written 
regulations that hamper foreign firms more than domestic firms, but with a specious 
                                                
126 On the MAI, see Devereaux, Charan, Robert Lawrence, and Michael Watkins. 2006. Case Studies in 
U.S. Trade Negotiations Volume 1: Making the Rules. Institute for International Economics. p. 135-182. 
127 This idea was perhaps most famously summarized by George Stigler’s widely cited argument that “as a 
rule, regulation is acquired by industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” Stigler, 
George. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science. 
p. 3.   
128 Sykes, Alan. 1999. “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade.” University of 
Chicago Law Review. 66:1. p. 1-46. Runge, C. Ford. 1990. “Trade Protectionism and Environmental 
Regulations: The New Nontariff Barriers.” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business. 11:1. 
p. 47-61. Baldwin, Richard. 2000. “Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations, and A Two-Tier World 
Trade System.” Discussion Paper No. 2574. Center for Economic Policy Research. Watson, William and 
Sallie James. Cato Institute Policy Analysis Paper No. 723. April 9, 2013. Evenett, Simon and John 
Whalley. 2009. “Resist Green Protectionism- or Pay the Price at Copenhagen” in The Collapse of Global 
Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20. Richard Baldwin and Simon 
Evenett (eds.) Center for Economic Policy Research. p. 93-98. 
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public safety justification, are one of the few efficacious tools of trade protectionism that 
governments have left. 
 This line of argument is quite common because it comports with the mildly 
cynical view of the political process held by many people. Government officials 
delivering protectionism to favored local constituencies and then pretending they were 
motivated by nobler and less parochial goals sounds like exactly the kind of thing we 
expect politicians to do.  
 Despite its intuitive appeal, there are several reasons to be skeptical of this 
argument. First, regulations limit businesses’ flexibility in ways that other means of trade 
protection do not. Countervailing duties for instance do not tell a business how it must 
conduct its affairs in the way that labor, environmental, or safety regulations do. Given 
this, when import-competing business seek protection from foreign competition, they are 
much more likely to ask for non-regulatory means of protectionism.  
 Second, there is also the fact that trade rules are much more effective at 
preventing this sly protectionism than they once were. Regulation as disguised 
protectionism did occur in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, many of the most famous 
examples of transparently protectionist regulations are from this period. For instance, in 
an effort to boost Japan’s nascent ski equipment industry, the Japanese government 
attempted to ban foreign ski equipment on the grounds that Japanese snow was “special” 
and that this “special” snow fell on every mountain in Japan.129 Ontario’s environmental 
rules on bottles were designed more for the purpose of curtailing American beer imports 
that protecting nature; what made this goal transparent was that those rules were not 
                                                
129 Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. p. 153.  
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applied to soda.130 New WTO rules under the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds largely 
curtailed that.  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos explain this change well and are worth 
quoting at length: 
“Under the old regulation of national sovereignty, it would be common for South Korea, 
for example, to do the regulatory bidding of Hyundai in a smoke-filled room when 
Hyundai wanted a new non-tariff barrier. The national sovereign would not be required to 
provide good reasons; there was no risk that its reasoning might become known to 
consumer groups, let alone excoriated by their critiques. The post-1980 global regulatory 
order no longer works this way. South Korea will have to give reasons for the regulation, 
in Geneva. These reasons will be exposed to critique by hostile foreign firms, by 
independent professionals from non-manufacturing states or from the Society of 
Automotive Engineers, and by consumer advocates. If the standard is a spurious one, the 
South Korean public will find out by Consumers International passing the information to 
Korean consumer groups. South Korea will risk a WTO complaint and panel hearing over 
the non-tariff barrier and it may jeopardize type approval of its vehicles in states that 
have performance standards which are deliberately defensible.”131 
 Given that businesses in the contemporary context are unlikely to demand 
regulatory protectionism and that government officials are far less capable of granting 
that protectionism than they once were suggests that the sneaky protectionism argument 
may not be a particularly helpful explanation despite its intuitive appeal.  
The California Effect 
 Fourth, David Vogel argues that trade, rather than creating a race to the bottom, 
can encourage states to raise their environmental and consumer safety standards.132 This 
                                                
130 Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 229-231.  
131 Braithwaite and Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. p. 453. 
132 Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up. The race to the bottom has been thoroughly discredited elsewhere. For 
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See Radaelli, Claudio. 2004. “The Puzzle of Regulatory Competition.” Journal of Public Policy.  24:1. p. 3. 
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explanation was called the California Effect after an eponymous example in his book. 
California set high auto emissions standards, German automakers manufactured their cars 
to meet those standards, and then, because they did not want to maintain two production 
lines or be disadvantaged in competition with domestic-only firms, successfully lobbying 
the German government to raise its emissions standards to the California level.133   
 There were three central elements to the California Effect.134 First, businesses will 
support stricter regulations when those stricter regulations make them more competitive. 
Second, richer states with higher standards force producers in other states to raise their 
standards in order to export to them and so de facto raise foreign standards. Third, trade 
agreements give richer states with higher standards leverage to pressure other states to 
raise their standards to the richer states’ level. Nevertheless, discrepancies between the 
expectations of the California Effect and empirical realities have shown that Vogel’s 
explanation though quite good, was incomplete.  
  The California Effect largely ignores government officials’ beliefs. That is 
problematic given that those officials are the people who write the regulations and who 
do the negotiating over international trade agreements. Government officials must 
evaluate the utility of raising regulations, the utility of promoting commerce, and the 
relationship between those two goals. If government officials believe that raising 
regulations and liberalizing trade are mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting goals, 
that is likely to have a huge impact. If they believe that potential increases in regulation 
are wrong-headed and/or represent an unacceptable curtailment of commerce, that too is 
likely to matter a great deal. Can societal actors persuade government officials on various 
                                                
133 Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 95, 259. 
134 These three elements are covered in Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 259-268. 
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matters, provide useful information, and exert political pressure on those officials? Of 
course, but that does not imply that those officials do not have ideas or that those ideas 
have not influence. 
 The California Effect also largely under-theorizes the construction of a state’s 
regulatory trade preferences. Why is exactly is a greener state greener? Within the case 
material covered in Trading Up, this often gets addressed, but within the California 
Effect theory itself, it is nowhere to be found. The demands on the state for stricter 
regulations come from somewhere and that somewhere needs to be explained. By 
ignoring activist organizations, the California Effect discards a variable that may be 
critical to explaining which regulations a state wants to raise and on which regulations it 
is willing to compromise for the sake of trade liberalization.  
 Finally, the California Effect overemphasizes the role of market power in 
regulatory trade politics.135 In the California Effect, as well as other explanations 
discussed below, it is asserted that market power matters because it gives states leverage 
in the form of threatening to deny another state and its businesses access to that lucrative 
market. The underlying thrust of that argument is that a smaller state, even if it wants to 
fight hard on its regulatory preferences, will eventually yield to the richer state’s demands 
because access to that richer state’s market presents such an enormous economic 
opportunity for the poorer state’s exporters. Undoubtedly, there is some truth to this 
argument. Trade agreements do present exporters with significant market access 
                                                
135 Vogel’s California Effect is not the only trade politics explanation that relies on power and leverage to 
do much of its analytical lifting. Beth Simmons for example has argued that market power gives some 
states a dominant position that allows them to promulgate regulatory innovations that other states must 
respond to. Relatedly, it allows that state to graft its regulatory preferences on to smaller states. Simmons, 
Beth. 2001. “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation.” 
International Organization. 55:3. p. 589-620.     
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opportunities and those exporters are likely to press their governments to pursue that 
access. Still, the market power argument overestimates the pliability of states’ 
regulations.  
 Labor, environmental, and consumer regulations are often sensitive topics. 
Changing them within a trade context may sometimes have the backing of activist 
organizations, as it did when Mexican environmentalists supported changes in their 
countries environmental regulations under NAFTA. In many other contexts though, 
attempts to change regulations within a trade context may run into strident opposition. 
Government officials changing these regulations for the sake of trade promotion risks 
being labeled a sell-out or a lackey.  
 The market power argument also assumes that government officials prize 
promoting commerce over maintaining regulatory independence. Again, that may be the 
case, but it is far from automatic. Finally, one must keep in mind that there are limitations 
to just how much the state with stricter regulations is willing and able to demand from 
other states within a trade negotiation. If a state with higher standards in one issue wants 
to complete a trade agreement with a state that has lower standards in that area, will it 
really be willing to jeopardize the success of that trade negotiation over a disagreement 
on a regulation in that policy area? The California Effect cannot answer this.  
 Even the United States, the country with the most market power leverage, is 
constrained in its ability to deploy that power. That is not to say that market power has no 
significance. It clearly does. But it does not have the significance that Vogel and others 
claim. In summation then, the California Effect can be improved upon by adding 
government officials’ beliefs to the analytic mix, by building a more substantial 
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explanation of state preferences in regulatory trade politics, and by shrinking though not 
eradicating the emphasis placed on market power.  
State-Centric Explanations 
 Fifth, Stephen Krasner and Joseph Grieco depict the intersection of trade and 
regulation as a distributional conflict with the winner determined by political power.136 In 
this depiction, states spar to see who can write the rules with the winning state framing 
them in such a way as to benefit itself directly or at least benefit its businesses.137 In this 
depiction, societal actors can be ignored and the state’s preferences can be assumed.  
 This state-centric depiction is parsimonious, but it assumes away many factors 
which may have a profound effect on the ultimate outcome of an international negotiation 
at the intersection of trade and regulation. If a state is assumed to have only one 
overarching objective in mind, win the struggle to write the rules, then it logically follows 
that the state will pursue that objective single-mindedly. To make that assumption, it 
helps tremendously to speak of country A wanting X and country B wanting Y, and in so 
doing, assume away the cacophonous debates that accompany political decision-making. 
Assuming that each of multiple unitary states wants to “win” almost inescapably leads to 
the conclusion that the winner is determined by who is stronger. 
 At the intersection of trade and regulation these assumptions befog more than they 
illuminate. At that intersection, states do not have one primary goal, win; they have two, 
                                                
136 See for example, Krasner, Stephen. 1991. “Global Communication and National Power: Life On the 
Pareto Frontier.” World Politics. 43:3. p. 336-366. Grieco, Joseph. 1990. Europe, America, and Non-Tariff 
Barriers to Trade. Cornell University Press: Ithaca.  
137 For a recent example of this perspective, see Quark, Amy. 2013. Global Rivalries: Standards Wars and 
the Transnational Cotton Trade. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago. See also Stopford, John, and 
Susan Strange. 1991. Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. Genoways, Ted. “Corn Wars.” The New Republic. August 16, 2015.  
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economic benefits and social regulation autonomy.138 States want both the economic 
benefits that derive from trade and the autonomy that comes with being able to set 
regulations completely independently. These two goals are frequently in tension. 
Agreeing to reduce regulatory trade barriers with another state delivers economic benefits 
at the cost of having specifically national regulations that can be changed on a political 
whim. Erecting regulatory trade barriers creates greater regulatory independence at the 
cost of trade-related economic benefits. States have these multiple goals because they 
have multiple actors in their societies who make disparate and often contradictory 
demands on government officials. This multiplicity of demands means that states’ 
international behavior, and thus international negotiation outcomes, are likely to vary 
with the intensity and effectiveness of the societal demanders as well as the proclivities of 
the governmental demandees.  
 This state-centrism is shared by Dan Drezner’s revisionist theory of international 
regulatory outcomes. Drezner argues that the distribution of great power preferences and 
the distribution of preferences between the great powers, the United States and the 
European Union, and other international actors, smaller states and NGOs, are the key 
independent variables in explaining regulatory outcomes.139 For Drezner, domestic actors 
are important only insofar as they raise the adjustment cost to regulatory coordination. In 
Drezner’s telling, on a given issue, government considers pursuing regulatory 
coordination and domestic actors become important only to the extent that they make 
                                                
138 This point is essentially the trade corollary of Polanyi’s double movement and Ruggie’s embedded 
liberalism, which both dealt with the uneasy coexistence of social protection and commercial liberalization. 
Polanyi, Karl. 2001 [1944]. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 
Beacon Press: Boston. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization. 36:2. p. 379-415. 
139 Drezner. All Politics is Global. p. 72.  
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government pay a price for pursuing that coordination. This fits with his approach of 
generally dismissing societal actors’ importance. He specifically argues that he believes 
that NGOs and businesses “function as intervening variables, not as underlying causes” 
and that the accurate causal story on regulatory outcomes is one in which “corporations 
and transnational activist networks do not appear.”140 
 On this point, Drezner’s view is flawed. The business community is an important 
domestic constituency. When it cares about an issue, its preferences matter. Indeed, in a 
review of international regulatory schemes, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal find very 
few instances in which businesses’ preferences were not significant factors.141 Though 
they are often but not always outgunned by business interests, activist organizations such 
as consumer groups and environmental advocacy NGOs matter as well.142 An explanation 
of trade and regulation requires taking into account the preferences and political 
strategies of those groups who are directly affected by that regulation. Ignoring societal 
actors is unhelpful as it leads to a serious under-theorization of state’s preferences. 
Conclusion 
 To summarize, businesses seek to reduce regulatory trade barriers when those 
barriers raise production costs or inhibit market access. They may however choose to end 
that pursuit if those regulations are cheap to comply with or pursuing their reduction 
carries major reputational risk. Activist groups defend regulatory barriers when they 
perceive those regulations to be the sole effective means to address a societal problem 
                                                
140 Drezner. All Politics is Global. p. xii-xiii.  
141 Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 2009. “The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State” in The Politics of Global Regulation. Mattli, Walter and Ngaire 
Woods (eds.) Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 50-51. 
142 Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk provide strong evidence against the notion that corporations are all 
powerful in their examination of how businesses were unsuccessful in defending regulations that limited 
competition to their benefit. Derthick, Martha, and Paul Quirk. 1985. The Politics of Deregulation. The 
Brookings Institution: Washington.    
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they are concerned about. They may accept a reduction in regulatory barriers if those 
barriers have low salience or their opposition is bought out through private standards, 
corporate social responsibility, or some other arrangement in which businesses are not 
directly regulated by government. Government officials choose whether to side with 
businesses or activist groups based on their relative prioritization of trade and regulatory 
independence, their staffing, and whom they identify as their core constituency. Concerns 
about competitiveness stack these factors in favor of reducing regulatory trade barriers. 
Concerns about needless death stack them in favor of maintaining or increasing those 
barriers.
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Chapter 4- Automobiles and Regulatory Regionalism in North America and Europe 
Introduction 
 By almost any measure, the automotive sector is massive in scale and 
significance. It accounts for three trillion dollars of global economic output per year.1 
Auto manufacturing employs close to a million people in the United States without even 
counting dealers and mechanics.2 A car is amongst the most important purchases many 
people make. Given the international nature of automobile production and the sheer 
volume of the trade in automobiles (1.3 trillion dollars in 2013), automobiles are 
inextricably bound up in trade politics.3 Automobiles are also highly regulated. From the 
horn’s decibel level to the exhaust’s content, essentially everything about a car is 
regulated in one way or another. The contrasting ways in which cars are regulated in 
different countries has significant implications for the trade in automobiles.  
 In the early 1980s, the European auto market sat atop a checkerboard of 
conflicting regulations that significantly impeded the intra-continental trade in vehicles. 
At that time, regulatory barriers also hampered the trade in cars between the three North 
American states. By 1996, regulatory trade barriers within both regions had been almost 
totally reduced. In Europe, environmental barriers were maintain in the first period from 
1983 to 1988 but were then reduced in 1989-1990. In North America, domestic content 
regulatory barriers were reduced in both Mexico and Canada. Domestic content barriers 
were blocked from existing at all in the United States. They were then completely 
eliminated in NAFTA. In contrast to this intra-regional attenuation, consumer safety-
related inter-regional regulatory barriers between North America and Europe have not 
                                                
1 Tilleman, Levi. 2015. The Great Race: The Global Quest for the Car of the Future. Simon and Schuster: 
New York. p. 2.  
2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. “Automotive Industry: Employment, Earnings, and 
Hours.”  
3 World Trade Organization. 2014. International Trade Statistics. WTO Press.   
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been reduced. Herein lies the research enigma that motivates this chapter: why were 
regulatory trade barriers in the automotive sector reduced within Europe and North 
American but not reduced between those regions?  
Table 4.1- Regulatory Trade Barriers Outcomes In Automobiles  
European Case 
Environmental 1983-1988--------> Maintained 
Environmental 1989-1990--------> Reduced via Buy-Out 
 
North American Case 
Domestic Content Mexico--------> Reduced 
Domestic Content Canada--------> Reduced 
Domestic Content U.S.------------> Prevented 
Domestic Content NAFTA-------> Reduced 
Environmental Mexico/U.S.------> Prevented via Buy-Out 
Consumer Safety Mexico---------> Maintained 
Mexican Trucking -----------------> Maintained, then Reduced 
 
Inter-Regional Case 
Consumer Safety 1996-1999-----> Maintained 
Consumer Safety Post-1999------> Maintained 
 
Environmental Regulatory Trade Barriers in Europe, 1983-1988  
Background 
 During the 1970s, European businesses became increasingly regional and thus 
more frustrated by intra-European trade barriers.4 This was especially true in 
automobiles. After Ford began profitably selling its vehicles on a continental basis, other 
automakers followed suit; this served to create a continental vehicle market and made 
intra-regional regulatory barriers more important.5  
                                                
4 Stephen, Roland. 2000. Vehicle of Influence: Building a European Car Market. University of Michigan 
Press: Ann Arbor. p. 7.  
5 Layan, Jean-Bernard and Yannick Lung. 2004. “The Dynamics of Regional Integration in the European 
Car Industry.” in Cars, Carriers of Regionalism? Carrillo, Jorge, Yannick Lung, and Rob van Tulder (eds.) 
Palgrave MacMillan: New York. p. 66.  
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 While this development was occurring, the European Community (EC) began to 
regulate automobiles with an eye toward liberalizing the continental market in vehicles.6 
Beginning in 1970 and then more robustly in 1972, the European Community began 
regulating air pollution from automobiles.7 EC 70/156 established a type-approval 
process for automotives and emphasized the imperative of promoting a common market.8 
EC 70/220 established the first limits on carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons 
(environmentally-damaging emissions).9 EC 72/306 established the first emissions limits 
on diesel engines.10 These three directives set the basis for the EC’s automotive 
environmental regulations to come; future iterations of EC automotive regulations were 
amendments to these three foundational directives. 
 Organizing production continentally would aid automakers in achieving scale 
economies, which were becoming more important and more difficult to achieve. The 
minimum volume for a firm to survive in the auto industry leapt from 800,000 in the 
1970s to two million in the early 1980s.11 Continental production would help this by 
                                                
6 On the political drive to create a common market and how regulations played into that, see Egan, 
Michelle. 2001. Constructing a European Market: Standards, Regulation, and Governance. Oxford 
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9 Hydrocarbons are environmentally toxic compounds of hydrogen and carbon.  
10 Diesel-engines are compression-ignition rather than positive-ignition engines and therefore were not 
covered under EC 70/220. EC 72/306 thus expanded the framework directive to also cover commercial 
trucks as well as the portion of automobiles that used diesel engines.  
11 Studer-Noguez, Isabel. 2002. Ford and the Global Strategies of Multinationals: The North American 
Auto Industry. Routledge: New York. p. 100. On scale economies and minimum efficient size pushing 
European firms to promote regional integration, see Chase. 2005. Trading Blocs. p. 146-154. 
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allowing for further specialization. Instead of having one production line for vehicle X in 
three markets, the automaker could have one of those lines produce vehicle X for all three 
markets and the other two lines produce vehicles Y and Z.  Greater scale would also help 
reduce costs through standardizing output while increasing the variety of goods produced 
by facilitating components exchange.12 Greater scale could also assist modularization, 
which involved demanding that suppliers make more complex parts- for example, an 
entire seat rather than just the fabric- and deliver that part to the automakers within 
minutes of when it was needed, to curb inventory costs.13 For modularization and 
economies of scale to function, automakers needed to be able to organize production on a 
continental basis.  
 The movement toward EC trade liberalization that was gaining momentum in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s held out the promise of helping them achieve exactly that, 
which is why automakers formed the vanguard in promoting regional trade liberalization. 
In fact, the European Business Roundtable, the peak organization for the largest 
European businesses, originated from discussions in 1982 between Pehr Gyllenhammer, 
the chief executive of Volvo, and Etienne Davignon, the vice president of the European 
Commission.14 As trade liberalization was gaining momentum in the early 1980s, 
emissions regulations were becoming more politically salient. 
Environmentalists and Emissions Regulations in Western Europe 
 At this time, environmentalists were gaining greater political strength in several 
European states. In March 1983, the West German Green Party for the first time 
                                                
12 Rubenstein, James. 1992. The Changing U.S. Auto Industry: A Geographic Analysis. Routledge: New 
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surpassed the five percent threshold in federal elections needed for representation in the 
Bundestag.15 The next year, environmental protection gained even greater salience as it 
became clear that between one-third and half of the country’s forests were being badly 
damaged by pollution and acid rain.16 One potential response, imposing speed limits on 
the autobahn, was sure to be highly controversial and politically costly for the West 
German government.17  
 Separately, environmentalists pushed for emissions standards so high that they 
could only be achieved by requiring all cars be equipped with catalytic converters, which 
would have created a major regulatory barrier to automotive trade.18 At first, German 
automakers did not join environmentalists in this effort but neither did they oppose them 
as they did on speed limits.19 This political landscape incentivized the West German 
government to unilaterally announce that it would make catalytic converters mandatory.20 
Only when West German automakers became concerned that other states’ retaliation 
could hamper their exports did they push against environmentalists’ attempts to raise 
these regulatory barriers.21 This pressure from German automakers convinced the West 
German government to drop its unilateral approach.22  
                                                
15 Financial Times. “Germany Votes For Stability.” March 8, 1983. The Green Party was also making 
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1984.  
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21 Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 70.  
22 Ibid. p. 70. 
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 Like West Germany, Denmark had developed astrong environmental movement 
that wanted to raise emissions standards.23 Unlike West Germany, Denmark had no 
domestic automakers and so the Danish government never faced countervailing pressure 
against environmentalists’ pushing for increased regulatory barriers.24 The Netherlands 
too had a strong environmentalist movement and no indigenous manufacturers, making it 
another state willing to push strict environmental regulations even when Europe’s 
automakers opposed them.25  
 There were no domestic automakers in Denmark or the Netherlands that would 
have benefitted from these regulatory trade barriers. Clearly, they were implemented not 
protect some non-existent firm but to promote environmental goals. This undermines the 
notion that regulatory barriers are simply disguised means of protectionism.  
 These activists’ engagement in the politics surrounding trade and emissions 
regulations underscores the limitations of the cleavage-based explanations of trade 
politics. The cleavage here was not between a sector of society that profited from trade 
and a sector that lost. It was between a sector (automakers) that had an economic stake 
and a sector (environmentalists) that wanted to prioritize non-economic public policy 
goals. This is one example of how, by focusing exclusively on economic considerations, 
these cleavage-based explanations ignore the extent to which trade increasingly animates 
actors with normative concerns once regulations get added to the equation.  
 
 
                                                
23 Support for environmental protection was widespread throughout Denmark. In 1984, 71 percent of Danes 
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Emissions Standards and Competitiveness   
 The specter of mandatory catalytic converters constituted a nightmare for Fiat, 
Peugeot, and Renault. Catalytic converters work by rearranging the oxygen and 
hydrocarbon molecules in car exhaust into the less damaging chemicals carbon dioxide 
and water. At the time, they were a relatively new technology and somewhat costly, 
adding about 500 dollars to the price of a car.26 For a large luxury car such as a Mercedes 
Benz, that additional cost was relatively small as a percentage of the total cost of the car 
and could be absorbed more easily by those consumers affluent enough to own a 
Mercedes.27 But for the small cars that Fiat, Peugeot, and Renault specialized in, these 
converter’s additional cost was much portion of overall costs and could seriously crimp 
sales if they pushed those vehicles out of reach for less well-off consumers.28  
 Moreover, vehicles equipped with catalytic converters required unleaded gasoline 
because lead makes catalytic converters malfunction. The problem for French and Italian 
automakers was that, unlike in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, unleaded 
gasoline was extremely difficult to find in their home countries.29 For Fiat, Peugeot, and 
Renault, mandatory catalytic converters thus meant producing vehicles that many of their 
customers could not afford and that no one would be able to drive as soon as the car 
needed its first gasoline refill.  
 This is why they could not accept emissions standards so high that they required 
catalytic converters as the basis for continent-wide regulations. They also could not 
countenance other governments’ unilaterally requiring catalytic converters, as that would 
                                                
26 Tagliabue, John. “Germany Fights For Car Pollution Limits.” The New York Times. March 18, 1985. 
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28 Ibid.   
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prevent them from exporting their products to those countries. In other words, these 
automakers advocated lower standards precisely because higher standards constituted a 
significant regulatory barrier for them. At the same time, and again in contrast to West 
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, the environmental movement in Italy and 
France was still quite weak.30 Government officials in these two states thus faced the 
exact opposite incentives in their domestic arena as their counterparts in West Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands.31 Furthermore, by undermining domestic automakers, 
these regulatory barriers also threatened to undermine the overall national economic 
competitiveness of Italy and France as well. Given this, they sided with their domestic 
automakers in opposing what they called regulatory “blackmail.”32  
 The trajectory of events here also undermines state-centric explanations of 
international trade politics.33 European governments’ stances were not independently 
designed. They only came about as a result of societal actors’ lobbying. The positions of 
Denmark and the Netherlands were a product of environmentalists’ strength there. The 
positions of France and Italy were a product of automakers’ strength there. One cannot 
explain these states’ position without first examining societal actors within those states.  
 With regards to EC officials, while they were not hostile to the call for 
environmental protection, at this point they saw creating a common market as their 
primary responsibility.34 The link between the national economies of Europe had grown 
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32 Ibid.   
33 For examples of these views, see Krasner, Stephen. 1991. “Global Communication and National Power: 
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tighter over the course of the 1970s.35 Europe’s economic recovery in the mid-1980s was 
much weaker than the United States’ or Japan’s.36 Trade liberalization was seen as a way 
of boosting European companies’, and by extension European states’, competitiveness 
and thus ending Eurosclerosis.37  
 High emission regulations that created intra-EC trade barriers were thus seen by 
EC officials not as an innocuous regulatory difference between states but as a throttle on 
European competiveness and on EC officials’ ability to deliver prosperity through the 
advancement of the internal market. Thus, they sided with France and Italy. The 1985 
agreement raised emission standards but excluded small cars to environmentalists’ 
chagrin, thus necessitating a future negotiation over those cars’ emissions.38 This 
agreement was vetoed by the Danish government which was still beholden to its 
environmentalists who wanted higher standards come what may in terms of trade.39  
 Danish officials continued to face pressure from only one direction domestically 
and so continued to block the compromise. The Green Party made significant gains in 
local elections in November 1985, which made Danish officials even more convinced 
that caving on emission standards was out of the question.40 Denmark’s environment 
minister made it clear where the battle lines were drawn, saying, “Denmark will not 
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accept this level. We have here a collision between environmental and business 
interests.”41 Danish objection persisted into 1987.42    
 In the meantime, the EC had passed the Single European Act in 1986, which set 
the end of 1992 as the goal of fully establishing a common market, codified 
environmental policy goals at the EC level for the first time, and changed the 
requirements for EC-wide regulatory rulings from being unanimous to a qualified 
majority.43 In July 1987, this procedure was used for the first time by other EC states to 
pass the regulations agreed to in 1985 over the objections of Denmark.44 After the accord 
was reached, Denmark made it known that it planned to enact its own higher emission 
standards anyway, which was sure to invite a legal challenge from other EC states.45 This 
had to be addressed, as did emissions regulations for the smaller vehicles excluded from 
the 1985 compromise. The start of small car emissions negotiations in January 1988 was 
not promising as France blocked any real discussion of toughening regulations on small 
cars.46 Jacques Calvet, the hardline chairman of Peugeot, attacked increased emission 
standards as a demagogic barrier to intra-EC trade.47 The French government 
                                                
41 Ardill, John. “Exhaust Pact Doubts/Danish Government Refuses to Withdraw Calls For Tougher Anti-
Pollution Measures.” The Guardian. September 23, 1986.  
42 Neher, Jacques. “EC Emissions Plan in Jeopardy, Danes Press For More Rapid Solution to Question of 
Small Cars.” Journal of Commerce. November 6, 1986. Gooding, Kenneth. “EEC Rows Over Timetable 
for Cars.” Financial Times. March 6, 1987.   
43 On the negotiation of the Single European Act, see Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: 
Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. p. 314-378. 
On the importance of business interests in promoting the single market, see Cowles, Maria. 1995. “Setting 
the Agenda for a New Europe: the ERT and EC 1992.” Journal of Common Market Studies. 33:4. p. 501-
526. 
44 Dawkins, William, and John Griffiths. “EC Agrees Car Exhaust Plan.” Financial Times. July 7, 1987. 
45 Dawkins, William. “EC Agrees Measures to Cut Car Pollution.” Financial Times. December 4, 1987. 
46 The Globe and Mail. “Exhaust Plan Delayed.” January 22, 1988. 
47 Betts, Paul. “Greens Make Peugeot Car Chief See Red.” Financial Times. July 14, 1988.  
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 120 
subsequently abandoned a compromise deal of small car emissions that had been 
tentatively worked out in June 1988.48 
Emission Standards Harmonized, 1989-1990  
 By 1989, it became apparent that two developments had altered the configuration 
of interests around emissions regulations. First, environmentalism had strengthened 
across Europe. Picking environmental fights with Brussels continued to be a political 
winner domestically in Denmark.49 Sweden’s election in 1988 demonstrated the 
continued growth of environmentalists there too.50 The Dutch government, which in 1988 
was keener on environmental issues than at any time since 1982, defied the EC by going 
ahead with a tax scheme that incentivized the purchase of cars that emitted such low 
emissions that they required catalytic converters.51 Environmentalists also gained strength 
in countries where they had previously been relatively weak. In Italy, the salience of 
green issues had grown substantially.52 In the UK, environmental concerns became a 
much higher political priority.53 The strengthening of environmentalists made it 
politically dangerous for EC officials to be seen as insufficiently green. It also made it 
clear that reducing regulatory barriers at a common low level of emissions standards was 
infeasible. 
 Second, advances in technology led automakers to relax their resistance to higher 
emission standards. In 1984, the EC had mandated that by 1989 all EC states had to 
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ensure the widespread availability of unleaded gasoline.54 By 1988, it was clear that 
states would meet their obligation to do that.55 It also became clear that other approaches 
to emissions could not match catalytic converters’ effectiveness.56 By 1988, as opposed 
to 1985, consumers were highly in favor of catalytic converters.57 The fear subsided that 
cars with catalytic converters would become useless once they needed a refill. 
Automakers and gasoline providers had achieved technological innovations that greatly 
reduced the performance penalties that had accompanied the use of catalytic converters a 
few years earlier.58 Catalytic converters also became cheaper to produce and install 
because automakers figured out how to replace the platinum in them with palladium 
which only cost one-tenth as much.59 Automakers specializing in small cars no longer 
perceived mandatory catalytic converters to be a revenue death knell.60 One-time 
opponents of catalytic converters such as Fiat and Renault had begun selling cars with 
converters in the Netherlands.61  
 EC officials identified with environmentalists and automakers. They were thus 
eager to promote a buy-out arrangement between them. The European Parliament 
continually pushed for greater environmental protection.62 The EC’s Environment 
Commissioner Carlo Ripa Di Meana openly advocated for the adoption of higher 
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standards and was soon joined by Karel Van Miert, the EC Transport Commissioner.63 It 
was not just these two. As one EC official noted, this Commission as a whole was 
“definitely a lot greener than the last.”64  
 The common market was also of course a central mission of the EC and so 
preoccupied its officials at least as much as environmental protection. By this point, those 
officials badly wanted one standard, any standard as long as it was a common one. For 
them the 1992 deadline grew ever more looming with each passing month.65 It was clear 
that environmentalists and the states that sided with them were not backing down. With 
automakers wanting one standard and environmentalists wanting a high standard and 
given the advances made in catalytic converters, high uniform standards became a way to 
liberalize rather block trade.  
 In April 1989, the European Commission proposed new higher emission 
regulations that effectively mandated catalytic converters.66 The EC Council voted to 
approve the new standards in the summer of 1989.67 This reduction in emissions-based 
regulatory barriers opened the way for similar reductions in the other regulatory barriers. 
Automakers hoped for region-wide standards on these issues for the same reasons that 
they wanted uniform emissions standards. There is no evidence that activists objected to 
reducing these regulatory barriers.  
 EC officials were committed to completing the single market. Martin Bangemann, 
the EC Commissioner for the Internal Market, had previously been the leader of the Free 
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Democratic Party in Germany and the West German Economic Minister. In other words, 
the negotiation of technical standards was guided by a politician who had led a highly 
pro-trade party in a highly pro-trade country. It therefore is not surprising that he 
provided the political leadership to reduce these other intra-EC regulatory trade barriers. 
Thus, in June 1989, EC officials announced their intention to put forth a mandatory 
technical standards regime for the entire EC; this regime was agreed to in March 1990.68 
This agreement, as part of the construction of the single market, effectively completed the 
regionalization of European auto production. 
Domestic Content Regulatory Trade Barriers in North America 
Background 
 Although there were differences in safety and environmental regulations among 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico in the 1980s, they did not generally constitute 
significant regulatory barriers. Automakers had to meet U.S. standards for vehicles 
destined for the United States but for vehicles produced for the Canadian and Mexican 
markets, they could meet either standard that state’s standard or the American standard at 
their discretion. The major regulatory barriers to continent-wide auto production were 
domestic content regulations.69  
 These regulations stipulated that a certain percentage of an automaker’s sales had 
to come from domestically produced parts and domestic labor. A domestic content 
requirement does not help firms because it limits their flexibility. Automakers prefer 
domestic content rules be eradicated because even when they seek protectionism, there 
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are a number of other non-regulatory means that achieve the same protectionist goal 
without limiting automakers’ flexibility. A domestic content requirement does help 
workers though by maintain domestic auto employment. Mexico and Canada had 
domestic content regulations but reduced them over the course of the 1980s and early 
1990s. The United States never had them; labor unions wanted them but were rebuffed in 
that attempt.   
 In 1981, the North American auto trade was stymied by these domestic content 
regulations and thus auto production was organized on a national basis. By the mid-
1990s, domestic content regulations between the United States, Canada, and Mexico had 
been effectively eradicated and auto production was organized on a regional basis.   
  The origins of this shift began in the late 1970s when the Big Three faced 
growing labor disharmony, ballooning labor costs, new environmental and safety 
regulations, a string of public relations fiascoes exemplified by exploding Ford Pintos, 
energy crises, and stagflation. None of these developments were popular in Detroit but 
what made them an existential crisis for the Big Three was that they intensified the 
competition American automakers faced from Japanese automakers. At the time, 
Japanese cars not only used less gasoline, they were also produced more efficiently 
(which meant they could be priced lower than American cars) and had fewer defects 
(which meant they lasted longer and needed fewer repairs).70 This was a dark moment for 
the Big Three. Chrysler almost collapsed while Ford and GM posted record losses.71  
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 In response to this competition, American automakers needed to cut production 
costs and so began exploring the possibility of relocating labor-intensive production steps 
to Mexico where labor costs were 31 percent of those in the United States.72 In addition, 
automakers were having difficulty getting unions to accept new production methods such 
as modularization; moving abroad could help them get around that problem.73 They were 
also hoping to benefit from greater economies of scale for the same reasons as in Europe. 
Additionally, by pushing up the value of the dollar, Paul Volcker’s tight monetary policy 
made producing a good abroad and importing it more profitable. The problem for the Big 
Three in this endeavor was the set of regulations on domestic content.  
U.S. Domestic Content Rules, 1982-1984 
 The confluence of factors hurting U.S. automakers in the late 1970s and early 
1980s hit auto industry employees particularly hard. Employment in auto assembly 
plummeted from 760,000 in 1978 to 490,000 in 1981.74 A Buy American campaign 
sprung up among the UAW’s rank-and-file, but did little to stem the rising tide of 
Japanese imports, and so the UAW began pushing for Congressional action to mandate a 
de facto Buy American regulation in auto production: domestic content rules.75 These 
proposed regulations mandated that all models with sales over 100,000 vehicles had to 
have at least 25 percent of their content made in the United States and employed a sliding 
scale that called for all models with sales over 500,000 to have 90 percent domestic 
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content.76  In 1981-1982, domestic content legislation in the auto industry was the top 
priority of the UAW and the AFL-CIO but was opposed by automakers.77  
 Ford and GM were just as much a target of these UAW-proposed regulations as 
Japanese automakers; UAW President Doug Fraser argued that “content legislation not 
only will address the savaging of the American economy by the Japanese….it will also 
confront the exporting of American jobs and capital by General Motors and Ford.”78  
 Even a cursory look at management behavior makes it easy to see why 
autoworkers resented their bosses. In 1982, the same day that GM convinced workers to 
accept wage freezes and fewer holidays, the executives were rewarded with bigger 
bonuses.79 Into the late 1980s, GM persisted with the antagonizing practice of having 
segregated bathrooms for hourly workers versus management.80 When Ford’s bosses 
bought an enormous Persian rug for their executive suite that was too large to install 
because it could not fit in any of the building’s elevators and then, rather than return the 
rug or not purchase such an extravagance in the first place, they had windows temporarily 
removed so that the rug could be installed via helicopter.81 Little wonder that unions saw 
management as just as much their enemy as foreign competition.    
 Though the UAW wanted domestic content requirements, American automakers 
decidedly did not. GM and Ford testified against the bill when it was before the House of 
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Representatives.82 Thomas Atkinson, a GM executive, succinctly summarized the 
automaker’s position on them saying “we wish these laws had never been invented, and 
would not like to see them increased or created in countries where they don't exist 
now.''83 Opposition to the domestic content bill was placed on a rhetorical foundation that 
it would make American-made cars less competitive.84 This provides evidence for a point 
that I made in Chapter 3, that when business want to seek protection, they are unlikely to 
ask for regulatory protectionism because those regulations limit those firms’ flexibility in 
ways that non-regulatory trade barriers do not. This is what automakers did here. The 
protectionism they sought was in the form of a quota-based voluntary export restraint 
agreement with the Japanese, not regulations on domestic content.85  
  In the meantime, Paul Volcker’s tight monetary policy was driving up interest 
rates which made the value of the dollar increase and so made American exports that 
much more expensive; this only compounded concerns about U.S. competitiveness.86 As 
evidence of how serious U.S. officials were taking these competitiveness concerns, both 
the Senate and the White House set up special commissions on economic and industrial 
competitiveness.87  
 To the delight of the Big Three and the infuriation of the UAW, the Reagan 
Administration was resolutely opposed to domestic content regulations. John Danforth 
(R-Missouri), the chairman of the lead Senate committee on trade, attested that many 
                                                
82 Farnsworth, Clyde. “Vote Due on U.S. Auto Content Bill.” The New York Times. December 8, 1982.  
83 Gilpin, Kenneth. “Local Content: Global Practice.” The New York Times. June 23, 1983.  
84 The New York Times. “It Will Come Back to Haunt Us.” July 25, 1982. The New York Times. “The Job-
Killer Bill.” December 14, 1982.  
85 Shoch. 2000. Trading Blows. p. 79. Farnsworth, Clyde. “Auto Talks With Japan: A Drama of 
Euphemisms.” The New York Times. March 26, 1981. Behr, Peter. “President’s Dilemma.” The Washington 
Post. March 22, 1981. 
86 Shoch. 2000. Trading Blows. p. 79. 
87 Fleming, Stewart. “The Great American Debate.” The Financial Times. December 7, 1983. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 128 
members of the Senate viewed the domestic content legislation as “perfectly ridiculous” 
while U.S. Trade Representative William Brock called it “the worst piece of economic 
legislation since the 1930s.”88 Mr. Brock was no fan of government intervention in 
markets in general; earlier in his Congressional career he had voted against the minimum 
wage, Medicare, and civil rights legislation.89 He was a dyed-in-the-wool free trader and 
was so stoutly hostile to labor unions, that in Reagan’s second term, he was appointed 
Secretary of Labor.90 With no support from the USTR’s office or anywhere else in the 
Executive Branch, the domestic content bill died in the Republican-controlled Senate.91 
In sum, labor unions attempted to create a significant new regulatory barrier to the trade 
in automobiles but were defeated by the combined efforts of the automakers and 
government officials who opposed the erection of those barriers. 
Mexican Domestic Content Rules, 1982-1989 
 The Latin American debt crisis, which started in Mexico in August 1982, 
augmented automakers’ opposition to Mexico’s domestic content rules. The dramatic 
decrease in demand for automobiles meant that the attraction of building in Mexico just 
for the domestic market had all but evaporated. To be profitable, vehicles produced there 
had to be competitive on the international market, and that could not happen without 
changes in Mexican policy. Ford was particularly aggressive in lobbying the Mexican 
government for changes in the domestic content and ownership regulations; one group of 
scholars even argues that the policy changes adopted by Mexico were a direct result of 
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Ford’s lobbying.92 At the very least, it would be fair to say that Ford was pushing hard for 
reduced regulatory trade barriers.  
 At this point, the American-based automakers were joined by Mexican businesses 
from other sectors organized under the Business Coordinating Council (CCE), a newly 
constructed super-lobby that had united CONCANACO and CONCAMIN, the two oldest 
and most prestigious business confederations in Mexico. They collectively pushed the 
Mexican government to take a less active role in the economy and to adopt policies that 
would help exporters.93  
 The debt crisis softened Mexican officials’ support for the domestic content 
regulations. They no longer had the same leverage over automakers but wanted to 
maintain manufacturing jobs and to promote exports to improve the country’s trade 
balance. To emerge from this debt crisis, their manufactured goods had to be competitive 
in export markets. One positive side effect of the crash was that it devalued the peso 
which made labor even cheaper and thus made exports more attractive, though again the 
domestic content regulations stood in the way.  
 Given these developments, in 1983 the Mexican government took its first steps 
away from ISI and toward promoting exports.94 The Border Industrialization Program, 
also known as the maquiladora program, was reformed and expanded, and the Trade and 
Industry Ministry which had long been protectionist was reorganized and given a staff 
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dedicated to trade liberalization.95 The expansion of the maquiladora program allowed 
firms to import goods tariff-free if they were used in to make products that were then 
exported, and it allowed automakers to have less domestic content on cars produced for 
export.96 The number of auto maquiladoras consequently increased from 51 in 1984 to 
129 in 1988.97 A Ford executive cited the decree as “a major reason” for the company’s 
decision to construct a new half-billion dollar facility in Hermosillo that year.98  
 Given that domestic demand had collapsed, for a Mexican business to survive, 
much less thrive, it had to find markets abroad for its products. During this period, the 
major businesses organizations grew more assertive toward the government in general 
and more eager to push the Mexican government to pursue further liberalization in 
particular.99 This was a major shift for business; less than a decade earlier, the 
composition of the business lobby was much more protectionist and had successfully 
blocked Mexico’s accession to the GATT.100 There was also a shift in the relative power 
of businesses in different regions of Mexico. Businesses in northern Mexico, given their 
proximity to the United States, had traditionally been more liberal in their trade 
preferences than businesses in central Mexico that owed their ascendancy to state-led ISI 
policies.101 The collapse of ISI weakened the latter group to the benefit of the former.  
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 Additionally, starting around 1986, trade liberalization had created its own vested 
interest among the business community that wanted still more liberalization.102 Compared 
to earlier periods, business leaders in the mid-1980s had both a greater commitment to 
free trade and greater access to like-minded government officials.103 Labor unions 
remained either repressed or co-opted and controlled by the government through the 
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). They were in no position to offer meaningful 
resistance to reducing domestic content requirements, especially in the auto industry.  
 The Mexican government was now headed by President de la Madrid, a man who 
had never been elected to office before but who had nearly unanimous backing from big 
business.104 De la Madrid stacked his cabinet with free traders.105 That coincided with the 
rise of what came to be known as the ‘technoburocrata,’ the cadre of younger, more pro-
market officials within the government.106 In 1984, the Mexican government sold its 
shares in Renault and VAM, meaning it no longer had a vested interest in protecting the 
two least competitive producers in Mexico.107 This made government officials even more 
willing to listen to calls for reductions in regulatory barriers. Given this configuration of 
interests, Mexico moved rapidly toward trade liberalization, deciding to join the GATT in 
1985 and signing the Tokyo Round non-tariff barrier (NTB) codes in 1987.108   
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 These moves accelerated the growth of export-oriented auto manufacturing in 
Mexico. For the period from 1983-1987 compared to 1978-1982, even though production 
for the domestic market fell 36 percent, auto production for export markets increased 184 
percent.109 Exports from Mexico at first were mostly parts, but then automakers realized 
that they could actually produce sophisticated components in Mexico with the same level 
of quality as in the United States.110 Trade liberalization was key to this because it meant 
that steel of higher quality than that produced in Mexico could be imported; this was 
critical in making feasible some of the most quality-dependent and capital-intensive 
processes.111 After this discovery, the Big Three began lobbying the Mexican government 
to adopt a new Auto Decree that would reward the production of more sophisticated 
components.112 The 1989 Auto Decree completed Mexico’s abandonment of ISI and 
reduced local content requirements.113 While Mexico’s auto industry had been 
transforming, the politics of regulatory barriers had been unfolding in Canada as well.  
Canadian Domestic Content Rules, 1982-1988  
 The 60 percent domestic content regulations impeding trade in automobiles 
between the U.S. and Canada in the early 1980s were a result of the 1965 Auto Pact 
between them.114 Like their Mexican counterparts but for different reasons, Canadian 
businesses in the early 1980s were far more eager to push for trade liberalization than 
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they had been just a few years prior. In the Tokyo Round that ended in 1979, in addition 
to the round’s NTB reforms, Canada was forced to accept a tariff reduction on industrial 
goods that most other countries had taken in the Kennedy Round; this led to a surge of 
imports thereafter.115  
 Faced with this import penetration, businesses needed greater export market 
access and so began to more vigorously lobby their government for greater trade 
liberalization, especially with the U.S.116 The global recession that took place in 1981-
1982 hit Canada especially hard and thus augmented this change in attitude.117 Moreover, 
the Canadian dollar, which was worth one dollar in 1976, traded at around 80 cents in 
1982; this made Canadian exports more competitive in the U.S. and Canadian importers 
less vulnerable to competition from American exports.118  
 Canadian businesses also preferred to pursue an explicitly liberal, business 
friendly trade regime rather than bring labor into the fold to form some kind of societal 
grand alliance.119 The Canadian Manufacturers Association (CMA), the Business Council 
on National Issues (BCNI), and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce began calling for a 
free trade agreement with the United States.120 It also was not just that their position had 
changed; their political power had also grown substantially through more effective 
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political organization.121 These business leaders were slightly ahead of their government 
counterparts in their turn toward trade liberalism but would not have to wait long to be 
joined by them. 
 What makes the turn in Canadian trade policy in the 1980s so interesting is that it 
flew in the face of almost every bit of Canadian trade policy to that point. The Canadian 
government had historically adopted a consistently protectionist line going as far back as 
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, high tariff barriers were essential in early Canadian 
political development. The 1879 National Policy was the Canadian government’s attempt 
to economically unify Canada by promoting domestic East-West trade rather than 
international North-South trade with the United States.122 Prior to this, it was much easier 
for a businessman in Winnipeg to conduct business with Minneapolis than with Ottawa, 
and so Canadians often had closer connections with Americans than with each other. 
High tariffs changed that.  
 When Wilfrid Laurier, a Prime Minister who had held power since 1896, pursued 
greater trade with the United States in 1911, he was quickly chased from office; “the 
lesson that emerged was clear and lasting, free trade was a political nonstarter in 
Canada.”123 Even in the 1960s and 1970s, Canadian support for GATT trade rounds was 
more about multilateralism than a deep-seated love of free trade.124 With regards to the 
U.S. in particular, the Liberal government under Pierre Trudeau advocated a Third 
Option policy that took an economically nationalist line even to the point of antagonizing 
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the behemoth to the south. The clearest example of this was the 1979 National Energy 
Program which, in an attempt to subsidize energy in Ontario and Quebec, curtailed 
energy exports to the U.S. at the exact moment it was suffering from an energy crisis.125  
 As late as 1983, Brian Mulroney, the leader of the Conservative Party who would 
later champion the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement said the following: “Don’t talk to 
me about free trade, that issue was decided in 1911. Free trade is a danger to Canadian 
sovereignty, and you’ll hear none of it from me now during this leadership campaign or 
at any other time in the future.”126  
 But the utility of greater trade with the United States was starting to percolate 
through the Canadian bureaucracy and many Canadian government officials were 
beginning to seriously question the protectionist policy orientation. Ed Lumley and then 
later Gerald Regan, two trade ministers sympathetic to both trade reforms and business 
interests, conducted a stem-to-stern review of Canadian trade policy; their final analysis, 
which was released in August 1983, advocated for greater trade and also somewhat 
unexpectedly signaled that bilateral negotiations with the United States might be an 
option in addition to Canada’s traditional commitment to the GATT.127 This report and 
the media attention it received sparked the most open trade discussion Canada had seen in 
a very long time.128 In many ways, it laid the groundwork for what would become the 
most consequential report in Canadian trade policy, probably ever. 
 In its encapsulation of the political zeitgeist and intellectual defense for a policy 
response to a problem fixating the nation, the Macdonald Report was as important for 
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Canadian trade policy in the 1980s as George Kennan’s writings were for American 
policy toward the Soviets in the 1940s. In 1982, the Canadian government set up a Royal 
Commission to diagnose Canada’s economic malaise. Its mandate was the economy in 
general; there was little expectation that it would focus on trade policy.129 The Report 
harshly criticized Trudeau’s policies that shifted political and economic attention away 
from the U.S. relationship, arguing that it contributed to Canada’s poor economy.130 The 
Report’s signature recommendation was for Canada to assertively pursue freer trade, 
especially with the U.S.131 When it was released in 1985, it delivered instant intellectual 
and political cover for a politician who wanted to unlearn the lesson of 1911. 
 The year before the Macdonald Commission Report, the Conservatives led by 
Brian Mulroney defeated the Liberals who had been the champions of leftist nationalism. 
Mulroney’s political base economically was the business community and geographically 
was the Western provinces, both of which wanted trade liberalization.132 His political 
instincts were to improve relations with the United States and trade, almost by definition, 
had to be a major part of that.133 After months of political planning, consultation with 
business leaders, and the release of the Macdonald Report, in September 1985 Mulroney 
announced his intention to seek a free trade agreement with the United States.134 
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 Once the negotiations for the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) got 
under way, what to do on automobiles became an enduring subject given its importance 
to both economies.135 The automakers wanted an end to Canada’s domestic content 
regulations.136 The lead negotiators also believed the domestic content regulations were 
expendable.137 Organized labor formed the vanguard of the opposition to CUSFTA and 
argued vociferously against reducing those domestic content requirements in the 
media.138  
 While businesses had been growing in political strength during this period, 
Canadian labor, much like their American counterparts, had seen their political power 
wither due to a decline in unionization, a fragmentation of the union’s overarching 
organizational structure, and the transition to a more service-oriented economy.139 
Contributing to this weakness, they made a major strategic error during the negotiations. 
Fearing their participation would give CUSFTA legitimacy, labor refused to participate in 
the negotiations even after being specifically invited by the government, and so 
undermined their own role and influence.140 In the end, the automakers and government 
officials got what they wanted. CUSFTA, signed in 1987 and in effect by 1989, 
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eliminated Canada’s domestic content requirements; content could now originate in 
Canada or the U.S and the level of required content was lowered to fifty percent.141  
 In all three of these states, the state-centric approach fails to explain why these 
states took the positions they did. This is further evidence that to understand states’ 
policies on regulatory trade barriers, societal actors must be examined.  
NAFTA and Domestic Content 
 As I showed earlier, by the late 1980s Mexico was even more predisposed to 
pursue trade liberalization than it had been earlier that decade. The firms most committed 
to protectionism had been smashed by the economic crisis.142 The major business 
associations were in favor of even greater liberalization.143 Also, for the first time, they 
were joined by small businesses.144 
 President Salinas, who took office in 1988, was just as much of a free trade 
advocate as his predecessor. This was especially the case vis-a-vis the United States after 
he received tepid interest from European businesses and government officials when he 
pursued a trade deal with the European Community.145 In addition to his sympathy with 
the trade policies advocated by business, Salinas also had an electoral incentive to pursue 
liberalization, as that would help the PRI by appealing to pro-liberalization business 
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forces that had defected to the National Action Party (PAN).146 Salinas also had tapped a 
Kimberly-Clark executive as his special economic adviser, while at the same time 
arresting a longtime union boss.147 In 1990, business and government leaders created the 
Coordinating Body of Foreign Trade Business Associations (COECE) to be the link 
between them in the formation of Mexican trade policy.148  
 During the NAFTA negotiations, Mexican officials and businessmen worked so 
closely together that during the talks they would meet before and after each session; 
business representative were even allowed to set up shop in the adjacent room with a 
computerized system that allowed them to monitor what was being said by whom.149 
Government-business collaboration during this period was frequent and close.150 This 
relationship was reflected in autos. One Mexican official admitted that the Big Three 
were just as influential in guiding Mexico’s negotiating positions as they were for the 
Canadian and American teams.151 Clearly, business and government officials were 
cooperating to marginalize labor.  
 The government-affiliated Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) followed 
the government dictated line and dutifully endorsed NAFTA.152 Another labor 
organization, the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC) took an 
ambivalent approach; they welcomed the agreement because they believed it would 
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generate more employment and better wages but also lobbied for special treatment for 
labor in the deal.153 Other labor unions, along with nationalists, were opposed to NAFTA, 
but were systematically marginalized by the coalition of business and government leaders 
pushing for trade liberalization.154 
 With content regulations combined for Canada and the United States, the final 
step to creating a regional production network for automobiles was folding Mexico’s 
domestic content into the regional content with the other two states. For automakers, the 
NAFTA negotiations were a fortuitous window for pushing exactly this kind of 
regulatory alteration.155 Canadian and U.S. negotiators closely consulted with the Big 
Three throughout the NAFTA negotiations.156 
 U.S. and Canadian unions advanced proposals that would reinforce domestic 
content requirements in all three countries, essentially taking the region back to where it 
was in 1982.157 These proposals had no chance of gaining support from automakers or the 
respective government officials. The Canadian and U.S. autoworkers’ unions knew that 
were NAFTA to pass, the regionalization of content requirements would be an inevitable 
result (along with manufacturing relocating to Mexico). Their hope was to stop NAFTA 
altogether. Given that everyone knew the unions would oppose practically any agreement 
that came out of the negotiations, their policy preferences carried little weight within 
those negotiations.158 Unions were further hampered, and business further helped, by the 
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fact that the Conservatives were in power in Canada and the Republicans were in power 
in the United States, both of which were ideologically sympathetic to business and 
ideologically hostile toward labor. With business advocating for reduced regulatory 
barriers and governments in all three countries aligning with business and marginalizing 
labor, NAFTA replaced domestic content with regional content.159 With content 
regulations organized on a regional level, they no longer impeded intra-regional trade.160  
Environmental Trade Barriers in North America Pre-Empted  
 NAFTA also dealt with environmental regulations that had the potential to create 
trade barriers.161 If access to the American market were conditioned on meeting certain 
environmental production standards that were not achievable at Mexican plants, those 
plants could no longer be used, and the entire regionalization strategy would no longer 
deliver the cost savings that were its reason for being.162 This was not beyond the realm 
of possibility. American environmentalists had recently done exactly that to the tuna 
industry.163 Environmentalists were concerned that Mexico’s more lax regulations would 
badly pollute the border region.164 They worried that they would attract industries eager 
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to engage in regulatory arbitrage and thus throttle regulatory improvements in the U.S.165 
Those environmentalists, experienced from the fight over the U.S.-Canada agreement, 
saw NAFTA as an opportunity to embed environmental protection into trade deals.166 
Mexican environmentalists saw NAFTA as a way to strengthen their country’s 
environmental rules.167  
 Businesses were determined to prevent regulatory differences from becoming 
trade barriers.168 They were not opposed to environmental protection per se, but such 
protection could not be allowed to raise trade costs. Therefore businesses pushed for the 
requirement that states employ the environmental regulation that was ‘least-trade 
restrictive.’169 The American and Mexican governments were willing to accept the 
addition of some environmental language to the agreement so long as that language did 
not create trade barriers.170  
 Unlike with organized labor, Mexican and U.S. officials in both countries were at 
least somewhat sympathetic to the policy goals of environmentalists. William Reilly, the 
EPA administrator, was a major proponent of linking environmental and trade issues and 
was able to use his personal contacts with U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills to 
advance that position even though the EPA is usually not a central player in trade 
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policy.171 Hills also appointed the leaders of the National Wildlife Federation, the 
National Audubon Society, the National Resource Defense Council, and the Nature 
Conservancy to key trade advisory committees.172 
 Additionally, over 200 Congressmen signed a letter in support of linking trade 
and environmental goals.173 Mexican officials also had little problem with their domestic 
NGOs’ desire for greater environmental protection.174 Given the imperative to liberalize 
trade, their sympathy towards environmentalists, and the cheapness of improving 
environmental protection practices, Mexican officials hoped to satisfy environmentalists 
first and resort to marginalization attempts only if that did not work.  
 To achieve this, the U.S. and Mexican governments needed to emphasize 
Mexico’s commitment to the environment, especially among the maquiladoras, and 
demonstrate to the American public that Mexico was neither sending pollution across the 
border nor attempting to attract firms with lax regulations. To accomplish that, they 
increased inspections and shutdown non-compliant maquiladoras in the lead-up to 
NAFTA.175 They also announced in January 1991 a plan to clean up the border.176 These 
were not long-standing practices. The Mexican government rarely inspected its industrial 
plants prior to the NAFTA debate but conducted more than 11,000 such inspections in 
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1992 and 1993, which suggests that satisfying environmentalists was the main impetus 
for those inspections.177  
 The heart of environmentalists’ complaints about Mexican environmental 
regulations was not that they were poorly written but that they were largely 
unenforced.178 Given this, the major thrust behind NAFTA’s environmental provisions 
was not to change their regulations but to ensure enforcement. The primary sanctions 
mechanism under the NAFTA environmental side agreement thus occurs when a state 
repeatedly fails to enforce its own environmental regulations.179 
 This approach alleviated trade impediments while respecting Canadian and 
Mexican sensitivities. Even though business leaders and government officials in those 
two countries had shifted to seek increased trade with the United States, that did not mean 
that their concerns over America imposing its regulatory will had evaporated. It was not 
politically possible for Canada and Mexico to accept the United States hegemonically 
setting regulatory standards for all three states in order to fully integrate the North 
American market, nor was it at all likely that the United States would cede much real 
authority to an EU-style supranational institution.180  
 Thus, in liberalizing North American regional trade, there was a greater need to 
minimize the number of regulatory alterations. This is why the environmental side 
agreement leaves so much room for interpretation. Article I stipulates that the whole 
point of the side agreement is to avoid new trade barriers while Article III stipulates that 
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the three states can set their own regulations as long as they ensure high levels of 
environmental protection.181 These side agreements satisfied a significant portion, though 
not all, of American environmental NGOs and thus they supported NAFTA.182 By 
satisfying at least some of the environmental groups, business interests and government 
officials prophylactically stopped the emergence of new regulatory trade barriers.183 
Environmental regulations were not allowed to interrupt the intra-regional trade in 
automobiles. Once again, the proposed environmental regulatory trade barriers were 
sought for normative reasons by activists, not by businesses that wanted trade protection. 
This is yet more evidence that regulatory trade barriers are generally not disguised 
protectionism.  
Consumer Safety Regulations in North America 
The Absence of a Mexican Ralph Nader  
 Whereas domestic content regulations were regionalized and regional 
environmental regulations were formulated to encourage environmental protection along 
with trade liberalization, consumer safety regulations did not change. The degree of 
difference between the United States and Mexico was as great in the late 1990s as it was 
in the early 1980s.184 Even today, Mexican automobiles are not required to have safety 
features such as anti-lock brakes and electronic stability controls that Americans take for 
granted; this is almost certainly one of the main reasons why adjusted for miles traveled, 
the automobile fatality rate in Mexico is more than three and a half times higher than it is 
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in the United States.185 This lack of convergence in regulations is interesting because the 
need for two production runs to satisfy different standards is often used by business as a 
primary justification for reducing regulatory trade barriers. Why then aren’t the 
automakers producing their cars for Mexico in the same way they are producing cars for 
the United States and Canada? Why haven’t regulatory standards converged as they did 
with environmental standards in Europe? In other words, why was there no California 
Effect?186 
 They have not done so because firms were not advocating for reduced regulatory 
differences nor, as was the case with European emission standards, nor were activists 
pushing for increased standards, which might have lead to regulations being harmonized 
but at a higher level. For the U.S.-based automakers, these regulatory differences have 
been a source of profit rather than a barrier to trade. Even though it requires a different 
production process, not including these features in vehicles boosts the automakers’ profit 
since they sell their less safe Mexican versions at the same price point as their American 
versions.187 There was no indigenous Mexican automaker for which the regulatory 
difference constituted a barrier to the U.S. market. There was no company that was 
meeting the American standard but being undermined by a purely domestic competitor. 
In other words, the regulatory difference did not pose a regulatory barrier for the Big 
Three even though it likely would have posed a barrier for the hypothetical Mexican firm. 
This demonstrates an important point. A cross-national regulatory difference may be a 
trade barrier for one firm but not for another even if they are in the same sector.  
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 Furthermore, whereas there were environmental activists pushing for higher 
regulations in Europe, there was no such group trying to increase Mexican safety 
standards. There has been no political entrepreneur like Ralph Nader able to make a 
political issue out of safety standards. Additionally, consumers have actually been 
resistant to more safety regulations due to a widespread perception that such standards 
would make cars unaffordable.188 This is in marked contrast to Japanese consumer 
groups’ approach to safety standards involving beef that will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Here again is an area where Gunnar Trumbull’s narratives of access and narratives of 
protection argument helps explain consumer groups’ political behavior.189 Whereas 
Japanese consumers were more concerned with being protected from the potential harm 
of American beef, Mexican consumers were more concerned with ensuring continued 
access to affordable cars. 
 The Mexican government has been reticent to fight for higher safety regulations 
because it does not want to throttle a sector that generates significant employment and 
revenue.190 Had consumer groups effectively mobilized around the issue, then perhaps 
government officials may have felt pressured to improve Mexico’s safety regulations, but 
that has not happened.  
Safety Standards Differences and Mexican Trucking  
 The one area where there has been a regulatory movement on safety standards 
involved an issue on which American activists and government officials were eager to 
increase regulatory trade barriers and leave it up to Mexican businesses to meet them. 
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The NAFTA agreement, for the first time, allowed Mexican trucks access to the U.S. As 
the 1995 opening date drew closer, highway safety advocates and state officials in Texas 
and California began loudly criticizing the safety of Mexican trucks.191 No American 
businesses would be negatively affected in the immediate term if these trucks were barred 
from the road and so there was no countervailing force arguing against these critics. 
Moreover, given the potential for fatal auto accidents to happen even when safety rules 
are being followed, there was a real chance that these trucks could become a public 
relations nightmare for the Clinton Administration; as one official put it, “all we need is 
one big environmental disaster, or one of these trucks plowing into a school bus, and all 
of a sudden NAFTA is going to look like a pretty disastrous idea.”192 Those deaths, had 
they happened, would have been seen as preventable. President Clinton thus banned 
Mexican trucks from traveling farther than 26 miles from the border.193  
 After the dispute dragged on for over a decade, Mexico began leveling retaliatory 
tariffs on 2.6 billion dollars worth of American products in August 2010, thus hurting 
their export competitiveness in Mexico; this got those exporters as well as a number of 
Congressmen to quickly and strongly push in favor of reducing regulatory trade 
barriers.194 Meanwhile, a pilot safety program from 2007 to 2009 had shown that by that 
time Mexican trucks were just as safe as American trucks.195 In 2011, less than a year 
after the Mexican tariffs were levied, with businesses screaming for a reduction of these 
regulatory barriers and highway safety advocates largely satisfied with Mexican trucks, 
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the U.S. and Mexico agreed to allow access for Mexican trucks in exchange for removal 
of those tariffs.196 When the regulatory barriers surrounding Mexican trucks were a 
matter of preventing needless death those barriers were maintained. When that fear 
subsided and when those barriers were a matter of competitiveness, they were reduced. 
Consumer Safety Regulatory Barriers in the Transatlantic Auto Trade 
Background 
 By 1996, for all intents and purposes, North America and Europe were each 
unified regions in terms of regulation and trade. For the previous decade and a half, the 
trajectory of automobile market organization bent toward greater and greater scale and 
internationalization. At that point, reducing the regulatory trade barriers that inhibited 
trade between Europe and North America seemed like the next logical step, and at first 
automakers adopted a strategy that suggested this was exactly what they believed. 
Carmakers, and especially Ford, attempted to create so-called ‘world cars’ that could 
satisfy consumers in multiple markets.197 At least initially, this seemed like a real 
possibility. Non-tariff barriers had been greatly reduced, as had domestic content 
regulations. American and European environmental standards were now much closer than 
they had been. The problem for these automakers was the bevy of consumer safety 
related regulations and the extent to which those regulatory differences inhibited trade. 
 Safety standards for automobiles first appeared in Europe in the late 19th century. 
The first set of automotive regulations was Britain’s 1896 mandate that cars have lights at 
night and a bell or horn.198 European safety standard recommendations began to be 
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promulgated on a regional level in the late 1950s under the aegis of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party 29.199 In 1970, under EC 
Council Directive 70/156, the EC established a type-approval under which the automaker 
would submit plans for a given design and the plans for that type of vehicle would be 
either rejected or approved. Using the EC 70 type approval system and coordinating work 
on technical standards under the WP 29 helped European standards alleviate potential 
regulatory trade barriers that might arise from different safety rules and attract extra-
regional adherents as well.200 This system carried though to the 1990s.201  
 The United States never joined that system. In the lead up to the creation of the 
NHTSA, Congress believed that European regulations were insufficient and so decided 
that the United States should develop its own set of standards.202 The United States 
moved toward a self-certification system under which automakers certify that they have 
met government standards and then automobiles are recalled if they are found to be non-
compliant with those standards. Interestingly, the NHTSA did initially use a system of 
rule promulgation similar to type-approval from its inception in 1966 to 1974.203 This 
proved too difficult given the United States’ penchant for adversarial legalism. A recall-
based approach was much easier to implement and uphold in court when challenged by 
automakers. In fact, the NHTSA lost half of the cases that were brought to court under 
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the rule system but only a single case under the recall system.204 As with Europe, this 
approach persisted into the 1990s. These different systems meant that safety standards in 
the two markets developed independently from one another. By the 1990s and even up to 
today, there are numerous differences in how automobiles are regulated in the two 
markets. The two photos below give a small sampling of the dizzying array of regulatory 
differences.  
Figure 4.1: U.S.-EU Regulatory Differences205  
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Consumer Safety Regulatory Trade Barriers, 1996-1999  
 Starting in 1995, businesses on both sides of the Atlantic came together to create 
the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), an international lobby to push for greater 
trade liberalization.206 Automakers were major players in the TABD.207 Some estimates 
claimed that harmonizing regulations could save $3,000 on the production cost of a 
car.208 Regulatory cooperation in automobiles was a core pursuit of the TABD starting 
with their first meeting in Seville.209 In 1996, with the support of the TABD, automakers 
called for their governments to “eliminate completely the barriers to trade resulting from 
unwarranted differences in vehicle regulation.”210 As a start toward this, they proposed 
harmonizing regulations for five parts (windshield wipers, defrosters, seatbelts, head 
restraints, and headlamp encasings) that they felt would be particularly easy to align 
regulations on.211 To their surprise, the regulators did not agree to make any changes to 
any of the requirements for any of those parts.212  
 This happened because the other interested parties chose to stridently resist 
businesses’ attempts to reduce regulatory barriers. American consumer groups, who were 
accustomed to extensive access during regulation comment periods and public hearings 
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in the U.S., were angry that the discussions going on under the auspices of the TABD 
systematically excluded them.213 European regulators chafed at automakers appearing to 
call the shots saying that European, and particularly French officials, “don't accept that 
businessmen can sit down and set policy.”214 
 Amongst the loudest critics of the TABD’s efforts was Ricardo Martinez, the 
head of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). He 
argued that the TABD was too willing to sacrifice the public’s safety for the sake of trade 
saying “I have great concerns that the perspective is not broad enough to respect the real 
issues of safety and health…the dialogue so far has been very much one way."215 
Martinez was not a former auto executive. He was a former ER doctor who frequently 
had to deal with the consequences of car accidents.216  
 This lack of industry background for the head of the NHTSA was not an anomaly 
for the NHTSA. A previous NHTSA chief was Joan Claybrook, a former chief executive 
of Public Citizen, the advocacy group founded by Ralph Nader.217 The NHTSA’s 
relationship with automakers is in many ways the diametric opposite of the USDA’s 
relationship with beef producers discussed in Chapter 5. Whereas the USDA sees its 
mandate as both protecting public safety and promoting meat industry sales, the NHTSA 
sees it mission as protecting consumers, full stop. The NHTSA was set up in 1966 in 
order to monitor automakers precisely because those automakers were perceived to have 
valued profits over passenger safety. The NHTSA’s early decision to staff its agency 
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primarily with engineers, rather than economists or industry representatives, created an 
institutional outlook at the NHTSA that promoted the use of design specifications, i.e. 
safety regulations, with little if any regard for automakers’ profit margins.218 This stance 
carried into the 1990s and meant that the NHTSA remained skeptical of automakers’ 
attempts to harmonize regulations to boost trade.  
 Moreover, changing those regulations would have required them to turn their 
backs on regulations they believed were just fine. Robert Zoellick, the former head of the 
World Bank explained it this way, “a lot of the regulatory authorities are sensitive to their 
prerogatives. They think ‘we are doing it the right way, and why should we change?”219 
Indeed, when asked about specific regulations such as airbag size, American and 
European regulators each insist that their standard is superior and saves lives.220 
American and European regulators both fervently believe the regulations that they have 
laid out are necessary and effective; for them to believe otherwise would be tantamount 
to admitting to being bad at their jobs, and that is something most human beings just do 
not do. As hard as it is to find someone who will admit to being a bad driver, it may be 
harder still to find a bureaucrat who admits to regulating poorly.  
 Yet again, these regulatory barriers were promoted by activists for normative 
reasons and were not means of disguised protectionism. The cleavage-based 
explanations, by ignoring these actors engaged in trade politics but for normative rather 
than economic reasons, would not have been able to explain the politics surrounding 
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these environmental regulations and trade. Furthermore, this case also demonstrates that 
business’ political power is more limited than is often estimated. As with the consumer-
safety related regulatory barriers related to mad-cow disease analyzed in the next chapter, 
these barriers seemed like the kind of technical, low-salience issues that should allow for 
easy cooperation between governments, especially when business interests are pressuring 
them to do so. Nevertheless, when these regulatory barriers take concrete form and seem 
to be protecting lives, consumer safety advocates can effectively defeat large businesses. 
Consumer Safety Regulatory Trade Barriers, Post-1999 
 As it was becoming more clear to automakers that they would face greater 
resistance to reducing transatlantic regulatory barriers than they originally believed, 
automakers also realized that the gains from transitioning their production from region-
based to globally-based were not likely to produce the level of benefits that they had 
envisioned. This realization centered around three considerations. First, economies of 
scale often have a diminishing marginal return. At a certain point, the fixed costs that 
drive economies of scale become smaller and firms encounter diseconomies of scale 
where increased size hurts profits. These diseconomies can emerge from a host of issues 
ranging from specialization getting too narrow to organizational decision-making 
becoming sclerotic and unwieldy.221 Automakers had already reached an effective size at 
the regional level to achieve helpful economies of scale. They did not need to reorganize 
globally to get those, and if they did attempt that, they might encounter costly 
diseconomies of scale.  
 Second, the just-in-time inventory systems pioneered by the Japanese firms in the 
1970s and adopted by other automakers and the 1980s and 1990s required that supplier 
                                                
221 Conybeare, John. 2004. Merging Traffic: The Consolidation of the International Automobile Industry. 
Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, MD. p. 24-25.  
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networks and automakers’ production processes be at least somewhat near each other.222 
To state the obvious, just in time inventory is much easier when there is not an ocean in 
the way. In addition, shipping finished vehicles is very expensive given their size and the 
need to handle them with care, which motivates firms to build vehicles at least in the 
general vicinity of where they will be sold.223  
 Third, consumer preferences between the two regions were so different that 
attempting to create a single vehicle for both markets might be a losing proposition even 
without being held up by regulatory trade barriers. Differences in consumer tastes 
between North America and Europe obviously did not begin in the 1990s, although they 
did become more significant over the course of that decade. In Japan, sales of mini-cars 
grew rapidly.224 In North America, light trucks and sport utility vehicles became highly 
popular; they grew from 30 percent of the market in 1990 to around 50 percent in 
2001.225 In Europe, diesel cars increased from 19 percent market share in 1990 to 42 
percent in 2001 whereas their share of the market in North America remained close to 
zero.226 Attempts at ‘world cars’ such as the Ford Mondeo had a habit of being successful 
in one region and tanking in the other.227  
 As it became more apparent that changing from a regional to a global orientation 
would be less lucrative and more difficult to achieve, automakers stopped expending 
political energy advocating for reduced regulatory trade barriers. There were no serious 
                                                
222 Sidney Weintraub and Christopher Sands (ed.) 1998. The North America Auto Industry Under NAFTA. 
Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington. p. 9.   
223 Rubenstein. 2001. Making and Selling Cars. p. 94, 322. 
224 Jürgens, Ulrich. 2003. “Characteristics of the European Automotive System: Is There a Distinctive 
European Approach.” Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Discussion Paper No. SP III 2003-301. p. 
12-13.  
225 Ibid.  
226 Ibid.  
227 Studer-Noguez. 2002. Ford and the Global Strategies of Multinationals. p. 133. Bordenave. 2003. “The 
Twin Internationalization Strategies.” p. 58.  
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efforts to harmonize regulations after 1999. Businesses had stopped advocating for 
reduced regulatory barriers while consumer organizations and regulators were ready to 
push against them if they started to do so again.  
 Some discussion of renewed regulatory cooperation in automobiles has 
accompanied the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that started 
being negotiated in 2013.228 Automakers hope that these talks will reduce regulatory 
trade barriers in their industry.229 They should not hold their breath. Those negotiations 
are languishing. The Obama Administration has its eye on the TPP ball, which it has 
accurately perceived to be further along than TTIP. European economic governance 
seems continually mired in the Greek debt crisis and may soon have to deal with Brexit, 
which could be a catastrophe that demanded all political and economic attention. 
 Even when U.S. and EU officials can find the attention to discuss transatlantic 
trade, mutual skepticism towards each other’s regulations impedes progress.230 German 
consumer groups went berserk when they found out that the TTIP could potentially lead 
to imports of American chicken that, unlike German chicken, is put through a series of 
chlorinated rinses.231 American consumer groups likewise worry about the areas in which 
                                                
228 Inside U.S. Trade. “EU Sets Most Ambitious Goals In Auto Sector Regulations In TTIP Talks.” Vol. 31, 
No. 28. July 12, 2013. Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S., EU Officials Say Auto Regulators Making Headway In 
TTIP Talks.” Vol. 32, No. 29. July 18, 2014.  
229 European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA). “Automobile Industry Welcomes the 
Opening of EU-US Trade Talks.” Press Release. June 17, 2013. 
230 Both German and American consumers trust the other’s standards much less than their own country’s on 
a number of issues including auto safety, data privacy, environmental regulations, and food safety 
standards. Pew Research Center. “Support in Principle for U.S.-E.U. Trade Pact: But Some Americans and 
Germans Wary of TTIP Details” April 9, 2014. The margins are especially profound for German citizens. 
231 Faiola, Anthony. “Free Trade With U.S.? Europe Balks at Chlorine Chicken, Hormone Beef.” The 
Washington Post. December 4, 2014. Johnson, Renee. “U.S.-EU Poultry Dispute on the Use of Pathogen 
Reduction Treatments (PRTs).” Capelouto, Susanne. “European Activists Say They Don’t Want Any U.S. 
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European standards are lower than in the U.S.232 These sorts of dynamics would likely 
arise in auto regulations if and when more negotiating progress were made on TTIP.  
 It would be foolhardy to try to predict exactly which car-related regulation 
consumer groups would latch on to, but given that car regulations have life-and-death 
consequences, it is not difficult to envision those groups finding some regulatory change 
in a proposed TTIP that they consider to be a public safety sacrifice in the name of trade 
expansion. Here’s one plausible scenario. Child safety restraint regulations are different 
in the United States and Europe.233 It would not be too difficult to imagine a policy 
entrepreneur with a blog convincing a slice of American parents that regulatory trade 
barrier reductions in a TTIP deal would make it more likely that their children die on the 
way to soccer practice. NHTSA officials would not-so-quietly mutter in op-ed pieces that 
these parents had a point, adding further fuel to the criticism that the USTR was getting. 
The only way to circumvent this criticism would be to have all of the harmonization go 
upward, but unlike in the environmental regulations, in safety regulations the various 
regulators and consumer groups cannot agree on what upward even means or whose 
regulations are higher than whose. Unless automakers can find some way of mollifying or 
marginalizing consumer advocacy groups as well as regulators, reducing safety-related 
regulatory trade barriers in the transatlantic auto trade seems unlikely. 
 This too undermines the disguised protectionism thesis as well as the state-centric 
and cleavage-based explanations. The regulatory differences were not promoted by 
                                                
232 Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue. “Letter to USTR and European Commission: EU and US Consumer 
Groups Initial Reaction to the Announcement of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.” March 
5, 2013.  
233 Abbott, Chelsea. “European Standards Versus American Standards: Car Seat Edition.” Magic Beans. 
June 30, 2013. http://mbeans.com/spillingthebeans/baby/car-seats/european-standards-vs-american-
standards-car-seat-edition/ (Accessed April 28, 2016). 
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automakers as a way to reduce competition. Far from it, they wanted these differences 
significantly reduced. Once again, the purely state-centric explanations, by ignoring 
societal actors, and the cleavage-based explanations, by ignoring those with normative 
motivations, fail to explain the politics behind the negotiations over these regulatory trade 
barriers.  
Concluding Remarks: Wealth Generation and Regulatory Sovereignty 
 The generation of wealth is a worthy goal for societies. Many of societies’ other 
goals depend on its accomplishment. Trade liberalization helps accelerate that. That is 
why concerns about competitiveness are so instrumental in reducing regulatory trade 
barriers. Competitiveness links businesses’ particular interest with society’s broader goal 
of wealth generation. Still, wealth generation is not the only goal societies have. They 
also want to protect their environments, their laborers, and their consumers. Pursuing 
those goals leads states to jealously guard their regulatory autonomy. This will especially 
be the case when the potential or actual removal of a regulatory barrier has clear negative 
consequences as it relates to government protecting its citizens. Preventing unnecessary 
death links activists’ particular interest with society’s broader goal of protecting people. 
As long as regulation and trade intersect, regulatory trade barriers will continue to affect 
societies’ attempts to generate wealth and their attempt to protect citizens. The politics 
surrounding regulatory barriers in the automobiles trade has been about these two 
imperatives since the 1980s and is likely to continue be so for the foreseeable future.  
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Chapter 5- Catching Roadrunner:  
Mad-Cow Regulations and the U.S.-Japan Beef Trade, 2003-2013 
 
Introduction  
 Beef exports are a lucrative business for American cattlemen. The single largest 
export market for American beef is Japan. Of the $6.5 billion in beef the U.S. exported in 
2014, 1.4 billion of that went to Japan.1 Beef exports have not just been remunerative. 
They have also been highly variable. The value of U.S. beef exports to Japan was $1.2 
billion in 2003, just 80 million in 2004 and 2005 combined, 439 million in 2008, and 1.3 
billion in 2013.2  
Figure 5.1. U.S. Beef Exports to Japan3 
 
The tariffs and other non-regulatory trade barriers faced by U.S. exporters 
remained constant throughout this period. The changes in regulatory trade barriers faced 
by U.S. beef exporters however were a major driver of this variability. At times those 
                                                
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Statistics and Information. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/cattle-beef/statistics-information.aspx. Accessed April 30, 
2016. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Figure 4.1 is based monthly data from the U.S. Meat Export Federation. https://www.usmef.org/news-
statistics/statistics/  Accessed March 8, 2016. Note: The negotiations over regulatory trade barriers are 
responsible for the overall trajectory seen in this graph but the individual peaks and valleys are due to the 
fact that overall demand for beef in Japan is higher in summer months. 
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regulatory barriers were increased, while at other times they were reduced, and at other 
times stayed the same. This chapter explains the political negotiations that drove that 
variation in regulatory trade barriers.  
 In the wake of discovering bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also 
commonly referred to as mad-cow disease, in their country in September 2001, the 
Japanese government instituted the world’s strictest beef safety regulations. They did not 
apply those regulations to beef imports from countries that had never had a case of BSE. 
At the time, that included the United States. Once the first case of BSE was discovered in 
the United States in December 2003 however, Japan’s strict regulations did apply to beef 
that U.S. producers wanted to export to Japan. These regulations were markedly tougher 
than the regulations those producers were accustomed to operating under in the United 
States. Because U.S. beef producers could not or would not abide by these Japanese 
regulations, depending on the phrasing one wants to use, this cross-national difference in 
regulations constituted a major regulatory trade barrier for U.S. beef. Negotiations 
between the United States and Japan in 2004-2005 resulted in a buy-out in which U.S. 
beef producers regained some market access but could only ship certain kinds of beef 
(only from cows under 20 months old and with all specified risk materials removed). A 
U.S. producer’s major safety mistake in 2006 led to a renewed ban and subsequently to 
another round of negotiations in which those producers regained access for a second time, 
but with even more regulatory strings attached.  A 2007 OIE decision led the United 
States to take a more hardline stance; the two sides could not reach an agreement and so 
the regulatory trade barriers remained in place. Just when a compromise seemed within 
reach, the LDP was replaced by the DPJ, which was much less willing to compromise on 
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the issue. The Japanese government’s initial steps to join the TPP led to some softening 
on the issue but was halted by farmer protests and the need to focus on recovering from 
the 2011 tsunami/nuclear disaster. Finally, negotiations that stretched from the fall of 
2011 to March of 2013 led to a nearly full re-opening of the Japanese market for U.S. 
beef producers almost a decade after that access had been originally shut.    
Table 5.1- Regulatory Trade Barriers Outcomes In the U.S-Japan Beef Trade 
BSE Emerges in Japan (2001-2003)---------------------------------------------------> Increase 
BSE in the U.S. (Dec. 2003-April 2004)----------------------------------------------> Stasis 
Market Access Re-Opening Negotiations (May 2004-Dec. 2005)-----------------> Buy-Out 
U.S. Mistakes and Diplomatic Clean-Up (Jan. 2006-April 2007)-----------------> Buy-Out 
American Exceptionalism and Throttled Compromise (May 2007-Aug. 2009)-> Stasis 
Self-Tied Hands and the DPJ (August 2009-September 2010)---------------------> Stasis 
The TPP and Confidence Building Measures (Oct. 2010-Oct. 2011)--------------> Stasis 
30-Month Rule is Implemented (October 2011-March 2013)----------------------> Decrease 
 
 I explain this variation by examining the political bargaining between U.S. beef 
producers, Japanese consumer advocacy groups, and government officials in both states. 
The reaction of Japanese consumers to the spread of BSE in Japan and then the United 
States was so strong that Japanese officials had no choice but to increase regulatory 
differences between the U.S. and Japan despite the protests from U.S. cattlemen and U.S. 
government officials. These Japanese consumer advocacy groups were motivated enough 
and strong enough to ensure that any compromises made that allowed renewed market 
access for American beef came with significant regulatory commitments. Only when 
those consumer groups became less animated by this issue and when the TPP brought 
Japanese producer interests into the negotiations, did American cattlemen regain nearly 
full market access.  
Cultural, Historical, and Scientific Background 
 In Japanese culture, the customer has traditionally been considered to be socially 
superior to the retailer; this has fostered high service standards but also encouraged 
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consumers to be detail-oriented and relatively unforgiving of merchants’ mistakes.4 Post-
war Japanese businesses, by advocating consumer education and promoting greater 
information provision as a means of protecting consumers without adding costs to 
themselves, amplified this trend.5 The upshot of this strategy was that by the 1970s, strict 
regulations had become foundational to Japanese consumer protection policies.6 The 
behavior and demands of Japanese consumer advocacy organizations remains embedded 
within this cultural and regulatory dynamic.   
 In terms of political activity, the stereotypical view of Japanese consumers is that 
they are either docile accomplices of producers or bullied into submission by the 
combined political strength of business interests in league with the powerful Japanese 
bureaucracy.7 By the early 2000s though, this depiction had grown far less accurate. 
Japanese consumer groups had been highly concerned by and engaged in food safety as 
far back as the 1970s and 1980s.8 An augmenting factor behind this concern was that 
newspapers often covered food safety-related stories because they involved issues that 
readers could easily digest, thus making good copy.9  
 Moreover, because consumer groups had far fewer avenues for recompense and 
protection through the court system than their American counterparts, they were much 
                                                
4 Prasol, Alexander. 2010. Modern Japan, Origins of the Mind: Japanese Traditions and Approaches to 
Contemporary Life. World Scientific Press: New York. p. 113-116, 141-142.   
5 Trumbull, Gunnar. 2012. Strength in Numbers: The Political Power of Weak Interests. Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, MA. p. 47, 50. 
6 Trumbull. 2012. Strength in Numbers. p. 50. 
7 On this stereotype, see Vogel, Steven. 1999. “When Interests Are Not Preferences: The Cautionary Tale 
of Japanese Consumers.” Comparative Politics. 31:2. p. 189. Maclachlan, Patricia. 2002. Consumer 
Politics in Postwar Japan: The Institutional Boundaries of Citizen Activism. Columbia University Press: 
New York. p. 1-3.   
8 Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 175. Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer 
Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies. 18:1. p. 124, 128, 134.  
9 Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 196.  
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more reliant on protection through government regulation.10 In line with this, the 
Japanese regulatory system is designed to prevent defects beforehand whereas the 
American system often relies on compensating victims after the fact.11 For these reasons, 
Japanese consumers have generally been more concerned with food safety regulations 
than their American counterparts.12  
 They have aggressively lobbied in favor of stringent labeling requirements and 
against the use synthetic food additives and post-harvest pesticides, both commonly used 
in the United States.13 That contaminated blood from the United States was one of the 
major sources of the spread of AIDS in Japan only compounded Japanese suspicions of 
imports from America.14 Japanese consumer groups have also tended to assert that safety 
inspections, even based on similar regulations, will not be carried out as carefully in other 
states as they would be in Japan.15 These groups have favored stricter regulations even 
when that limits the variety of products available to them.16  
 Japanese consumer groups’ political strength grew still further in the 1990s. The 
Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss of power in 1993, its first such loss since the 
1950s, greatly weakened producers’ stranglehold on the political process, and relatively 
strengthened consumer activists by creating a greater number of access points and leading 
                                                
10 Okimoto, Daniel. 1989. Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for High Technology. 
Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA. p. 15. Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. 
p. 178. Trumbull. 2012. Strength in Numbers. p. 51-52. Also, Japanese law does not usually allow product 
liability lawsuits from advocates who have not themselves been hurt by a product. Machlachlan. 2002. 
Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 236.  
11 Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” p. 141. 
12 Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 178.  
13 Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” p. 124, 128, 131-132. 
Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 181, 188-190.  
14 Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” p. 140. 
15 Chira, Susan. “Diffuse Goals Set By Naders of Japan.” The New York Times. July 14, 1986. 
16 David and Karen Martin. 1985. “Western Ideology, Japanese Product Safety Regulation and International 
Trade.” University of British Columbia Law Review. 19:2. p. 363. Vogel, Steven. 1999. “When Interests 
Are Not Preferences.” p. 194.  
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to augmented consumer protection laws.17 Consumer groups have effectively punished 
political parties, especially the LDP, for perceived mistakes on several other occasions as 
well.18 Compared to other Japanese civil society groups such as environmentalists, the 
consumer movement is organizationally strong and politically influential.19  
 This organizational strength was, and continues to be, supplemented by the great 
extent to which government officials have dreaded the public outrage that can ensue from 
a scandal; as one minister put it, “we have to be very careful to prevent incidents because 
the newspapers really go after you when you slip up.”20 Businesses were still well 
represented in the halls of Japanese power, but by 2000, they no longer dominated the 
political process to the exclusion of consumer groups in the manner they once did, 
especially with regards to food safety regulations. As this change was occurring, Japan 
was also rapidly increasing its imports of U.S. beef. 
 Western food became prevalent in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s.21 Beef was a 
significant part of that trend. Japan began importing large amounts of U.S. beef in the late 
1970s but these imports were subjected to a highly protectionist quota system.22 In 1991, 
these quotas were replaced with tariffs, which were further reduced in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations that created the WTO in 1995.23 Consequently, Japanese imports of 
U.S. beef significantly increased in the early 1990s and then surged again in the late 
                                                
17 Machlachlan. 2002. Consumer Politics in Postwar Japan. p. 234, 243-246.  
18 Vogel, Steven. 1999. “When Interests Are Not Preferences.” p. 192. 
19 Vogel, David. 1992. “Consumer Protection and Protectionism in Japan.” p. 148. 
20 Vogel. 1999. “When Interests Are Not Preferences.” p. 192. Trumbull. 2012. Strength in Numbers. p. 63-
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21 Bestor, Theodore. 2011. “Cuisine and Identity in Contemporary Japan” in Routledge Handbook of 
Japanese Culture and Society. Victoria Bestor, Theodore Bestor, and Akiko Yamagata (eds.) Routledge: 
New York. p. 282. 
22 Conlon, Michael. “The History of U.S. Beef and Pork Exports to Japan.” USDA Foreign Agricultural 
Service. Global Agriculture Information Network. April 24, 2009. p. 3, 8-9. 
23 Conlon, Michael. 2009. “The History of U.S. Beef and Pork Exports to Japan.” p. 13. Davis. 2005. Food 
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1990s.24 This increase notwithstanding, even though imported foods were once highly 
prized, by the 2000s domestically produced foods had become associated with higher 
quality and safety.25 
 Amidst this increase in beef imports, in 1996 bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) gained international notoriety, especially in Europe, and led to calls for regulatory 
action to prevent its spread. BSE, also commonly referred to as mad-cow disease, is a 
neurological disease that may infect cattle. If a person consumes meat from a cow 
infected with BSE, even if the meat is cooked thoroughly, that person can contract variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (vCJD), which is fatal within one to two years after onset and 
has no known cure.26 BSE is highly correlated with a cow’s age. That is why many of the 
regulations designed to combat BSE have an age component. The disease clusters in the 
cow’s brain and spinal cord which is why these parts are deemed “specified risk 
materials” that should be removed from cattle that are slaughtered after they reach 30 
months of age according to the World Animal Health Organization (referred to as the 
OIE), the international standard-setting body for regulations used in the meat industry.27  
BSE in Japan But Not in the United States: September 2001-December 2003       
 In September 2001, the first case of BSE was discovered in Japan.28 The Japanese 
government, especially the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) and 
the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (HLW) were widely perceived to have badly 
                                                
24 Conlon, Michael. 2009. “The History of U.S. Beef and Pork Exports to Japan.” p. 13. Dyck, John. 1998. 
"US-Japan Agreements On Beef Imports: A Case of Successful Bilateral Negotiations." United States 
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25 Cwiertka, Katarzyna. 2006. Modern Japanese Cuisine: Food, Power and National Identity. Reaktion 
Books. p. 167, 172-173. 
26 Center for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “vCJD: 
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease.” http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/vcjd/index.htm Accessed March 8, 
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27 For an encyclopedic coverage of BSE, see the OIE’s official website on BSE. http://www.oie.int/animal-
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botched their response because the infected cow had inadvertently been processed into 
bone meal and distributed to pork and chicken farmers.29 Pigs and chickens cannot 
contract BSE but this still alarmed consumers and created a perception of an ineffective 
safety system.30 As one Japanese consumer said, “I don’t think there is any concrete logic 
to say that meat is safe, when you hear that the cow was not actually destroyed, what can 
you believe?”31 The MAFF was also criticized for not banning meat-and-bone meal 
(MBM) being fed to cattle as the OIE had recommended.32 The Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare (HLW), which was the ministry responsible for conducting the BSE 
tests, also came under severe criticism because it was that ministry’s officials who 
contributed to the slow response by forgetting to actually inform their counterparts in the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF) that a BSE case had been found.33   
 The opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) condemned the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) handling of the situation and engaged in a bit of 
rhetorical outbidding, advocating for a total ban on the use of MBM, even for pigs and 
poultry because if it was allowed to be fed to chicken and pigs, it would be very easy for 
farmers to give potentially infected MBM to cattle either mistakenly or as a cost-saving 
                                                
29 Tolbert, Kathryn. “Japan to Test 1 Million Cattle for ‘Mad Cow’; Concerns Grow After First Case 
Botched.” The Washington Post. September 20, 2001. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid.  
32 The Nikkei Weekly. “Mad-Cow Disease Plagues Beef Industry.” October 1, 2001. MAFF did ban the 
practice after the first BSE case was discovered but by then over 2,000 cows had consumed the infected 
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maneuver without the government knowing.34 Shortly thereafter, it came to light that the 
Japanese government had not just ignored but actively suppressed a report on the risk of 
BSE coming into the Japanese market via meat-and-bone meal imports from Europe.35 
The discovery of that suppressed report only added to consumer groups’ outrage.36 
 A series of scandals shortly after the discovery of BSE involving domestic meat 
firms further reinforced Japanese consumer groups’ belief that strict regulations were 
needed to prevent beef producers from engaging in unsavory behavior. One company had 
falsely labeled imported beef as domestic and had sold meat to the government well past 
its expiration date in order to take advantage of a government insurance program, a 
maneuver that a MAFF official called “heinous beyond imagination.”37 Subsequent 
investigations revealed that at least two other major meat companies had falsified 
information regarding their products as well.38 A number of smaller scale frauds 
accompanied these revelations and convinced consumer advocates that these deceptions 
were “only the tip of the iceberg.”39 These episodes fueled calls for greater traceability 
and more exacting labeling requirements for meat and some of these calls directly 
accused the government bureaucracies of being too cozy with producers.40  
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 These events, though not directly related to U.S. beef producers, had two major 
consequences for the regulatory trade barrier negotiations that would occur later. First, 
they convinced consumer activists that stringent regulations were absolutely necessary 
and so made them more rigid in defending Japan’s BSE countermeasures. This 
conviction also helped give birth to a traceability system in which shoppers could view 
the cow’s breeding history, their inspection certificate showing they were free of BSE, 
their species, breed, sex, slaughter date, the packaging plant they came from, the name of 
the meat inspector, and even a photograph of the farmer who sold the animal to the 
slaughter facility.41 Once Japanese consumers considered that level of transparency the 
norm, the argument made by U.S. beef producers a few years later that they should not 
have to keep records of or identify a cow’s actual age- the factor most strongly correlated 
with BSE- struck those consumers as unreasonable and flippant.  
 Second, these scandals so thoroughly embarrassed the Ministry of Agriculture 
that it became highly incentivized to aggressively pursue and enforce food safety 
regulations in order to win back credibility in the eyes of the public. After these incidents, 
Agriculture Minister Takebe said that the MAFF would begin implementing regulations 
“from the standpoint of the consumer.”42 Demonstrating the extent to which this issue 
was being taken seriously across the Japanese government, the Fair Trade Commission, 
                                                
41 The Japan Times. “Tracking Systems Try to Tackle Food Safety.” May 1, 2002. Clemens, Roxanne. 
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Doubt.” March 25, 2002. The MAFF continued to make this claim in later years as well. The Nikkei 
Weekly. “Tariff Hikes on Beef Lack Justification.” August 4, 2003. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 170 
though it was not the central target of consumers’ ire, also said that it to would take a 
stronger stand on consumer protection regulations.43   
 In order to re-establish its credibility on food regulation and reassure consumers 
of the safety of Japanese beef, the government implemented the world’s most stringent 
BSE counter-measures. All cattle entering the food supply would be tested for BSE and 
all specified risk materials had to be removed.44 Later, in 2003, when the OIE 
recommended the vertebrae also be considered a specified risk material, Japan changed 
its regulations to match the OIE’s guidance, which suggests that the Japanese government 
was not as contemptuous of international standards as the U.S. would later claim.45 These 
regulations were not applied to beef imported from states that had never had a case of 
BSE. Therefore, beef imports from the United States, which still had not had a BSE case, 
were not subjected to these regulations. This counts as strong evidence that the Japanese 
government was not attempting to use BSE regulations as a disguised means of 
protectionism. If a government were using regulations as a sneaky form of protectionism, 
it would not exempt imported products from the regulations imposed on domestic 
producers.   
 Also during this time, U.S. beef producers, through the U.S. Meat Export 
Federation, organized a promotional campaign to extol the safety of American beef.46 
They ostentatiously labeled their products as imported from the United States and even 
had U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman tour the country, giving cooking lessons 
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prominently featuring American beef to Japanese schoolchildren.47 By May 2003, 
Japanese beef consumption had returned to 86 percent of its pre-BSE level and so as long 
as the U.S. could remain BSE-free, U.S. beef producers could resume their billion dollar-
plus level of annual exports to Japan.48 That did not happen. 
The Discovery of BSE in the U.S. and Initial Reactions: December 2003-April 2004  
 In December 2003, the first case of BSE was discovered in the United States. In 
response, Japan suspended U.S. beef imports until an investigation could be undertaken, 
as is standard international practice when a country reports its first BSE case.49 That BSE 
discovery had two effects. First, it increased Japanese consumers’ skepticism of the 
adequacy of U.S. food safety regulations and the safety of U.S. beef.50 These concerns 
were especially acute because when that first BSE case was discovered, by the time the 
test results came back showing that the cow in question did have BSE, that cow had been 
slaughtered, its meat had been mixed with 10,000 pounds of meat from other cattle, and 
had been shipped to supermarkets in eight states.51 The BSE discovery raised 
considerably more alarm in Japan that in the United States.52  
 Second, it meant that if U.S. beef producers wanted to regain market access, they 
now had to meet Japan’s strict BSE countermeasures. Notably, the Japanese government 
declared that U.S. producers would not have to implement a Japanese-style traceability 
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program and stated that by making this exception they were hoping to avoid erecting an 
unnecessary trade barrier, again suggesting they were not attempting to use regulations as 
disguised protectionism.53 
 In the wake of the BSE discovery, U.S. beef producers fought against every 
regulatory change designed to curtail BSE on the grounds that those changes would be 
too expensive and successfully blocked a number of proposed regulations.54 The USDA 
did implement some new safety measures after the BSE discovery.55 For example, it 
stopped allowing downer cows (i.e. cows too sick or injured to walk) to be slaughtered 
and enter the food supply, and instituted a rule that if a cow was tested for BSE, that 
cow’s meat could not be sent to retailers until after the BSE test results came in.56 It did 
not however institute universal testing or specified risk material removal on all cows.  
 Consumer groups criticized the meat industry for adopting this approach and the 
U.S. government for acquiescing to industry demands but were no match for an industry 
with deep pockets and a direct interest in those regulations, especially since they were 
unable to galvanize the wider public.57 This situation resembled what James Q. Wilson 
has called entrepreneurial politics in which a diffuse interest squares off against a 
concentrated interest.58 For the diffuse interest to prevail, a successful political 
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entrepreneur must be able to garner attention and sympathy from the wider public. U.S. 
consumer groups were not able to do that.  
 The American regulatory changes were not enough for Japanese politicians or 
consumers, who saw no reason why American beef producers should not have to abide 
by the same safety regulations as Japanese producers.59 Prime Minister Koizumi stated 
that all beef imported from the United States had to pass “the same measures taken in 
Japan to secure safety and peace of mind such as removal of specified risk materials and 
inspection on all cows.”60  
 The Japanese government did however introduce an exception to blanket testing. 
The youngest cow found to have BSE in Japan was 21 months old and so the Japanese 
government stated that beef from cows slaughtered at 20 months or younger did not have 
to be tested for BSE.61 Though any producer could theoretically take advantage of the 20-
month age exception to universal testing, in practice only U.S. producers could use this 
carve-out. That was because, through intensive grain feeding, U.S. cattle are the only 
cattle that are raised and fattened quickly enough that they are ready for slaughter at or 
before 20 months.62 In contrast, Japanese cattle are not ready for slaughter until they are 
roughly four years old.63 This too counts as strong evidence that the Japanese government 
was not using BSE regulations as disguised protectionism. If the Japanese government 
had been doing so, the last thing they would have done would be to create an exemption 
to their regulations that only imported products could take advantage of.   
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 Despite this concession, U.S. producers still balked at Japan’s regulatory 
demands. They were less interested in assuaging Japanese consumers than in getting the 
Japanese government to allow them to sell their products under a regulatory framework 
more to their liking. As Roger Evans, the President of the Colorado Cattleman’s 
Association put it, “this thing has to be producer-friendly [and] I want it to be in the 
private sector that way someone is accountable to the producer.”64 Note the extent to 
which this cattleman did not understand, or did not care, that food safety regulations are 
usually thought of as being primarily for consumers’ benefit.  
Explaining the Absence of a California Effect 
 U.S. beef producers could have chosen to adopt the higher Japanese standards and 
lobby the U.S. government to raise U.S. standards accordingly, thus creating a California 
Effect. Had they done so, they would have immediately regained access to the Japanese 
market. Two factors made this California Effect even more likely. First, the Japanese 
market was the largest export market for U.S. beef producers. Market power is what 
gives states with high regulatory standards the ability to force foreign producers to raise 
their standards.65 If any foreign state had the market power to create a California Effect in 
U.S. beef, it was Japan. Second, the cost of changing these regulations was actually low, 
which is another factor that should encourage a California Effect.66 The direct costs of 
administering universal testing would only have been about a few cents per pound of beef 
and only took around six hours.67 U.S. producers could have implemented these 
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regulations only for beef being exported to Japan but worried that would lead American 
consumers to demand the same elevated standards. In other words, U.S. beef producers 
were actively trying to prevent a California Effect, and seemingly so was the USDA.  
 One small producer, Creekstone Farms, did attempt to adopt universal testing. 
The USDA blocked it from doing so because it was concerned that one company testing 
all of its beef for BSE would lead to consumers demanding that all companies do the 
same, thus adding costs for major beef producers.68 In other words, the USDA was 
implementing its regulations with the express purpose of undermining consumer activism 
over those very food safety regulations.  
 The penetration of beef industry insiders at the highest levels of the USDA made 
it even more likely the USDA would identify with those producers. For example, Alisa 
Harrison, the spokeswoman for Agriculture Secretary Veneman, and Dale Moore, 
Veneman’s Chief of Staff, both worked for the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association 
prior to their time at the USDA.69 Previously, in 1994, when Michael Taylor (who did not 
have a connection to the meat industry) took office as head of the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) at the USDA, he recalls being perturbed that the phone in his 
new office already had two speed dials, both for beef producer organizations.70 As Taylor 
explains, there was “a culture [in the USDA] that has developed over the years at the 
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political level, the food safety program at the USDA thinking of the industry as the 
customer rather than the consumer, and thinking in terms of efficient inspection rather 
than protecting public health."71 Collectively, these examples strongly suggest that the 
USDA at this time defined its role as protecting beef industry profits.  
 Regardless of the USDA’s position, U.S. producers’ resolute opposition to 
adopting Japanese standards even though that refusal lost them access to their largest 
export market demands explanation. Two factors explain their intransigence. First, their 
rhetorical strategy for criticizing Japanese BSE regulations further hardened their 
position. Because they disagreed with Japan’s regulations, and because regulations need 
to be justified on scientific grounds, U.S. producers repeatedly impugned as Japanese 
BSE rules as “unscientific.”72 Over time, these derisions created an echo chamber among 
beef producers that reinforced rather than softened their position.73   
 Not only were beef producers unwilling to incur even small cost increases, they 
also were philosophically opposed to regulation and government intervention in markets 
in general. This outlook is reflected in the fact that since 1990, three-quarters of their 
over 60 million dollars in campaign contributions have gone to Republicans; relatedly, of 
the 15 largest recipients of livestock industry campaign contributions in the 2014 cycle, 
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all 15 were Republican.74 Since the 1980s, the meat industry has also been rabidly anti-
union.75 The meat industry as a whole at this time was not ideationally predisposed to 
accepting higher regulations it deemed unnecessary. 
 Second, universal testing would have required American beef businesses go 
against the primary strategy of their business model, aggressive cost cutting.76 The meat 
industry’s primary focus at that time was, as it is now, on cost-control and getting meat to 
market as cheaply as possible; every other consideration was of secondary importance.77 
Adding costs, especially costs emanating from a regulatory approach they deemed 
unscientific, was simply not something beef producers were willing to do, even if such a 
stance lost them export business. Beef producers were not only in competition with each 
other; they were also in competition with the producers of all other foods, especially 
other forms of meat. Even if new testing requirements costs were spread evenly across 
beef producers thus ensuring that none of them gained a competition advantage, beef 
producers as a whole would still have lost out by having their product become more 
expensive relative to chicken, pork, and fish.  
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 That the conditions for the California Effect were present and yet it still did not 
occur suggests a few caveats to the California Effect. First, while market power does 
matter, it does not automatically override other concerns. As much as American cattle 
producers were committed to regaining access to Japan’s market, they were even more 
committed to promoting a regulatory regime that operated on their policy terms. Second, 
unlike automakers in their interaction with environmental regulations discussed in 
Chapter 4, U.S. beef producers believed they had another option besides conforming with 
Japan’s stricter regulations and pressing the U.S. government to raise its standards to 
match them. As will be shown in the following section, they believed that they could get 
the U.S. government, and specifically the United States Trade Representative, to 
successfully pressure the Japanese government into allowing imports of U.S. beef under a 
special arrangement that exempted U.S. beef producers from Japan’s more onerous 
regulations.  
 That Japanese market power could not make U.S. producers adopt stricter 
regulations but U.S. political and economic power could tempt them into attempting to 
strong-arm the Japanese, which did not work either, suggests that economic and 
diplomatic power in this case impeded progress toward a settlement more than it helped. 
That power backfired in a situation where it arguably should have been effective suggests 
that power-based explanations may be less efficacious than is commonly assumed. It also 
suggests just how sensitive the domestic politics over regulation can be.  
Details and Timing: Age Verification, Elections, and the Crawl Toward Market 
Access, May 2004- December 2005  
 With U.S. beef producers refusing to accept either Japanese standards or 
permanent exclusion from the Japanese market, their only other option was to lobby the 
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U.S. government to pressure the Japanese government to allow U.S. beef imports under a 
special arrangement. Through the early fall of 2004, the U.S. government pressured the 
Japanese government to allow a resumption of American imports under regulatory terms 
that U.S. producers could accept, showing that it was not just the USDA siding with 
producers. Allen Johnson, the chief U.S. agricultural negotiator alluded to the United 
States potentially taking the case before the WTO and Senator Max Baucus as well as 
Vice President Cheney urged the Japanese government to reopen its market.78 In June, 
Agriculture Secretary Veneman and President Bush also implored Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi to re-establish market access for U.S. producers as soon as possible.79 
These entreaties grew more insistent as the U.S. presidential election loomed closer. 
President Bush badly wanted to be able to declare victory on this issue in order to gain 
support in key swing states with large agriculture sectors such as Colorado, Missouri, and 
Florida.80  
 The lead negotiators throughout this case were in the office of the United States’ 
Trade Representative (USTR). Two dynamics combined to incentivize the USTR to 
vigorously defend the interests of U.S. beef exporters in this case. First, the USTR is 
strongly in favor of trade liberalization in its culture, its personnel, and its mission.81 
Second, the USTR also generally wants good relations with Congress.82 In many cases, 
there is a tension between those two imperatives. Congressman X wants to protect the 
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industries in their district while the USTR wants to promote trade, which may come at the 
expense of those industries. However, when a Congressman’s efforts to protect their 
constituent industry do not entail raising U.S. trade barriers but instead reducing another 
state’s trade barriers, the USTR’s two bureaucratic interests dovetail. Moreover, in this 
particular case, the trade barriers that the USTR would be trying to reduce were not part 
of some larger trade deal. Thus, they need not worry that some other Member of 
Congress would object to the USTR’s backing of the beef industry while not 
demonstrating the same fealty to an industry in their district. Additionally, the USTR had 
no bureaucratic or ideational interest in the content of America’s domestic beef 
regulations. This dispute with Japan over beef regulations provided the USTR with a rare 
opportunity to simultaneously pursue trade liberalization and good relations with 
Congress, and there was no countervailing interest mitigating those incentives.  
 Meanwhile, MAFF and HLW officials worried that a resumption of U.S. imports 
under looser regulations than those imposed on domestic beef would be perceived as the 
government sacrificing public health in order to appease the United States.83 By October 
2004, it was clear that Japan, at least for the time being, would not back down from its 
final offer of a 20-month age exemption from universal testing and removal of specified 
risk materials from all cattle.84 U.S. negotiators had already accepted a plan very close to 
this as an acceptable first step, so it seemed as though the United States and Japan were 
very close to re-opening at least some market access for U.S. beef producers.85  
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 The only real difference between the U.S. and Japanese plans was how to measure 
the age of the cattle to ensure they were not older than 20 months. Japan wanted the 
United States to institute a cattle tracking system like its own. The United States wanted 
to be allowed to estimate the cattle’s age based on the cow’s skeleton even though that 
method had a greater margin for error than Japanese regulators were comfortable with.86  
 The Bush Administration decided to accept the Japanese terms and declare trade 
victory less than two weeks before the presidential election.87 It presumed that the age-
verification details could be worked out later and that in any case this was only a 
temporary agreement that would be superseded after the United States won still greater 
access to the Japanese market.88 The timing of the agreement led the main opposition 
party, the DPJ, and a number of consumer groups to mistrust the reopening of imports as 
they saw the agreement as Prime Minister Koizumi’s political gift to President Bush.89   
 To the consternation of U.S. beef producers, the dispute over age verification and 
thus the exclusion of U.S. beef from the Japanese market dragged into and throughout 
most of 2005. The MAFF and HLW accepted new U.S. proposals for age-verification in 
February 2005 but they did not have final say on the matter.90 To implement the 
agreement with the United States, an official end of the universal testing policy as well as 
the acceptability of the U.S. age verification system had to be recommended by the Food 
Safety Commission, an independent, politically insulated panel of experts that was 
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created in July 2003 to make scientific judgments on food safety.91 It was created for the 
express purpose of making neutral decisions on food safety. MAFF and HLW officials 
argued, probably correctly, that any attempt on their part to force the commission to 
expeditiously make the decision MAFF/HLW wanted would likely have generated a 
storm of outrage that once again the government was not adequately protecting public 
health.92  
 After the Japanese government had publicly stated its intention to create the 20-
month exemption, the Food Safety Commission came under intense pressure from 
consumer groups to maintain universal testing.93 These consumers groups also argued 
that the Food Safety Commission should not allow a resumption of U.S. imports because 
safety procedures at U.S. meat processing facilities did not meet Japanese standards.94 In 
March 2005, Japanese restaurants that needed specifically American beef started 
lobbying the government to find some way to expedite the Food Safety Commission’s 
decision.95 This was the first time that the Japanese government received significant 
business lobbying in favor of reducing the regulatory barriers.  
 U.S. beef producers and government officials believed the October 2004 
agreement amounted to a Japanese commitment to allow a resumption of U.S. beef 
imports and that the continued delay was at the very least intentional foot-dragging if not 
a wholesale reneging on that agreement.96 U.S. officials became much more overt and 
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aggressive in their diplomatic pressure. Beef industry organizations and Congressmen 
began demanding that retaliatory sanctions be leveled against Japan if it did not allow 
imports of U.S. beef.97 This pressure made any relaxation seem to be a response to U.S. 
demands. In their zeal of pushing sanctions, members of Congress actually made 
reducing these barriers more difficult by delegitimizing Japanese government officials’ 
attempts to change their country’s regulations in ways that would have facilitated greater 
imports of American beef. Here too power backfired more than it helped. 
 Despite these threats, filing suit before the WTO on behalf of beef producers was 
never a real option for the U.S. government. A ruling in favor of the U.S. could have 
created a perception that Japan was being forced to accept imports of unsafe beef. That 
perception, besides generating diplomatic tension, could lead consumers to shun U.S. 
beef, thus negating the regained market access. This points to a potentially significant 
limitation to the power of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism as it pertains to 
regulatory barriers. Exporters benefit when the WTO rules against a particular trade 
barrier such as an unfair subsidy. However, the political sensitivity of states’ domestic 
regulations means that an exporter cannot make a WTO case out of that regulatory barrier 
because forcing a state to change its domestically agreed upon rules risks destroying the 
exporter’s reputation, and thus profits, in the importing country.  
 Throughout 2005, consumer groups remained convinced that U.S. safety 
standards did not pass muster and said so loudly.98 The DPJ criticized the ruling LDP for 
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disregarding consumer safety and for seeming to kowtow to the United States.99 This was 
a particularly sensitive time for the DPJ to make such accusations because there was a 
general election scheduled for September 2005. Much as President Bush wanted a trade 
victory just before the November 2004 U.S. elections, Koizumi and the LDP wanted to 
avoid making a trade concession that would incur consumer groups’ wrath until after 
their elections.  
 After those elections, to get the Food Safety Commission to approve U.S. beef, 
the LDP-led government ordered the commission to perform its risk-assessment based on 
the assumption that U.S. producers would follow Japanese regulations.100 In October 
2005, the Commission approved a resumption of U.S. imports under that assumption but 
noted, presciently, that they were skeptical that stringent adherence to Japanese standards 
would actually be carried out.101   
 Throughout this period, contra to the expectations of IR theories that presume that 
security issues predominate, neither side sacrificed its position on regulatory trade 
barriers in beef to realize gains on other security-related issues such as Japan’s 
participation in the war in Iraq, talks with North Korea, China’s military growth, or 
basing issues in Okinawa.102 Relatedly, even though they were key security allies, neither 
side was willing to allow the other to have its way on this issue.103 In fact, the beef issue 
at certain points overshadowed security matters during bilateral talks.104 This pattern of 
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beef-related tensions predominating security concerns would be repeated at later points as 
well.105 That the United States could not get Japan to yield on these regulatory barriers 
suggests that the political economy-related leverage benefits gained from providing 
security benefits to a regional protégé are highly limited once regulations are involved.  
 This is a significant development. It has long been presumed that delivering those 
security benefits gained the United States diplomatic capital that it could spend in other 
policy areas. Indeed, throughout the Cold War, trade policy often was subservient to 
geopolitical concerns, but that was a time period in which trade policy generally did not 
impact regulations. In the post-Cold War era, trade policy very much does affect 
regulation. Given this, looking forward the United States should not presume that security 
assistance will coax other states into bending in negotiations over regulatory trade 
barriers.   
 In December 2005, U.S. beef was allowed to be exported to Japan.106 The 
regulatory standards under which U.S. beef producers regained access to the Japanese 
market (under 20 months age limit, removal of all specified risk materials) still 
constituted a significant regulatory barrier, but at least renewed access meant some 
access, and if U.S. producers could demonstrate the safety of their product then perhaps 
those regulatory barriers could be reduced still further.107  The resumption of imports 
was severely criticized by Japanese consumer groups.108 The notion that U.S. meat 
packaging facilities might not always abide by the rules was not a figment of Japanese 
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consumer groups’ imagination; a USDA audit found 1,036 violations of specified risk 
material regulations from January 2004 to May 2005, and these rules were not even as 
strict as those contained in the U.S.-Japan agreement.109 MAFF and HLW officials, as 
well as Prime Minister Koizumi and the LDP, had staked their reputations on public 
health policy on the safety of U.S. beef. As long as U.S. beef producers adhered to the 
regulatory requirements agreed to by the U.S. and Japan, they could regain sales with 
more potential revenue gains to come. U.S. beef producers however failed to follow those 
regulations, to put it very mildly.  
Careless, Stupid Mistakes And Diplomatic Clean-Ups- January 2006 to April 2007  
 In January 2006, Japanese inspectors found a serious lapse in U.S. beef 
producers’ implementation of the safety protocols, which resulted in Tokyo suspending 
U.S. beef imports.110 In one of the boxes of U.S. beef, Japanese inspectors found 
vertebrae and a spinal cord.111 It would be difficult to overstate just how much of blunder 
this was. Recall that BSE clusters in the cow’s nervous system, making the spinal cord an 
especially risky “specified risk material.” The Aberdeen American News of South Dakota, 
as pro-beef a publication as one is likely to find anywhere, called the inclusion of these 
materials “a careless, stupid mistake.”112 Mike Johanns, the new U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture rightly said it was “an unacceptable failure.”113  
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 Johanns’ contrition was undermined however by statements other American 
officials and suppliers were making. The National Cattlemen’s Beef Association 
downplayed the mistake, pointing out that the inclusion of spinal cords from cattle less 
than 30 months old was not actually illegal in the United States, as if somehow that 
obviated Japanese concerns and regulations.114 In a similarly thoughtless vein, 
Agriculture Undersecretary J.B. Penn compared the risk of contracting vCJD from eating 
American beef to the risk of being hit by a car on the way to purchase the beef.115 From 
an actuarial standpoint, he may have been correct, but the remark was tone-deaf. In any 
case, comparing the consumption of one’s product to being struck by a vehicle does not 
conjure up images of safety and wholesomeness. The perception of insensitivity these 
comments engendered was compounded by Congressmen who immediately began calling 
for retaliatory sanctions after Japan’s re-imposition of the import ban.116    
 Meanwhile, Japanese consumer activists that had objected to allowing U.S. beef 
imports were apoplectic over the mistake and vindicated in their opposition. The Food 
Safety Citizen’s Watch declared their “great anger” and reminded everyone that they had 
“pointed out again and again…there is indeed a danger to us Japanese consumers [from 
U.S. beef].”117 This mistake shook Japanese consumers’ trust in American beef as badly 
as, if not worse than, the original discovery of BSE in the U.S.118 As one official put it “in 
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the opinion of the Japanese consumer, this is like a new scandal being revealed.”119 The 
DPJ party leadership pounced on the scandal, portraying it as indicative of the LDP’s 
insufficient concern for consumer safety and pointing out that it had opposed the market 
access agreement.120  
 Consumer groups demanded that, at minimum, the U.S. should have to allow 
Japanese regulators to inspect and decide for themselves which facilities to approve and 
that Japanese inspectors should be allowed to accompany their U.S. counterparts when 
they conducted surprise inspections of American meatpacking facilities.121  
 Japanese consumer groups demanded reinforced protection rather than continued 
access. What Gunnar Trumbull has called “narratives of access” (i.e. arguments in favor 
of using the state to increase consumers’ access to certain goods) were less powerful than 
“narratives of protection” (i.e. arguments in favor of using the state to protect consumers 
from the dangers posed by certain goods).122 Narratives of access had relatively little 
power to encourage relaxations of the Japanese regulations on American beef exports 
because consumers knew that their demand for beef could still be satisfied by other 
sources. A Japanese shopper interviewed after the spinal cord discovery argued that "the 
government should stop importing dangerous beef from the United States as (a supply 
shortage) could be averted with beef from Australia.”123 For their part, Australian beef 
importers expressed astonishment at the maladroitness of this American blunder but were 
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nevertheless happy that their main competition, after fighting so hard to regain market 
access, had managed to fritter away that access so expeditiously.124 
 Japanese officials again faced a serious threat to their credibility on food safety. 
What made the matter all the more perilous for the MAFF and HLW was that the day 
before the spinal cord discovery, Japanese officials had, on camera, assured consumers of 
American regulatory effectiveness.125 Given the predicament these officials were in, in 
order to retain the public’s trust, they had no choice but to re-impose the ban on beef not 
universally tested for BSE and insist upon the two policy demands advanced by the 
consumer groups. As a Japanese abattoir owner pointed out, “MAFF took the USDA at 
its word and it let them down. Because they look foolish, it would be some time before 
trade resumes.''126 The MAFF also decided to increase inspection of U.S. beef at ports of 
entry should imports be resumed.127 If these policies meant trade friction with the United 
States, then that was Prime Minister Koizumi’s problem; MAFF had almost no choice but 
to insist on significant regulatory improvements from the Americans.  
 Koizumi thus needed to demand tougher rules on U.S. beef but also not start a 
trade row. He did not want to be seen as caving to U.S. pressure and so argued that the 
decision was in the MAFF’s hands. When asked when about U.S. imports, he said that 
“specialists are discussing this matter. I'll follow their opinion.”128 Importantly, by April 
MAFF officials were satisfied with the increase in safety rules being placed on U.S. 
producers. They also believed that Japanese consumers’ concerns had become 
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overwrought; as one Food Safety Commission official said, “as specialists here at the 
ministry, we regard the consumers' reaction as extreme.”129  
 The U.S. acceded to these demands and in May 2006 the Japanese and U.S. 
governments reached an agreement to restore U.S. beef producers’ access to the Japanese 
market starting in July.130 This restored access came with a stricter oversight regime that 
gave foreign regulators inspection rights over American firms located entirely within the 
United States, an uncommon arrangement to say the least. Moreover, the HLW also 
decided to begin inspecting every box of imported U.S. beef rather than just a random 
sample.131 Still, this agreement only restored market access to its December 2005 level, a 
level U.S. cattlemen were never satisfied with in the first place. U.S. beef had not yet 
even reached Japan before the American government was already pushing Japan to 
further reduce its regulatory barriers, specifically raising the age exception on universal 
testing to all cows 30 months and younger.132 This pressure continued into 2007.133  
 It bears noting that throughout this period and into 2008, U.S. beef producers 
continued to make basic errors in complying with the U.S.-Japan beef export verification 
agreement. For example, they included unapproved thymus glands in one shipment, 
erroneously shipped beef that did not abide by Japan’s age limits on multiple occasions, 
                                                
129 Yomiuri Shimbun. “Pressure Grows to Lift U.S. Beef Ban.” May 7, 2006. Wiseman, Paul. “Trade War 
Looms Over Beef Dispute; Japan’s Ban Stands Amid Mad Cow Fears.” USA Today. April 20, 2006. The 
Japan Times. “Beef Safety Audit Passes Muster.” May 20, 2006. 
130 Yomiuri Shimbun. “U.S. Beef Exporters Must Not Slip Up Again.” May 21, 2006. The official wording 
of the agreement can be found in, Inside U.S. Trade. “Text: U.S.-Japan Statement on Beef.” Vol. 24, No. 5. 
June 23, 2006. 
131 The Japan Times. “Japan Set to Lift U.S. Beef Ban.” June 21, 2006. 
132 Kyodo News. “Japanese Minster Rejects U.S. Call for Talks to Expand Beef Exports.” August 1, 2006. 
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific. Wijers-Hasagawa, Yumi. “Japan Receives First Batch of U.S. Beef.” The 
Japan Times. August 8, 2006. Inside U.S. Trade. “Japan Opens To Limited U.S. Beef Trade Amid Calls 
For Broader Openings.” Vol. 24, No. 3. July 28, 2006.  
133 Kyodo News. “Japan Turns Down US Request For Beef Talks.” January 25, 2007. BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 191 
and included yet another spinal column.134 These mistakes did not make the Japanese 
more eager to alter their regulations to match American preferences. Still, Japanese 
officials believed that on the whole, U.S. safety standards were effective enough that in 
response to these mistakes, instead of imposing broader import restrictions as they had 
after the earlier spinal cord mistake, they chose to decertify the offending facilities 
individually.135 Additionally, in April 2007, the U.S. agreed to allow Japan to conduct 
more audits of American meat packing plants in exchange for the Japanese agreeing to 
loosen its policy of inspecting 100 percent of all beef boxes.136 The OIE would soon issue 
new estimates that encouraged Japanese regulators to have even more confidence in U.S. 
regulations. 
American Exceptionalism and Throttled Compromise: May 2007 to August 2009 
 In May 2007, the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) reclassified the 
United States from being a country with ‘unidentified BSE risk’ to being a country with 
‘controlled BSE risk.’ This decision, though non-binding in international law, officially 
endorsed U.S. BSE regulations as effective enough that it supported the United States’ 
ability to export beef regardless of age.137 In response to this ruling, and after an internal 
review and Diet elections in July, Japanese officials announced that they were willing to 
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relax their universal testing regulations and exempt all cattle 30 months and younger.138 
In effect, this meant adopting the age threshold the United States had been advocating 
since December 2003 when BSE was first found in the United States.  
 In other words, Japanese officials were agreeing to implement the regulations that 
U.S. beef producers and policymakers had spent the previous three and a half years 
saying they wanted. All that the United States’ officials had to do was accept the offer 
and the confrontation over regulatory trade barriers in beef between the United States and 
Japan would have been over. Japan would have been able to maintain the regulations it 
preferred and U.S. beef producers would have had what in effect amounted to a 90 to 95 
percent opening of the Japanese market as that is the percentage of American cattle that 
are slaughtered between the ages of 15 and 24 months.139 That did not happen. American 
officials rejected the Japanese offer.140 
 The same OIE guidelines change that softened the Japanese government’s 
approach led the United States government, and in particular the USDA, to adopt a more 
ambitious goal of convincing the Japanese government to remove all of its age 
restrictions to cattle.141 Indeed, immediately after the OIE change was made, USDA 
Secretary Johanns said that the United States would “use this international validation” to 
pry open the Japanese market for all American beef products.142 Thereafter, U.S. officials 
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all the way up to President Bush pressured Japan to remove all of its age-related 
regulatory trade barriers.143 What made the American position transparently hypocritical, 
and thus easier for the Japanese to disregard, was that though the United States held up 
the OIE as the definitive ‘scientific’ international standard in this particular instance, it 
continued to ignore OIE standards on other matters related to beef regulations calling 
those recommendations ‘unscientific.’ The U.S. would not fully align its beef regulations 
with OIE recommendations until March 2012, over three years into the Obama 
administration.144  
 Three principle reasons lay behind the U.S. government’s decision to reject the 
Japanese offer of a 30-month age limit. First, as was seen earlier in this case, USDA 
officials and American producers did not accept the legitimacy of the Japan’s regulatory 
preferences, dismissing them as “unscientific” and did not accept that they needed to 
bend at all.145 Second, the U.S. was attempting to fully open Japan’s beef market so that it 
could use that as a lever to open the South Korean market in the free trade agreement 
negotiations that were taking place between the United States and Korea.146  
 Third, this maximalist approach fit the Bush administration’s modus operandi 
with regards to international negotiations. Bush administration officials tended to conflate 
anything that could be construed as compromise with capitulation. Christopher Hill, a 
career diplomat who has served in high-level positions under both Republican and 
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Democratic presidents, argued at the time that, for Bush Administration officials, there 
was no need for the United States to give up anything in international negotiations; 
according to Hill, those policymakers’ negotiating positions on seemingly all issues were 
essentially “come out with your hands up.”147 A ‘come out with your hands up’ approach 
only works in Western movies, and even then only sometimes. When the other side is not 
surrounded, does not consider you the sheriff (even if that is how you imagine yourself), 
and does not consider itself an outlaw, the most likely result is continued non-movement, 
and that is exactly what happened here. It was for these reasons that the dispute between 
Japan and the United States dragged into 2008.148 
 International standards bodies like the OIE, ISO, and the Codex Alimentarius are 
often credited with facilitating cooperation, and indeed there is considerable evidence that 
they do exactly that.149 This part of the case study though suggests a potential limitation 
to that. When these bodies issue recommendations that support a particular claimant’s 
preferences, they can make that claimant more rigid in their position. In situations in 
which the willingness to compromise is more important than coordination difficulties, 
which is arguably a huge proportion of regulatory trade barrier disputes, making one 
party more immutable may hamper cooperation more than the recommendations facilitate 
that cooperation through the enunciation of potentially common standards.  
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 In its own way, Barack Obama’s rhetoric also demonstrated that, like President 
Bush, Obama too saw his role on this issue as supporting American beef producers. 
Though he criticized the Bush Administration on almost all other issues, then-candidate 
Obama’s rhetoric on these beef regulations was remarkably similar to President Bush’s. 
He too chalked up the regulatory differences to simple protectionist chicanery saying that 
“you can’t get beef into Japan and Korea, even though, obviously, we have the highest 
safety standards of anybody, but they don’t want to have that competition from U.S. 
producers.”150 Likewise, Austan Goolsbee, who would later be the Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers, argued that  
“two facts are not in dispute. Japan and Korea retain rules that prevent 
imports of U.S. beef, rules that other countries don’t have, and in countries 
that don’t have those rules, U.S. beef exports have returned to higher 
levels than before. So you’ve got to be highly suspicious at the outset.”151  
 
 The Obama administration may have phrased its position on Japan’s beef 
regulations specifically, and foreign regulatory barriers broadly, in a more polite way 
than their Bush administration predecessors, but that position was still based on the same 
hubristic premise. 
 The underlying assumption behind Goolsbee’s and Obama’s statements as well as 
the Bush Administration’s position is that American businesses, and by extension 
America, are so unfailingly excellent that if they cannot effectively compete in a foreign 
market, the only logical explanation is that there must be some underhanded trade policy 
trick preventing them from doing so. In contemporary America, there is sometimes a 
tendency to see the two parties as diametrically opposed on everything and Democrats as 
more urbane in their foreign policy approach than Republicans, but in important ways in 
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this case the two parties behaved in exactly the same manner. Both were eager to arrogate 
to the United States the role of final arbiter of scientific truth. Both were willing to 
indulge in the haughty trope of American exceptionalism.   
 When the National Cattleman’s Beef Association’s policy position on negotiating 
with Japan changed, so did President Obama’s. In January 2009, the NCBA asked its 
members to consider changing the association’s position to supporting an incremental 
approach vis-à-vis the Japanese.152 Instead of pushing for the removal of all age 
restrictions, as was their preference before, the beef industry representatives were willing 
to accept the 30-month position that Japan had signaled it would accept after the OIE’s 
2007 ruling. In May 2009, that became the NCBA’s position and the U.S. Meat Export 
Federation joined them in promoting this incrementalism.153  
 In the intervening period between January and May 2009, the Obama 
Administration’s position remained unchanged from the Bush Administration’s.154 After 
the beef industry preference shift, the Obama Administration adopted that incremental 
approach; by July, even Congressional Republicans had adopted that position.155 That the 
Obama administration’s position did not change immediately upon taking office but did 
shift after the beef industry’s position changed strongly suggests that this policy position 
adjustment was not simply a manifestation of campaign rhetoric being jettisoned in the 
face of the realities of governance. Rather, it was a manifestation of policymakers 
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defining their role as promoting the beef industry and taking their policy cues from them. 
That the GOP’s position changed too and aligned with the Obama administration’s 
further supports that explanation. 
 The problem for U.S. policymakers was that by this point, summer 2009, there 
was a Japanese general election fast approaching in August and the ruling LDP knew that 
it was in for a difficult election. They did not want to implement sensitive compromises 
then, better to wait until September.156 The LDP had been in power for all but 11 months 
since the 1950s, which is why Japan has often been held up as an exemplar of a single-
party democracy, and so there was some sense that the issue could be dealt with after the 
election. Perhaps, had the LDP remained in power, there may have been some way for 
the two states to find agreement. The LDP’s loss of power to the DPJ in August 2009 
buried any chance of that however.   
The DPJ and Beef Imports: August 2009-September 2010 
 The DPJ had spent years castigating the LDP as too subservient to the United 
States and insufficiently protective of consumers.157 The DPJ had held up every 
concession that the LDP had made to the United States from 2005 to 2009 as indicative 
of the LDP’s craven diplomacy and had called for a much tougher approach to U.S. beef 
imports.158 Even if its leaders had wanted to compromise with the U.S. on regulatory 
trade barriers in beef, such a naked volte-face, at least in the near term, would have been 
a humiliating climb down with little domestic upside.  Moreover, the divisions 
within the DPJ, which was created in 1998 as a merger of several smaller parties, 
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continued to shine through on trade policy.159 Though the party had used the beef 
regulation dispute as a cudgel against the LDP and though some DPJ members opposed 
trade liberalization, other DPJ members were in favor of a broader trade agreement with 
the U.S. as a way to promote Japanese exports; these members were thus willing to 
consider a relaxation of Japan’s regulatory trade barriers against U.S. beef if it were part 
of a larger trade agreement.160 Though that created some potential room for compromise, 
it also meant that attempting to address this issue jeopardized splitting the already 
fractious party. Percolating disputes with the U.S. over other agenda items made the issue 
even more politically fraught for the DPJ.  
 In 2006, the LDP had signed an agreement with the United States to move the 
U.S. base at Okinawa, which was highly unpopular with local residents, from Futenma, a 
major urban center, to a less populated area of the island called Henoko.161 During the 
2009 election, DPJ leader Hatoyama had promised to move the base off of the island of 
Okinawa completely.162 After the DPJ won, Okinawa residents believed that they would 
finally be rid of this foreign military base, which many of them despised. When the DPJ 
ultimately had to allow the base to remain on the island, large protests against leaving the 
base in Okinawa ensued.163 The public relations damage to the DPJ was so bad that DPJ 
leader Hatoyama was forced to resign.164  
                                                
159 Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Mark Manyin, and William Cooper. “Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for 
Congress.” Congressional Research Service. March 31, 2006. p. 13.  
160 Inside U.S. Trade. “New Japanese Government Divided on Trade Policy Despite Rhetoric.” Vol. 27, No. 
34. September 4, 2009. 
161 Chanlett-Avery, Emma, and Ian Rinehart. “The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma 
Base Controversy.” Congressional Research Service. p. 1.  
162 Ogawa, Satoshi, and Toshimitsu Miyai. “Election 2009- Battle for Power; U.S. Keeps Close Eye on DPJ 
Manifesto.” Yomiuri Shimbun. August 11, 2009. 
163 Fackler, Martin. “Hatoyama Drops vow Over U.S. Base.” The International Herald Tribune. May 24, 
2010. 
164 Alford, Peter, and Rick Wallace. “Japan PM Quits For Party’s Sake.” The Australian. June 3, 2010. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 199 
 Once again, trade considerations were not made subservient to security concerns; 
neither the Japanese nor the American government attempted to barter away their 
position on beef regulations to win concessions on the basing dispute. In fact, the 
Futenma basing dispute meant that the DPJ did not believe it could afford to be seen 
caving to American demands regarding an issue as sensitive as consumer safety.165 Not 
only did this basing controversy leave the DPJ with even less political room to be seen as 
compromising with the United States but it also led to leadership changes that added an 
additional hurdle to resolving the beef trade dispute. 
 The new Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, largely left the cabinet the same. However, 
one of the few changes he did make directly affected policy related to trade and beef 
regulations. Kan’s choice to head the MAFF was Masahiko Yamada, a devoutly 
protectionist beef farmer who had written a book titled America Will Destroy Japan’s 
Food Industry and a dystopian novel titled The Japan-US Food War: When Japan Goes 
Starving.166 Little else needs to be said about his policy outlook. The 
compartmentalization of Japanese policymaking meant that Yamada would play a major 
role in determining the extent to which the government compromised with the U.S. over 
BSE regulations and trade in beef as long as he was in office. Kan chose him because he 
had been close to Ichiro Ozawa, a long time power broker within the DPJ who had been 
forced to resign with Hatoyama, and Kan wanted to hold the various factions in his party 
together.167  
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  Later that year, when Ozawa attempted to usurp Kan’s leadership of the DPJ, Kan 
was able to beat back the challenge to his leadership and consolidate his control over the 
DPJ. Soon thereafter, he sacked Yamada, replacing him with a free trade advocate and 
installing Akihiro Ohata, another proponent of trade liberalization, as the head of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.168 U.S.-Japan discussions over the beef issue 
ensued directly after this shake-up, though nothing was agreed to in the immediate 
sense.169 The new Japanese leadership did signal its seriousness in considering relaxing 
the regulatory barriers by asking the United States to provide the data it would need to 
conduct an internal risk assessment that would be the first step in that process.170 The 
change in Japanese leadership and their tentative steps toward meaningful negotiation 
augured well for compromise on the beef trade issue. It was at this point that the nascent 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) began to gain salience in Japan. That increased salience 
brought hitherto uninvolved domestic actors into the negotiation of regulatory barriers in 
beef. 
The TPP, Farmer Protests, and the Triple Disaster: October 2010-October 2011  
 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) began in 2005 as a free trade agreement 
between New Zealand, Brunei, Chile, and Singapore but by 2010 had been joined by 
Peru, Malaysia, Australia, Vietnam, and the U.S. and so had grown immensely larger in 
geographic and economic terms. To this point, the main actors in this case have been 
Japanese consumer organizations, Japanese policymakers, American beef producers, and 
American policymakers as they were the four groups that had an interest in beef 
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regulations and trade. The attenuations and increases in the regulatory trade barriers in 
beef were based on their respective positions. The TPP gave Japanese beef producers and 
Japanese export oriented businesses an interest in those regulatory trade barriers as well.  
 Japanese beef producers had never really entered the political contestation over 
these regulatory trade barriers. The reason they did not was because their competition 
was not U.S. beef imports in particular so much as imports period. As long as Australia 
and other states could provide beef to fill the lost American supply, Japanese producers’ 
incomes were not really affected by the regulatory trade barriers.171 Perhaps, had the 
Japanese regulations been disguised forms of protectionism that excluded all imports, 
Japanese beef producers would have been major defenders of those regulations. Given 
that these regulatory barriers did not erect tariff-like walls that affected all imports 
however, beef producers had to no reason to expend political capital on regulations. 
Instead they would save their organizational strength for the policy fights that did matter 
to them: tariffs and other non-regulatory trade policy, and it was exactly those kinds of 
policy fights that the TPP was creating.  
 Throughout this time period (2001-2010), whenever international negotiations 
over beef involved tariffs or other trade barriers not related to regulation, Japanese beef 
farmers loudly opposed any trade liberalization. For example, at the behest of Japanese 
beef farmers, the Japanese government chose not to end safeguard tariffs early despite the 
fact that they were generally considered unnecessary and were raising prices for 
consumers.172 In 2007, Japanese farmers had blocked trade liberalization talks with the 
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U.S.173 In 2008, they had also stood in the way of a free trade agreement with 
Australia.174 In these episodes, the negotiations over regulatory and non-regulatory trade 
were always kept separate. That would not be the case for the TPP. 
 These farmers understood that the U.S. would demand compromise on beef 
regulations as a price of Japanese entrance into TPP negotiations. In other words, 
Japanese beef farmers saw regulatory trade barrier relaxation in beef as paving the way 
for the TPP which would lower tariffs, thus reducing the costs of imports which in turn 
would threaten their livelihood. These farmers saw those regulatory trade barriers as a 
roadblock to that and wanted to ensure that roadblock stayed in place. Just days after 
Prime Minister Kan began to signal that the government was considering joining the TPP, 
thousands of farmers rallied in Tokyo against it.175 
 Meanwhile, the conclusion of a free trade agreement in December 2010 between 
the U.S. and Korea gave Japanese businesses an augmented interest in getting Japan to 
join the TPP.176 70 percent of Japanese and South Korean exports to the United States are 
in the same two commodities: cars and machinery.177 Japanese businesses, especially in 
these two areas, feared that the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement had given their Korean 
rivals a significant competitive advantage and that now they too needed a free trade 
agreement between the United States and their country in order to compete in the 
lucrative American market.178 Fortunately for them, the TPP presented just such an 
opportunity, if only they could get the U.S. government to acquiesce to Japan’s inclusion 
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in the TPP. Like Japanese farmers, these businesses also recognized the extent to which 
the regulatory barriers in beef trade functioned as a roadblock to Japan’s entry to the TPP 
negotiations. Unlike those farmers though, they badly wanted this roadblock removed. 
 The addition of non-agricultural issues to the trade docket also had a significant 
impact on the Japanese government’s approach to these issues. In principal, the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) controls Japanese trade policy. However, 
when the trade policy at hand is agricultural, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF) is given 
primary responsibility in that negotiation.179 MAFF is generally more inclined toward 
protectionism than MITI.180 As long as the negotiations over regulatory barriers on beef 
remained isolated from other trade issues, MAFF controlled Japan’s position. Once 
regulatory barriers in beef became embedded in a larger constellation of trade issues, 
MITI became the leading player in formulating Japan’s trade policy. 
 Moreover, exchanging one trade concession for another did not generate the 
political blowback that exchanging agreement on the beef issue for non-trade concessions 
threatened to. This suggests something interesting about the nature of cross-issue linkages 
in trade negotiations. Which issues are getting cross-linked matters a great deal. How 
citizens and policymakers think about concessions is central to which concessions can be 
made. Linking other trade-related issues to the beef regulation dispute created greater 
space for compromise because both sides in a trade negotiation recognize that 
concessions are a prerequisite for the successful conclusion of the negotiation. 
Conversely, linking security-related issues was, at best, a non-factor in the negotiation 
over regulatory trade barriers, and at worst, made finding a resolution more difficult. 
                                                
179 Davis. 2005. Food Fights Over Free Trade. p. 125-126. 
180 Klinger, Dustin. 1999. "Comparing Apples to Oranges: Lessons from the Failure of US Apple Exports 
to Japan." Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal. Vol. 8. p. 144-145.  
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 204 
 While the deliberations surrounding joining the TPP were occurring, in March 
2011, Japan was struck by the triple disaster of an earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent 
nuclear crisis. Progress on compromise over these regulatory trade barriers in beef was 
slowed by the simple fact that the catastrophe understandably pushed all other agenda 
items to the margins while recovery and reconstruction began in earnest in the spring and 
summer of that year.   
The 30-Month Compromise is Finally Reached: October 2011- March 2013   
 By fall 2011, Yoshihiko Noda had replaced Naoto Kan as DPJ leader and Prime 
Minister. His positions on trade were essentially the same as his predecessor’s. By this 
point, the mood in Japan regarding the country’s BSE countermeasures had begun to 
shift. Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s most widely circulated newspaper, which had opposed 
some earlier efforts to relax the beef regulatory trade barriers, now supported such a 
move.181 Later, Yomiuri Shimbun even specifically admonished consumer groups for 
continuing to oppose relaxation, thus providing political cover from Japanese political 
leaders who wanted to advance exactly that position.182 Moreover, public sentiment 
towards relaxed rules had softened as the total global number of cattle found with mad-
cow disease had fallen to 29, which was an almost infinitesimally small fraction of the 
high-water mark of 37,000 cases.183  
 By this time, most middle class urban consumers were accepting of American 
beef.184 This is a critical point because the diminishing consumer hostility to relaxing the 
regulatory trade barriers on American beef imports was essential in giving the Japanese 
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government the political space to agree to those relaxations. Even with Japanese export-
oriented businesses pushing for the TPP, the government would have found it very 
difficult to relax those regulatory trade barriers on beef had the general public still been 
aroused in opposition. This change suggests that not only were Japanese consumer 
organization critical in promoting the augmentation of regulatory trade barriers but were 
also key is allowing an attenuation of regulatory trade barriers through their 
acquiescence. It was in this context that in October, the Japanese government announced 
that it intended to revise its BSE regulations, which clearly signaled that it was strongly 
contemplating relaxing the age regulations on beef.185 Soon thereafter, the Japanese 
government formally announced its intent to join the TPP talks.186  
 Relatedly, this case complicates the ‘business dominates’ hypothesis. Throughout 
this case, U.S. beef producers pushed for a relaxation of regulatory barriers. They 
enjoyed a cozy relationship with U.S. officials who adopted and fought hard for their 
policy positions. Still, time and again, in terms of international negotiation outcomes, 
they lost that policy fight. Despite their constant efforts, it took them a decade to regain 
full market access, at the cost of billions of dollars to themselves. At no point were they 
defeated by a competing business interest. Instead, their losses came at the hands of 
consumers groups, i.e. the interest most frequently held up as the exemplar of diffuse, 
weak interests. It was only when consumer fears had subsided that American businesses, 
i.e. the interests most frequently held up as the most powerful private interests in the 
world, were able to enact their policy preferences.  
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Let us assume that U.S. beef exporters, over the time period of this case, had been 
able to maintain the same market access they enjoyed prior to December 2003. Beef 
exports to Japan averaged 118.2 million dollars per month for the first 11 months of 
2003.187 The shaded region in Figure 4.2 represents those beef producers lost exports 
from December 2003 to March 2013. That lost revenue totals 9.2 billion dollars.188 If 
business dominates, it does not lose 9.2 billion dollars in revenue at the hands of the 
paragon of diffuse interests defending regulations those firms perceive to be illegitimate. 
Figure 5.2: Revenues Losses for U.S. Beef Producers189 
 
 The U.S. government politely welcomed the Japanese announcement but made it 
clear that in the context of TPP negotiations they expected actual movement on the 
regulatory barriers in beef, not just signals and promises of future movement.190 The next 
month, Tami Overby, the Vice President for Asia of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
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echoed this saying that “now we need to see action. Not words, action” and specifically 
called on Japan to enact three “confidence-building measures” that would demonstrate 
Tokyo’s readiness to participate in TPP talks.191 The United States government, 
specifically the USTR, soon adopted this very position, even using the exact same 
‘confidence building measures’ phrasing.192 With regards to beef regulations, the 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association announced its support for Japan’s entrance to TPP 
negotiations contingent on Japan relaxing its regulatory barriers on U.S. beef.193    
 In September 2012, the Japanese government took another procedural step toward 
altering its 20-month regulations on beef to 30-months, pleasing the U.S. Meat Export 
Federation (USMEF) as well as the USTR.194 The LDP, which took power after elections 
in December 2012, contained even fewer opponents of the regulatory alterations than the 
DPJ had.195 Interestingly, even though they did not oppose relaxing these regulatory trade 
barriers in beef, many LDP Diet members did oppose Japanese participation in the TPP 
as a whole because they did not want to see reductions in agricultural tariffs; they even 
specifically stated that their opposition stemmed from their concern for the farming 
sector, again undermining the idea that these regulatory trade barriers were sneaky forms 
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of protectionism as well as contradicting the behavior we should have seen based on the 
expectations of the cleavage-based explanations.196 
 In January 2013, the Japanese government announced that it was changing its 
regulations to the 30-month age limit.197 U.S. beef producers now had essentially 90-95 
percent access to the Japanese market. They could finally resume their roughly billion 
dollar annual level of exports to Japan. Once the regulatory relaxation was fully 
implemented in March, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association endorsed Japan’s 
involvement in TPP negotiations “as soon as possible.”198 After Japanese Prime Minister 
Abe officially announced that Japan would be seeking entrance to the TPP, the U.S. 
government, for the first time, supported Japan’s inclusion in the TPP.199  
Conclusion: The Surprising Difficulty of Catching Roadrunner 
There was a certain Wile E. Coyote quality to the negotiations over these 
regulatory barriers. Just when U.S. and Japanese negotiators thought they had found a 
way to use an ACME rocket to catch Roadrunner (i.e. compromise on regulatory barriers 
in beef), the rocket would explode, obliterating their best-laid plans. To wit, the 
negotiators thought they had found agreement in fall 2004 but were stymied by 
something as technical and seemingly inconsequential as age-verification techniques. In 
January 2006, again the negotiators thought they were making progress only to be 
thwarted by slapdash producers allowing spinal cords to find their way into beef 
packages. In 2009-2010, hopes for agreement were first dashed by a stunning election 
result and then by an unrelated controversy over military base locations. The reason these 
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events had the power to block progress toward compromise on these regulatory barriers 
was because those barriers were embedded in sensitive domestic politics. Finding 
agreement on issues that affect consumers’ health and safety required engaging in a 
laborious and contentious process. Given that sensitivity, any number of trends and 
dynamics had the potential to act as a roadblock. 
 Relatedly, nesting the international negotiation over these regulatory trade barriers 
within a milieu of other issues undermined compromise on the regulatory barriers at least 
as often as it facilitated compromise. Adding issues to the negotiating agenda is often 
considered to be an avenue toward reaching a deal because it increases options and gives 
each side a greater ability to find some concession on an unrelated matter. The more 
issues that are the table, the easier it is to find some concession on issue Y that can be 
exchanged for movement on issue X. Indeed, this logic is what has traditionally 
underpinned conducting trade negotiations in a single undertaking, i.e. lots of issues 
negotiated on once. While that sort of tradeoff did occur within the context of Japan 
gaining access to the TPP in exchange for regulatory trade barrier relaxation, in other 
instances, additional agenda items such as the base dispute made compromise harder to 
reach because the Japanese government felt that it could not be seen as capitulating to the 
United States on two issues at once. This suggests that embedding multiple issues into a 
single undertaking, a maneuver that was quite effective at promoting trade liberalization 
in tariffs and other non-regulatory measures, may actually backfire when applied to some 
regulatory trade barriers.    
 At first glance, regulatory barriers seem like the kind of technical, low-salience 
issues that should allow for easy cooperation between governments, especially when 
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business interests are pressuring them to do so. Businesses move to reduce those 
regulatory trade barriers and think they will be able to do so easily because they perceive 
themselves as being the only entities interested in them. Governments, responding to 
these entreaties from business, explore international cooperation over those regulatory 
barriers and then find, to their surprise, that catching the compromise Roadrunner is not 
so easy because activists also care about those regulatory barriers. This process of policy 
deal exploration and then surprise opposition happens because most people do not get 
excited when they hear the word “regulation.” When talked about in the abstract, trade 
regulations seem remote and almost painfully boring, but when the regulations being 
discussed take concrete form and affect those citizens in a tangible, easy-to-understand 
way, some of those citizens get quite animated and when they do, they detonate the 
ACME rocket. Only when those activists can be prevented from doing so either through 
persuasion or political marginalization can negotiators pursue their policy prey 
unimpeded. This is why finding a mutually acceptable attenuation of regulatory trade 
barriers requires Sisyphean perseverance.    
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Chapter 6- Small Details, Enormous Consequences:  
Regulation and the International Trade in Pharmaceuticals 
Introduction 
 Perhaps more than any other product, pharmaceuticals distill the complex 
interplay between commercial interests and non-economic public policy goals that is at 
the center of regulation and trade politics. The global trade in pharmaceuticals is worth 
approximately $550 billion annually.1 Drugs generate massive sales because they are 
indispensible in promoting the health of huge numbers of people around the world. 
Almost everyone will take some form of medication at some point in their lives. 
Governments have an interest in promoting the health of their citizens and thus have an 
interest in promoting access to safe, effective medications. This is why drugs were 
amongst the first products to be closely regulated by governments.2  
 Across the globe, societies are aging and developing, which means they are likely 
to spend greater shares of their GDP on health care.3 This means that the trade in 
pharmaceuticals is likely to continue growing larger and more geopolitically significant. 
Moreover, given the increasing extent to which different states’ disparate regulations on 
pharmaceuticals impact this global trade, the content of those regulations is also 
becoming a central issue in international trade negotiations. The very last issue resolved 
                                                
1 World Trade Organization. Statistics Database. Merchandise Trade by Commodity. Accessed February 
15, 2016. Pharmaceuticals represent 55% percent of all health-related products that are traded 
internationally. Devices and equipment are second at 19%. Smith, Richard, Carlos Correa, and Cecilia Oh. 
2009. “Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals.” Lancet. Vol. 373. p. 684. 
2 While Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle and the filth of meatpacking lead the meat industry to garner most of 
the attention in the Progressive Era growth in regulation, the 1906 legislation that regulated new industries 
was in fact called The Pure Food and Drug Act. The public consequences of the proliferation in phony, or 
worse poisonous, tonics were as gruesome as the foulness of much food at the time. For an examination of 
early efforts to regulation drugs in the United States. Hilts, Philip. 2004. Protecting America’s Health: The 
FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation. University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill. p. 
3-55.   
3 World Health Organization. 2011. “Global Health and Aging.” NIH Publication 11-7737. 
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in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations was what length of data exclusivity to give 
to patented biologic drugs.4 
 Pharmaceutical companies are highly reluctant to produce drugs in, or import 
drugs into, countries in which their intellectual property will not be respected. Refusing 
to protect a firm’s intellectual property constitutes a trade barrier because it prevents that 
firm from reaping gains from trade and so effectively prohibits them from engaging in 
international trade. Differences in regulation on intellectual property thus have the power 
to impede the trade in pharmaceuticals and thus constitute regulatory trade barriers.5 
Those regulatory barriers are becoming the centerpiece issues in the geopolitical 
negotiations that surround the trade in pharmaceuticals.  
 The United States and India are two of the central players in the geopolitics of 
drugs and will likely continue to be so for the foreseeable future. The United States is 
home to some of the largest, most advanced drug companies in the world.6 It has been a 
leader in using regulation to promote a highly efficient pharmaceuticals sector.7 More 
controversially, it has attempted to get other countries to adopt intellectual property 
regulations similar to its own. It is the leader of the camp that wants intellectual property 
                                                
4 Mauldin, William. “U.S., Australia Agree on Complicated Compromise on Biologic Drugs.” The Wall 
Street Journal. October 4, 2015. Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S., Australia Float Joint Biologics Text to Other 
Countries For Vetting.” October 4, 2015. Indeed, this issue was the main reason why the TPP negotiations 
were not wrapped up in July 2015 at a meeting in Hawaii. The Washington Post. “A Debate Over U.S. 
Pharmaceuticals is Snagging the Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal.” August 10, 2015.  
5 On how upward harmonization of intellectual property improves trade and investment and thus how 
different intellectual property regulations constitute regulatory trade barriers, see Maskus, Keith. 2000. 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. Institute for International Economics: Washington. p. 
112-118, 186-194. 
6 In 2006, 8 of the 14 largest pharmaceutical companies by global sales were American. Smith, Richard, 
Carlos Correa, and Cecilia Oh. 2009. “Trade, TRIPS, and Pharmaceuticals.” Lancet. Vol. 373. p. 685.  
7 On the growth of the American governments’ drug-regulating capacity and how it took a lead role in 
global pharmaceutical regulations, see Bach, David, and Abraham Newman. 2010. “Governing Lipitor and 
Lipstick: Capacity, Sequencing, and Power in International Pharmaceutical and Cosmetics Regulation.” 
Review of International Political Economy. 17:4. p. 665-695.   
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regulations set at high levels.8 Still, it is no exaggeration to say that without the United 
States and its drug firms, many of the miraculous drugs in existence today would not 
exist, and many millions of people would have had shorter, less fulfilling lives. For its 
part, India has been a leader in using intellectual property regulations to promote access 
to medicines for even the poorest of citizens. It has been the leader of the camp that wants 
intellectual property regulations set at lower levels. It too is no exaggeration to say that 
without India, many millions of people would have had shorter, less fulfilling lives, not 
because the drugs they needed did not exist, but because those drugs were too expensive.   
 The extent to which states’ regulations on intellectual property differ has varied 
over time. The negotiation of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) in the 1980s and early 1990s significantly reduced those regulatory 
differences. The Doha Declaration in 2001 strengthened the flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement and so gave states greater policy room to re-expand those regulatory 
differences. Subsequent WTO decisions from 2003 to 2015 amounted to a stalemate that 
preserved the policy space that allowed these regulatory differences. India also found 
ways after 2005 to creatively interpret TRIPS provisions to further increase those 
differences but selectively employed those flexibilities in ways that balanced the interests 
of activists and drug companies. This chapter explains that variation. 
Table 6.1- Regulatory Trade Barriers Outcomes In Pharmaceuticals 
TRIPS-------------------------------> Decrease 
Doha Declaration------------------> Increase 
WTO Decisions--------------------> Buy-Out 
Indian Flexibilities-----------------> Buy-Out 
 
                                                
8 For the purposes of this chapter, I am defining high regulations as those that increase the scope of 
intellectual property protection. Thus a 20-year patent and 12 years of data exclusivity are considered 
higher regulations than 15-year patents and 5 years of data exclusivity.  
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 I explain this variation by examining the political bargaining between 
pharmaceutical companies, access to medicine advocates, and government officials. In 
the TRIPS negotiations, two factors were key to pharmaceutical companies and the U.S. 
government officials that identified with them being able to significantly reduce those 
regulatory differences. First, activists were still not engaged on the issue and so had the 
negotiating terrain to themselves. Second, pharmaceutical companies were able to 
successfully link their policy requests with broader societal concerns about economic 
competitiveness.  
 In the negotiations leading up to the Doha Declaration, activists were able to wage 
a highly successful public relations campaign and work with developing country 
government officials to force pharmaceutical firms and their allies in Western 
governments to accept an increase in those differences. They were able to do this by 
linking uniform intellectual property regulations with needless death, specifically the 
AIDS crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 In the WTO decisions that pertained to intellectual property and pharmaceuticals, 
the two sides fought to a draw and so the international legal architecture on intellectual 
property has largely remained the same. The Indian government has sought to pacify 
access to medicine advocates as well as multinational pharmaceutical firms and so has 
used TRIPS flexibilities in creative ways that uphold firms’ intellectual property much of 
the time but still curtail them often enough to please activists. 
A Primer on Intellectual Property Regulations 
 The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) 
structures those intellectual property (IP) regulations that have significant trade 
implications. One set of those regulations concern patents and so shape the international 
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trade in pharmaceuticals.9 At their heart, the IP regulations that surround patents are an 
attempt to balance the desire to limit monopoly and at the same time limit free riding.10 
On the one hand, the intellectual work that goes into a given product has to be protected 
from being imitated before the creator can be appropriately compensated. Doing nothing 
to prevent this sort of free riding undermines the incentive to innovate and leaves society 
as whole worse off. This is particularly the case when there are significant up-front 
research and development costs. If it costs 2.5 billion dollars to develop a new drug but 
the marginal costs of producing every additional pill is one cent, a second company can 
come along, copy the drug, and profitably sell it for far less because it never incurred that 
$2.5 billion cost.11 Knowing this, the first company would be foolish to invest those $2.5 
billion in that new drug unless there is some mechanism to prevent the second imitating 
company from undercutting it. That mechanism is a patent.12 
                                                
9 TRIPS also deals with copyright, trademarks, and geographical indicators. Those three areas are not 
nearly as central to the trade in pharmaceutical products as patents and so this chapter will bypass them. 
10 For a concise economic discussion of these two competing goals, see Winegarden, Wayne. 2014. “The 
Economics of Pharmaceutical Pricing.” Pacific Research Institute.   
11 This number comes from one of the most widely used estimates for the cost of new drug development 
and takes into account the costs of drug failures and capital costs. DiMasi, Joseph, Henry Grabowski, and 
Ronald Hansen. “Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs.” Tufts Center 
for the Study of Drug Development. November 18, 2014. Access to medicine advocates contend that this 
number is too high and argue that R&D can be done for much less. Love, James. “KEI Comments on the 
New Tufts Study on Drug Development Costs.” November 18, 2014. Knowledge Ecology International. 
Others have noted that the Tufts Center is primarily funded by research-based drug companies and so has a 
clear incentive to arrive at a high estimate, which helps justify high drug costs. Their earlier estimates are 
also based on a sample of drugs that seems to have been intentionally selected to produce high estimates. 
Dukes, Graham. “Assessing the Emprical Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Developing New Drugs- A 
Global Perspective.” Paper presented at ESF-IfW Conference: "The International Regulation of New 
Medical Technology: Health Technology Adoption in the European Union, North America, East Asia, and 
in the Developing World." Salzau Castle, Germany. May 7-10, 2007. p. 3. Still, even if the 2.5 billion 
estimate is inflated, there is no doubt that developing a new drug is very expensive. 
12 For an introduction on the politics of patents and the pharmaceuticals industry, at least as it pertains to 
biotechnology see Friedman, Yali. 2008. Building Biotechnology, 3rd Edition. Logos Press: Washington. p. 
103-136. More generally, see Timmermans, Karin. 2005. “Intertwining Regimes: Trade, Intellectual 
Property, and Regulatory Requirements for Pharmaceuticals.” The Journal of World Intellectual Property. 
8:1. p. 67-74. 
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 Patents give businesses the exclusive right to market their invention for a given 
period of time; in other words, it gives them a temporary monopoly.13 They are granted 
for new inventions that meet three criteria: novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness.14 
The stronger patent regulations are, that is the longer the patent lasts and the more 
effectively it prevents free-riding, the greater the commercial incentive will be to invest 
in new drugs. Pharmaceutical executives point to stunning improvements in the health 
outcomes for patients with diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C that used to be death 
sentences and contend the profitability of drugs for those diseases is the major incentive 
driving this innovation.15 And in fairness to the pharmaceutical companies, society now 
has in its possession a vast array of medicines that are highly effective and that, because 
they are now off-patent, are incredibly cheap. Yes, these medicines were expensive when 
they first came out and yes, pharmaceutical companies created them out of profit-seeking 
rather than philanthropic motives, but it can still be credibly argued that the stringent IP 
regulations that the United States employs built that storehouse of wonder drugs. 
Pharmaceutical companies also contend that, despite the eye-popping costs of some 
drugs, they actually save the overall health care system money by preventing more 
expensive procedures such as transplants and extended hospital stays.16  
                                                
13 The length of that patent monopoly is of course a critical distinction.  
14 As will be explained later, different states’ patent regulations define and apply these terms in different 
ways, which has significant implications for which drugs receive patents and which do not.  
15 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. “Intellectual Property.” 
http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property Accessed February 11, 2016. Ingram, Robert. “A 
Not-So-Transparent Attempt to Cap Drug Prices.” The Wall Street Journal. July 19, 2015.  
16 Anderson, Richard. “Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits.” BBC News. November 6, 2014. 
Ingram, Robert. “A Not-So-Transparent Attempt to Cap Drug Prices.” The Wall Street Journal. July 19, 
2015. It is also important to think about the difference between cost per dose and cost per cure. In 2010, 
hepatitis C drugs costs $50,000 and cured a little over one-third of patients so the cost per cure was about 
$140,000. Sovaldi is $85,000 but cures 95 percent of patients and so the cost per cure is actually about 
$50,000 less than previous treatments. Scannell, Jack. “Four Reasons Drugs Are Expensive, Of Which Two 
are False.” Forbes. October 13, 2015.  
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 Finally, because the catalogue of available medicines continues to improve, the 
benchmark that pharmaceutical companies must exceed to create new medicines 
continues to get higher.17 The first person to invent Tylenol could patent that. The second 
person had to invent something better than Tylenol, which was harder. The third person 
had to invent something that was better still, and so even more difficult. Every generation 
of scientists makes the next generation’s job that much harder. This is yet another reason 
why drug firms want patents to be as strong as possible. If it is getting ever harder to 
invent patentable products, they have an even greater incentive to ensure that those that 
do get patented are revenue bonanzas. 
 It is not just patent regulations though that pharmaceutical companies want 
expanded. They also want a high regulatory standard for what is known as data 
exclusivity, especially for biologics, today’s cutting edge medical products that cost far 
more to develop than traditional small-molecule drugs.18 When research-based 
pharmaceutical firms attempt to get their product approved by regulators such as the 
FDA, they must provide extensive amounts of data demonstrating the safety and efficacy 
of their drug. When the patent term on that drug expires, generic firms can make copies 
of that drug. Rather than repeat the costly and difficult tasks needed to replicate the data 
that demonstrated the drug’s safety and efficacy, the generic firm will simply use the first 
firm’s data. After all, if H2O was safe to consume when it was sold by Prescott 
pharmaceuticals, it should be just as safe when sold by a different firm.  
                                                
17 Scannell, Jack. “Four Reasons Drugs Are Expensive, Of Which Two are False.” Forbes. October 13, 
2015. This is also one of the main reasons why drug firms’ research has moved toward more serious 
diseases because it is on those diseases that the inelasticities are greatest and the regulators are most willing 
to accept risks. Ibid. 
18 Clift, Charles. “Data Protection and Data Exclusivity in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals.” IP 
Handbook of Best Practices. Chapter 4.9. http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch04/p09/ Accessed 
February 9, 2016. The Brookings Institute. “Health Policy 101: How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Will 
Affect Prescription Drugs.” May 19, 2015.  
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 Research-based firms argue that the generic firm using their data is still free-
riding and that because they produced that data, they own it and should have exclusive 
rights to it.19 The government granting this data exclusivity effectively lengthens patent 
times by forcing the generics firm to repeat the trials that created that data, thus making it 
more difficult for a generic to enter the market.20 Research-based firms base their 
arguments in favor of data exclusivity on the same incentives-promotion premises as their 
support for extensive patents.21 While there is certainly some validity in drug firms’ 
claims regarding IP regulations, one does have to take their position with a grain of salt 
given that it is clearly in their direct financial interests to promote high IP regulations. 
 While high intellectual property regulations do create powerful incentives for 
innovation, they are not without drawbacks. Monopolies, which are what patents 
effectively constitute, limit competition, thus raising prices for consumers. The very 
profits that create that incentive come from consumers, insurance companies, and the 
government. That incentive may have sparked innovation, but it is still astoundingly 
expensive. All told, the United States spent $374 billion on prescription drugs in 2014.22 
There is also a great deal of profit making in that. The ten largest pharmaceutical firms 
had an average profit margin in 2013 of 19.6 percent.23  
                                                
19 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. Special 301 Submission 2014. p. 9-10. 
Biotechnology Industry Organization. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Innovation in the Bioeconomy: 
The Need for 12 Years of Data Protection for Biologics.” 
20 Shaffer, Ellen and Joseph Brenner. 2009. “A Trade Agreement’s Impact on Access to Generic Drugs.” 
Health Affairs. 28:5. Godoy, Angelina. Of Medicines and Markets: Intellectual Property and Human Rights 
in the Free Trade Era. Stanford University Press: Palo Alto. p. 24-25. Oxfam International. 2007. “All 
Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to 
Medicines.” p. 2.  
21 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. “12 Years of Data Protection in TPP.”  
22 Pfeifer, Stuart. “Prescription Drug Spending Jumps 13% to Record $374 Billion in 2014.” Los Angeles 
Times. April 14, 2015.  
23 Anderson, Richard. “Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits.” BBC News. November 6, 2014. 
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 One of the major drivers of these high profits is that medicines are the epitome of 
inelastic goods.24 When the extent to which a good is purchased varies more than a 
change in price, that good is elastic. So if the price of a good increases by 10 percent and 
its sales drop by 30 percent, that good is elastic. If that same 10 percent increase only 
leads to a 3 percent drop in sales, that good is inelastic. Elastic goods are typically those 
goods that are less necessary, have many substitutes, and for which purchases can more 
easily be postponed. Medications for serious diseases do not demonstrate any of these 
properties. The upshot of a good being inelastic is that the most sensible business 
strategy, from a purely revenue perspective, is to raise the price since the revenue 
increase from the raised price will overwhelm the revenue loss from the few people who 
stop purchasing the good.25 At a basic level, the source of drug firms’ massive profits is 
that they produce what might be the most inelastic goods in the world.26  
 From a purely revenue perspective, it makes sense for pharmaceutical firms to 
charge as much as they can get for a product, but from a societal perspective, generating 
huge revenues for drug companies is not the point of IP regulation. The point of IP 
regulation is generating an incentive to innovate. Those who are opposed to higher levels 
of IP regulations, such as access to medicine advocacy groups like Oxfam International, 
argue that it is not obvious that prices and profits must be totally unbounded to produce 
                                                
24 In this paragraph, I am referring to demand, rather than supply, elasticities. 
25 For a look at the internal discussions pharmaceutical companies have to determine the price of a new 
drug, see Johnson, Carolyn and Brady Dennis. “How an $84,000 Drug Got Its Price: ‘Let’s Hold Our 
Position Whatever the Headlines.’” The Washington Post. December 1, 2015.  
26 This inelasticity, not the research costs, is primarily what determines a drug’s cost. As Peter Ubel, a 
doctor and professor of business at Duke University put it “if I’m the pricing person for something, I’m not 
looking at how much we spent making it. I’m looking at what I think the market will bear.” Stockton, Nick. 
“How Prescription Drugs Get So Wildly Expensive.” Wired. September 23, 2015.  
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the same incentive.27 Gilead made 10.3 billion dollars on Sovaldi in 2014; would they 
really not have done research on a hepatitis C cure if Sovaldi were only going to net 4 
billion dollars in revenue in 2014?28 Must pharmaceutical companies be allowed to 
charge whatever the market will bear for an adequate incentive to innovate to be present? 
Of course, drug companies would answer that question with a yes and access to medicine 
advocates would say no, but both answers come from sources with clear, vested interests 
in giving the answers they give. The correct answer, like so many answers in social 
science, is probably a combination of ‘we do not know’ and ‘it depends.’ 
 Opponents of higher IP regulations also contend that they slow innovation by 
preventing researchers from borrowing certain ideas or working on certain projects.29 
They also restrict the flow of information, which almost by definition slows scientific 
progress.30 For this reason, they are particularly critical of data exclusivity provisions and 
efforts to limit Bolar exemptions.31  
 Relatedly, they are major proponents of compulsory licenses, which are a 
mechanism by which a state gives a license to a generic firm to manufacture copies of a 
patented medicine without the permission of the inventing firm.32 They are, in effect, 
                                                
27 Oxfam International. “Intellectual Property and Access to Medicine.” http://policy-
practice.oxfamamerica.org/work/trade/intellectual-property-and-access-to-medicine Accessed May 4, 2016. 
28 Pollack, Andrew. “Sales of Sovaldi, New Gilead Hepatitis C Drug, Soar to 10.3 Billion Dollars.” The 
New York Times. February 3, 2015.  
29 Drahos, Peter and John Braithwaite. 2002. Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 
The New Press: New York. p. 3. For a sweeping critique of pharmaceutical patents, see Shiva, Vandana. 
2001. Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights. University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago. 
30 Universities Allied for Essential Medicines. “Make Medicines for People Not Profits.” November 2015.  
31 For their critique of data exclusivity, see Oxfam International. “Data Exclusivity.” http://policy-
practice.oxfamamerica.org/work/trade/data-exclusivity/ Accessed February 15, 2016. See also Doctors 
Without Borders, Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines. “Data Exclusivity in International Trade 
Agreements: What Consequences for Access to Medicines?” May 2004. Bolar exemptions are rules that 
allow a generic firm to use a patented product for testing purposes while it is still under patent.  
32 Doctors Without Borders. “Access to Medicines: India Offers First Compulsory License.” March 12, 
2012. Doctors Without Borders. “Reneging on Doha.” May 2003. On compulsory licensing, see Saha, 
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patent revocations and so bring drug costs down. As will be discussed below, there have 
been extensive negotiations over the conditions under which states may issue these 
compulsory licenses. Pharmaceutical firms want these conditions to be as constraining as 
possible while access to medicine advocates want them to be as permissive as possible. 
This concern with costs is also why access to medicine advocates want tight rules on 
what makes a drug patentable so as to prevent drug companies from profiting through 
‘evergreening’, which is when those firms extend the life of a patent, and thus keep the 
cost of a drug high by making small changes to the product and re-patenting it.33  
 Those opposed to higher IP regulations do not want those regulations eliminated 
though they do want them relaxed.34 In a nutshell, they want shorter patent times, no data 
exclusivity, fewer curbs on Bolar exemptions, fewer strings on compulsory licensing, and 
tight rules on what qualifies as patentable. They also point out that drug firms’ poor 
mouthing about huge R&D costs is undermined by the fact that nine out of ten of the 
largest drug firms spend more on sales and advertising than they do on R&D.35 They also 
                                                                                                                                            
Subhasis. 2009. “Patent Law and TRIPS: Compulsory Licensing of Patents and Pharmaceuticals.” Journal 
of the Patent and Trademark Office Society. 91:5. p. 364-374. See also Bird, Robert. 2009. “Developing 
Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing Access to Essential Medicines While Minimizing 
Investment Side Effects.” The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Side Effects. 37:2. p. 209-221. For the 
WTO’s official perspective, see World Trade Organization. “Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals 
and TRIPS.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm. Accessed February 
18, 2016. 
33 MSF International President Unni Karunakara. “Removing Barriers to Access for a More Equitable, 
Healthy World.” Doctors Without Borders.” November 21, 2012. Drug companies argue that many of these 
changes are in fact genuine improvements in the drug and thus patentable. See for example 
GlaxoSmithKline. “GSK Public Policy Positions: Evergreening.” August 2011. European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations. “The Degree to Which Patenting, and in Particular Secondary 
Patenting, Protect Pharmaceutical Products During Their Lifecycle is Often Misconstrued.” November 28, 
2012. For a balanced discussion of evergreening, see Collier, Roger. 2013. “Drug Patents: The 
Evergreening Problem.” Canadian Medical Association Journal. 185:9. p. 385-386. 
34  Malpani, Rohit. “MSF Oral Testimony to the United States House of Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means.” December 8, 2015.  
35 These firms collectively spent approximately 44 percent more on marketing than on research. Swanson, 
Ana. “Big Pharmaceutical Companies are Spending Far More on Marketing Than Research.” The 
Washington Post. February 11, 2015. Anderson, Richard. “Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat 
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point out that the U.S. government, through NIH grants and tax credits, subsidizes much 
of the drug firms’ R&D costs.36 Thus, because the risks of that money being spent on a 
failed drug have been socialized, the benefit from a successful drug should also be 
socialized. Entirely privatized profits only makes sense if the risks too are entirely 
privatized and they are not. Most critically, those who oppose higher IP regulations argue 
that those regulations lead to drug prices so high that they make drugs unaffordable for 
poor people in developing countries.37  
Background to the Cases 
 Outside of Western developed countries, there have been few if any cultural 
traditions supporting stringent IP rights.38 Knowledge was considered a collective good 
and imitation was considered appropriate, possibly even a form of flattery.39 For the first 
two decades after World War II, the lack of patent protection in developing countries did 
not really concern Western pharmaceutical firms because their profits were much less 
dependent on patent protection than they are now.40 Indeed, until the 1960s, most 
developed countries also did not have extensive IP protections.41 Patents were often only 
on the process of producing a drug, not the drug itself, and so there was a significant 
                                                                                                                                            
Profits.” BBC News. November 6, 2014. See also, Oliver, John. “Marketing to Doctors.” Last Week 
Tonight. February 8, 2015.  
36 Mazzucato, Miriam. “How Taxpayers Prop Up Big Pharma, and How to Cap That.” The Los Angeles 
Times. October 27, 2015. Johnson, Carolyn. “Taxpayers Helped Fund This $129,000 Cancer Drug. Should 
the Government Help Cut the Price?” The Washington Post. January 14, 2016.  
37 ‘t Hoen, Ellen. 2009. The Global Politics of Pharmaceutical Monopoly Power: Drug Patents, Access, 
Innovation and the Application of the WTO Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. AMB 
Publishers: Diemen. Ellen ‘t Hoen was the policy and advocacy director of Doctors Without Borders. 
38 Deere, Carolyn. 2009. The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of 
Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press: New York. p. 34-35. 
39 Drahos and Braithwaite. 2002. Information Feudalism. p. 20.  
40 In fact, U.S. IP law had historically prioritized the public interest over the rights of profit-seeking private 
entities. Harris, Donald. 2004-2005. “TRIPS’ Rebound: An Historical Analysis of How the TRIPS 
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amount of reciprocal reverse engineering which helped these states build large 
pharmaceutical infrastructures and keep drug prices down.42  
 Even once they became more concerned with patents, there were few if any firms 
in those developing states that had the capacity to copy their drugs anyway.43 IP was also 
not really considered a trade issue at this time either. It had been left out of the GATT 
almost entirely.44 Developments from the late 1960s to the early 1980s however created 
tensions between Western drug firms’ commercial aims and developing countries’ IP 
regulations.45 
 During the 1960s, India had some of the world’s highest drug prices despite its 
poverty and so its government redesigned its IP legal system to reduce the costs of 
drugs.46 In 1970, India passed a new patent law that prohibited patents on drugs.47 It only 
allowed patents on the process by which a drug was made.48 Allowing process patents but 
not product patents meant that generic drug makers were incentivized to make the same 
drugs as Western firms but to find ways to do so more cheaply.49 This led to Indian firms 
becoming highly skilled reverse engineers that excelled at producing drugs at very low 
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cost.50 This new IP regime resulted in much lower drug prices.51 It also meant that Indian 
firms became major exporters to other developing states.52 India’s IP regulations were not 
just important because of what they did to the Indian market, but also because India was a 
leader among developing states in attacking stringent IP regulations.53  
Pushing Against an Open Door: The TRIPS Negotiation 
 As developing countries’ IP regulations became more injurious to Western drug 
firms’ interests, they became much more highly motivated to reduce those regulatory 
trade barriers in IP. Activists, who might have fought against these firms’ efforts, were 
not yet significant participants in IP politics. With businesses promoting the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and with activists 
largely silent, government officials in the United States and India faced one-sided 
incentives and so gave businesses what they were asking for: significantly reduced 
regulatory trade barriers related to intellectual property.     
Business Efforts to Strength International IP Regulations  
 By the late 1970s, the less stringent IP rules in the developing world, and in 
particular India, were starting to irritate Western pharmaceutical firms.54 Also, advances 
in technology combined with a lack of enforcement mechanisms had made violating IP 
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easier and increasingly rampant.55 On drugs specifically, technological advances had 
made reverse engineering patented drugs easier and cheaper.56Moreover, by the early 
1980s, Western drug companies had become much more dependent on patents for their 
revenue stream.57 At about the same time, these firms in the United States were also 
honing their lobbying skills and forming effective, durable political coalitions with each 
other as they collectively fought for changes in U.S. patent regulation.58   
 Reverse engineering was beginning to eat into their sales across the developing 
world. Additionally, pharmaceutical companies started to worry that the emergence of 
cheaper copies of drugs in the developing world might lead to developed country citizens 
wondering why they had to pay so much more for a drug than what people in developing 
countries paid.59 These firms also tended to view developing country arguments against 
stringent IP regulations as simply a smokescreen for their “real” motivation, giving an 
advantage to domestic businesses.60 If developing countries’ IP regulations were going to 
undermine these Western companies in both new markets as well as established ones, 
something had to be done about them.  
  U.S. drug companies like Pfizer, as well as other IP-intensive firms such as IBM, 
wanted an international IP-regime that had two characteristics. First, they wanted 
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developing states’ IP regulations to be raised to match U.S regulations.61 Patents terms 
should be extended; all classes of products, including pharmaceuticals, should be 
patentable; and the means to break these patents should be greatly circumscribed.62 
Second, they wanted this new regime to have strong enforcement capabilities to prevent 
those developing countries from backsliding or ignoring their own laws whenever it was 
convenient.63 At the time, the primary international organization for IP issues, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) had no real means of enforcement and no 
dispute settlement mechanism.64 Also, because it only dealt with IP issues, there was no 
possibility of cross issue linkage.65 Even worse, from the perspective of these firms, was 
that it had a one-country, one-vote structure, which meant it was dominated by 
developing states.66  
 At first, these businesses attempted to achieve their policy goals through WIPO, 
but after being stymied, they began looking for a new forum.67 This is where the GATT, 
and explicitly linking IP with trade, enters the picture. Jim Enyart, Monsanto’s point man 
on intellectual property explained how these firms approached WIPO, saying this about a 
meeting with Arpad Bogsch, the head of WIPO, in Bogsch’s penthouse overlooking Lake 
Geneva:  
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“He fed us a multicourse lunch from his private dining room. It was concluded 
with cognac and cigars…Finally we said to him, “Look, Mr. Bogsch, we have 
found WIPO to be not constructive in the protection of IP and we are going to 
do something about it. You are either going to help out or we are going to go 
right around you.” And he said, “Well you can’t do that, we are the only 
authorized organization.” And we said, “Well, we are going to do it. You’ve 
got your choice; you either get on board or get left in the dust.” It turned out, 
when the negotiations started in GATT, Mr. Bogsch became very friendly and 
said that there was a great deal of expertise in WIPO and how there ought to be 
a huge role for WIPO in the TRIPS agreement. You will notice that the TRIPS 
Agreement has a reasonably weak consultative role for WIPO.”68  
 
 IP-intensive firms, led by the drug companies, argued that developing states’ 
lower IP-standards were essentially theft of their intellectual property and amounted to 
piracy.69 These businesses successfully sold the causal story that intellectual property 
rights lead to free trade and investment and so promote economic growth.70 Moreover, in 
the mid-1980s the perception of a loss of competitiveness was something of a policy 
crisis in the United States; these businesses successfully capitalized on that crisis by 
arguing that the best way to improve American competitiveness would be to force other 
states to cease and desist with this intellectual property theft.71 The best place to do that, 
according to the firms, was in trade policy.72  
 According to them, linking IP with trade would have several advantages. First, 
through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), it meant that there was something 
that could be exchanged for a country agreeing to higher IP regulations.73 Second, the 
single undertaking of the Uruguay Round meant that states could not pick and choose 
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areas of the agreement to sign. It thus created cross-issue linkage and so states that never 
would have countenanced more stringent IP rules in isolation could be bought off with 
concessions in other areas. Finally, the GATT, unlike WIPO, had a dispute settlement 
mechanism, albeit a relatively weak one (though it would get strengthened as part of the 
Uruguay Round). 
 The industry’s lobbying efforts to place IP regulations on the Uruguay Round 
agenda were considerable. According to one US trade negotiator, Edmund Pratt and John 
Opel, the bosses of Pfizer and IBM respectively “basically engineered, pushed, and 
cajoled the government into including IP as one of the topics for the negotiation.”74  
 Edmund Pratt and other pharmaceutical executives repeatedly beseeched 
government officials to make increasing other states’ IP regulations a centerpiece of U.S. 
trade policy.75 To build an intellectual foundation for linking trade and IP they partnered 
with conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation that President Reagan was 
known to respect.76 To pressure their governments to take a stronger stand on IP 
regulations, they formed alliances with executives in Europe and Japan.77 To sustain the 
momentum behind these efforts they created organizations such as the Intellectual 
Property Committee (IPC), a coalition of representatives from IP-intensive industries.78    
NGOs Remain Silent; Government Listens to Business 
  In contrast to the concerted efforts by business, at this time, there was little if any 
push back from activists against using trade policy to reduce differences in trade-related 
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intellectual property regulations. Prior to TRIPS coming into force in 1995, health 
advocates really did not engage in IP at all; it was not part of their agenda because it was 
not perceived to directly affect their goals.79 NGOs just were not part of most of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on IP.80 James Love, a prominent activist on medicine and 
IP has admitted that even as late as 1994, much less in the 1980s, “there was virtually no 
awareness in the United States or European [NGO community] of the scope and 
importance of the trade effort to raise levels of patent protection on medicines.”81 They 
were not alone. Public health agencies also had little to no understanding of what was 
being negotiated and so also sat on the sidelines.82 With activists not taking part in the IP 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, business was pushing against an open door. 
 U.S. government officials responded warmly to the arguments made by these 
businesses. Competitiveness was a major concern at the time and blaming America’s loss 
of competitiveness on thieving foreigners was a convenient argument to buy.83 The 
argument did have at least some merit. In 1984, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
estimated that America businesses lost between six and eight billion dollars due to other 
states’ more relaxed IP regulations.84 The language of piracy was highly effective at 
getting U.S. government officials to take a very hard line in favor of higher IP standards 
as it made it a moral issue with many fewer shades of grey.85  
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 Even if they were not IP specialists, and in almost all cases they were not, 
Congressmen could not help but notice that the businesses animated by a desire for 
higher IP regulations were some of the most significant businesses in America and thus 
their districts.86 Once drug firms’ focus was foreign rather than domestic IP laws, the 
issue of drug costs became much less important to legislators.87 The pharmaceutical 
industry’s status as one of the few industries that maintained a trade surplus further 
augmented its political standing on Capitol Hill.88 Finally, the arcane character of IP 
meant government officials often relied on business for guidance.89 
 The executive branch was receptive to these businesses too. The Reagan and Bush 
administrations deeply respected property rights and so framing high IP regulations as 
defending intellectual property rights was highly effective.90 The Reagan Administration 
was a major proponent of trade liberalization and was eager to spearhead a new GATT 
Round.91 USTR Bill Brock also saw IP as a way of bolstering business support for trade 
liberalization.92  
 Since 1981, Edmund Pratt had headed the Advisory Committee for Trade 
Negotiations (ACTN), a key group charged with providing the business community’s 
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trade policy advice to the Executive branch.93 Changes in US trade law in 1984 gave IP-
intensive firms greater access to USTR officials. In 1985, the new USTR Clayton Yuetter 
created an assistant USTR position dedicated solely to promoting higher IP regulations 
globally.94 IP-intensive firms also began to employ former USTR negotiators which gave 
them special expertise in how the USTR operated and indirectly but strongly signaled the 
rewards that might accrue to USTR officials after they left their posts if they did the 
bidding of those firms.95 Given all of this, it is perhaps not surprising that the business 
community’s assessment of what IP-trade policy should be, which was titled “Basic 
Framework of GATT Provisions on Intellectual Property: Statement of Views of the 
European, Japanese, and the United States Business Communities” became the 
foundation of the USTR’s negotiating position in the Uruguay Round.96 
 Some scholars such as Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite have criticized these 
officials’ willingness to act as lawyers for these businesses, portraying them as part-
puppets, part-bullies bent on strong-arming developing countries into an agreement that 
benefitted corporate America, whatever the cost to public health. But given the incentives 
and information around these officials at the time, it would have been surprising for them 
not to have taken the actions they did.97 From an informational perspective, there were 
not yet any access to medicine advocates or other lobbying organizations providing 
analyses to government officials that would have countered IP-intensive businesses’ 
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claims. From an electoral perspective, backing the pharmaceutical companies was a high-
reward, low-cost strategy. The resistance from developing countries was also pretty 
minimal. This was not a cabal or a conspiracy against poor, sick people. It was a lesson in 
what happens in the politics of regulation and trade when businesses show up for a policy 
fight and activists do not.  
 The trajectory of events here also undermines state-centric explanations of 
international trade politics.98 The American government’s stance was not independently 
designed. It only came about because businesses lobbied vigorously and successfully for 
it. Likewise, developing countries’ willingness to yield in these negotiations had 
everything to do with the fact that domestic actors within those societies were not 
particularly animated by TRIPS.99 One cannot explain these states’ positions without first 
examining societal actors within those states. 
How the U.S. Government Promoted Higher IP Regulations in the Uruguay Round  
 In 1984, the United States made IP regulations a major part of its bilateral trading 
relationships through a mechanism known as 301.100 The 1974 Trade Act had a provision 
in it called Section 301 that authorized the executive branch to retaliate against trade 
policies implemented by other states that either violated international trade treaties, 
discriminated against American products, or posed an unreasonable restriction on U.S. 
commercial interests. Section 301 retaliation could either be initiated by the executive 
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branch, or more commonly, after a U.S. firm petitioned the executive branch to act on its 
behalf. It thus gave U.S. businesses a powerful institutional mechanism with which to 
seek reductions in other countries trade barriers.  
 The 1984 Trade Act amended this section by explicitly defining inadequately high 
IP regulations as an unreasonable restriction on U.S. commercial interests and thus meant 
that U.S. firms could now demand that the executive branch retaliate against states that 
had IP regulations those companies felt were insufficiently high.101 The Trade Act also 
made having high IP regulations a key criterion for receiving GSP benefits.102 GSP 
benefits were important to agriculture and, given agriculture’s importance to many least 
developed states’ economies, lost benefits could have serious social and political 
ramifications. This helps explain why 301 was so effective and powerful in the minds of 
developing country officials. The Reagan Administration also floated the idea of trying to 
make IP regulations a criterion for assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.103  
 These mechanisms were further strengthened in the Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988.104 That act erased the requirement that pharmaceutical firms demonstrate 
that a foreign set of regulations actually hurt them to petition the government for 301 
action.105 It also created the mechanism known as Special 301.106 This provision charged 
the USTR with monitoring other states’ intellectual property regulations and annually 
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making a ‘naughty list’, known as the Special 301 Watch List, of those states whose IP 
regulations, by virtue of being lower than U.S. IP regulations, impeded American IP-
intensive businesses.107 The USTR was, and continues to be, required to enter into 
negotiations with states on that list to raise their IP regulations. If that country does not 
raise its IP regulations, it can then be put on the Priority Watch List. The USTR will then 
issue a specific set of actions it wants that state to take. If that state does not take those 
actions, the USTR can then downgrade that state to the most serious level, Priority 
Foreign Country (PFC). A PFC faces an imminent threat of strong retaliatory sanctions.  
 The U.S. government assertively used these measures in its bilateral relationships 
to one-by-one get its trading partners to raise their intellectual property regulations.108 
First, the USTR used 301 to get South Korea to raise its IP regulations.109 Then, it 
targeted Brazil over its lack of pharmaceutical patents; after retaliatory tariffs started to 
be imposed, it too raised its IP regulations.110 301 also got Argentina to do the same.111 
The U.S. used GSP to get developing countries like Thailand to raise their intellectual 
property regulations as well.112 This bilateral strategy had two benefits for the U.S. First, 
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there were the direct benefits that would accrue to American IP-intensive firms doing 
business in those states. Second, it indirectly helped the U.S. at the multilateral level 
because now that state would not object to TRIPS because it had already raised its 
standard to what the U.S. wanted.113  
 While it was deploying 301 at the bilateral level, the United States had also been 
pushing to include an agreement on higher IP regulations in the Uruguay Round. The 
same aspects of WIPO that Western firms found so frustrating- its lack of enforcement 
mechanism and its one-country, one-vote model- made it quite popular with developing 
countries. They saw no reason why intellectual property should be handled by any 
institution other than the World Intellectual Property Organization.114 U.S. government 
officials however insisted that IP be put on the agenda and threatened to scuttle the whole 
round if it were not included. Developing countries got agricultural liberalization added 
to the agenda in exchange.115  
 Developing countries thought they had given away very little by agreeing to 
discuss IP in the Uruguay Round.116 At this point, those countries, as well as public 
health activists, had no idea what TRIPS would become. There was still a general 
perception that any IP provisions that got added to the GATT would be relatively weak, 
would likely only focus on counterfeit goods, and even if a state violated the rules, given 
the GATT’s institutional structure there would not be a mechanism to punish them.117 
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And so, in 1986, intellectual property was officially put on the agenda.118 All three of 
those beliefs turned out to be very wrong.  
 Over the next several years, the United States worked with European states and 
Japan in private, informal sessions to arrive at common positions so that a united front 
could be presented to developing countries.119 These states understood that much of the 
key negotiating was going on between developed countries and that forums they were 
invited to were mere formalities and so, according to one developing country negotiator, 
“we lost interest [in the TRIPS forums].”120  
 Developing countries would later become highly engaged in the politics of IP, 
especially with regards to pharmaceuticals, but at this point, they did not consider TRIPS 
to be a big deal. Many developing countries, unlike the United States, had no IP experts 
on their trade negotiating teams.121 Many of them did not understand the details of what 
they were negotiating and so did not understand the full measure of their concessions.  
 Even if they had been more engaged on IP, developing states were far less well 
organized under the GATT than under WIPO.122 There was often little to no coordination 
between their trade negotiators in Geneva and national capitals.123 Lodging negotiators in 
Geneva is not exactly cheap and so many of these developing countries had tiny, poorly 
funded trade negotiation teams.124 These teams would simply get overwhelmed in 
negotiations with the U.S. team.  
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 India was really one of the only developing countries that had the technical 
expertise to resist American demands on IP and so many developing states looked to 
them for leadership.125 India was the most resilient developing state in its opposition to 
TRIPS.126 Its leadership on the issue though was still quite spotty. Given the stakes, 
Indian drug companies did surprisingly little lobbying; like access to medicine advocates, 
they did not really get engaged with the issue until after TRIPS had been signed.127 India 
did not often engage with other developing states on this issue and skipped what was 
supposed to be a key meeting of those states to coordinate their negotiating position on IP 
regulations.128 When they did engage in negotiations, U.S. negotiators were prepared to 
beat back any argument they made; as Mike Hathaway, the lead U.S. negotiator on IP 
recalled, “we certainly had fun….beating down arguments made by India.”129  
 Even if they had wanted to oppose the United States more forcefully, many of 
their key allies such as Argentina and Brazil had been peeled away. South Korea was 
attempting to gain admission to the OECD and so was more concerned with pleasing 
developed countries than with showing solidarity with Brazil and India.130 Additionally, 
other developing states such as the ASEAN members, badly wanted a deal to get done 
and believed that giving the United States what it wanted on IP was the required price 
and so they had little appetite for a fight over IP.131   Developing countries generally 
perceived services liberalization to be the biggest threat and TRIPS to be a lesser issue 
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and so reserved their energy for fighting on services rather than on IP.132 Also, India, like 
other developing countries, was attempting to liberalize its investment laws to attract 
foreign direct investment and raising IP regulations seemed to be consistent with that.133 
The one area where India did fight hard was on compulsory licensing and there it was 
able to win more permissive language, which would have major ramifications later on.134 
 Moreover, developing countries were not going home empty-handed. In exchange 
for acquiescing to the United States on IP, developing countries won concessions in two 
areas that were much more important to them, agriculture and textiles.135 An Argentinian 
negotiator said “they didn’t give a damn what was in the IP code as long as they got what 
they wanted in agriculture.”136 IP was perceived by developing country leaders to be part 
of broader bargain in which they would get investment and market access benefits in 
textiles and agriculture in exchange for increasing their IP regulations.137  
 Developing states believed, inaccurately, that TRIPS would curtail America’s 301 
unilateralism.138 Also, because these states were to be given a grace period to implement 
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the new IP regulations, their governments lowered the extent to which they prioritized the 
costs of higher IP; the costs were far down the road and so just not as important.139 As 
myopic as this seems in hindsight, discounting future costs is basic human nature. 
Finally, the Uruguay Round came with many other agreements and TRIPS was but one of 
them. These agreements collectively ran over 1,000 pages long and most developing state 
legislatures had little discussion of the impact TRIPS would have; it was only later when 
those impacts became more clear that these legislatures took more interest.140 In the U.S., 
it was an afterthought for the public as well. Unlike NAFTA, the completion of the 
Uruguay Round, including TRIPS, was not particularly controversial.141   
 Developing states’ decision to accept TRIPS was understandable, but TRIPS, 
which came into force in 1995 with the birth of the WTO, nevertheless represented a 
major reduction in regulatory differences by requiring all signatories to adopt the higher 
IP regulations developed countries wanted.142 They all had to have patents that lasted 20 
years. None were allowed to prohibit patents on drugs. The use of compulsory licenses 
was constrained.143 All states were required to stringently enforce IP regulations. Failure 
to do any of these could lead to that state being taken before a WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism, which was much more robust than the GATT’s had been.144  
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 The California Effect actually applies well to this case.145 There were three central 
elements to the California Effect. First, businesses will support stricter regulations when 
those stricter regulations make them more competitive. Second, richer states with higher 
standards force producers in other states to raise their standards in order to export to them 
and so de facto raise foreign standards. Third, trade agreements give richer states with 
higher standards leverage to pressure other states to raise their standards to the richer 
states’ level.  
 All three of those were present here. American IP-intensive businesses saw high 
IP regulations as a competitive advantage. The United States linked other states’ 
producers’ access to the U.S. market and used the Uruguay Round to pressure other states 
to raise their IP standards. This suggests that the California Effect may, at times, be 
applicable outside of the two regulatory areas (consumer safety and the environment) 
which Vogel originally intended.  
 TRIPS required little adjustment for the U.S. but came with very large adjustment 
costs for many developing countries such as India.146  All WTO members were now 
required to adopt the exact kind of IP regulations demanded by the United States. In the 
words of one pharmaceutical lobbyist, “we got 95 percent of what we wanted.”147 It 
would not be that long however before the connection between intellectual property 
regulations and trade became a white-hot international political issue. 
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The Doha Declaration: Access to Medicine Activists Show Up…..and Win 
 In the second half of the 1990s, the AIDS epidemic grew into a public health 
nightmare, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Given the relative newness of the disease, 
practically all of the effective HIV drugs were patented and thus expensive. Poor people 
were dying of a disease for which effective medicines existed but which were far too 
expensive for them to afford. Public health advocates began to take a closer look at the 
connection between IP regulations and the cost of drugs and concluded that the high IP 
regulations mandated by TRIPS were the main drivers behind the expense of the 
medicines and thus complicit in widespread death. Drug companies compounded this 
imagery when they sued the South African government over measures it had taken to 
stem the AIDS crisis. Even after they dropped the lawsuit, developing countries and 
access to medicine advocates wanted states to have more flexibility under TRIPS to 
institute different IP regulations. For a variety of reasons, the U.S. government, which 
normally would have been expected to oppose any increase in regulatory barriers in 
pharmaceuticals, relented and accepted the Doha Declaration which strengthened 
developing states’ ability to implement different IP regulations. 
The HIV Crisis Gets Really Bad But Drug Firms, and the U.S. Government, Hold Their 
Ground 
 By the late 1990s, 25 million Africans had HIV/AIDS.148 In 1998, it killed more 
than two million people in Sub-Saharan Africa and life expectancy there had fallen by 
twenty to thirty years.149 Drug firms were reluctant to substantially lower their prices in 
developing countries because that would demonstrate just how low their marginal costs 
were and thus could lead government officials and citizens in wealthier states to ask why 
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they should have to pay so much more for the drug than it cost to make.150 With HIV 
rates soaring and drug prices out of reach for most of its HIV victims, in 1997 the South 
African government passed a law that permitted the parallel importing of generic drugs 
manufactured under compulsory licenses.151 In effect, the South African government said 
that the AIDS crisis justified ignoring drug companies’ patents on anti-retroviral drugs.152  
 Western drug firms were irate over this policy. They believed that it amounted to 
“carte blanche for the wholesale abrogation of patent rights for all pharmaceuticals” in a 
$2.5 billion market.153 They worried that the South African legislation would set a 
precedent that other states would follow and implement on other diseases, which could 
lead to an unraveling of TRIPS altogether.154  Not only were they opposed to any 
weakening of TRIPS, they in fact had been wanting TRIPS strengthened still more 
through requirements that states grant patents on biological products, more limits on 
compulsory licensing, greater enforcement of TRIPS and more stringent data exclusivity 
provisions.155 They were not interested in finding a compromise solution. U.S. trade 
officials said that when they asked pharmaceutical representatives whether they could 
accept some concessions to South Africa, the companies “said no, we really just want you 
to hold the line and continue to pressure South Africa to terminate this law altogether.”156  
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 These drug firms first attempted to intimidate the South African government into 
backing down. Merck threatened to leave the country altogether and take millions of 
dollars and thousands of jobs with it.157 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Pharmacia and Upjohn, 
and Eli Lilly all closed plants after the introduction of the bill.158 The International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers said the weakening of patents could lead to 
South Africa being denied access to any new HIV drugs that came on the market.159 That 
was an extremely serious and not-at-all veiled threat.  
 These firms continued to hold a privileged position in the U.S. trade policymaking 
process. The 1984 Trade Act required the USTR to consult with a range of businesses 
through the (IFAC-3), a group of 40 industry representatives that plays a key role in 
preparing the USTR’s annual Section 301 Reports as well as reports on trade agreement 
that go to the Executive branch and to Congress.160 IP-intensive businesses also 
continued to have the ear of Capitol Hill; 47 members of Congress signed a letter 
encouraging the USTR to fight the South African law.161 Congress also reduced foreign 
aid to South Africa over the law.162 
 These government officials echoed the drug industry’s argument about the danger 
of a precedent being set. One Western official argued that  
"if the Health Minister thought it was in the interest of public health that 
those $10,000 AIDS cocktails be cheaper, she could just rip off the patents 
and set up a factory in Cape Town to make them…..and if the Minister of 
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Health says this is O.K., then the Minister of Education will be able to say, 
'Well, affordable computers are in the interest of public education, but 
Windows is just too darn expensive, so we're going to buy knockoff 
copies.'163  
 It was not just about AIDS drugs. The way U.S. government officials saw it, the 
South African law was a direct challenge to the new, higher IP regulations embodied in 
TRIPS. They had fought to reduce those regulatory barriers and were in no mood to see 
their work undone.  
 U.S. government officials thus sallied forth in defense of the drug companies. In 
1998, the USTR placed South Africa on the 301 Priority Watch List.164 IP regulations 
were the central issue at the US-South Africa Binational Commission meetings in August 
1998.165 By the U.S. government’s own admission, multiple agencies and branches of the 
government colluded to put extraordinary diplomatic pressure on South Africa to scrap 
the 1997 Medicines Act.166  
The HIV Crisis Prompts Access to Medicine Advocates to Get Engaged in IP Politics 
 Meanwhile, public health activists had gotten seriously engaged in the politics of 
IP regulations in a way they never had during the TRIPS negotiation.167 The first big 
international meeting of NGOs on the relationship between IP and public health was in 
1996, the year after TRIPS came into effect.168 The second meeting was hosted by the 
Indian National Working Group on Patents and also brought in government 
representatives and generic drug producers.169 The U.S. attempt to coerce South Africa to 
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repeal its allowance of compulsory licenses on HIV drugs in 1998 infuriated NGOs. As 
one of NGO leaders put it “this whole debate in 1998 woke people up. It really got the 
attention of the public health community, which really started to get engaged at this point. 
It was what paved the way for the Doha Declaration- it was Doha before Doha.”170   
 These activists’ engagement in the politics surrounding trade and intellectual 
property regulations highlights the limitations of the cleavage-based explanations of trade 
politics. The cleavage here was not between a sector of society that profited from trade 
and a sector that lost. It was between a sector (pharmaceutical firms) that had an 
economic stake and a sector (access to medicine advocates) that wanted to prioritize non-
economic public policy goals. By focusing exclusively on economic considerations, these 
explanations again miss how trade increasingly animates actors with normative concerns 
once regulations get added to the political equation.  
 In 1998, these activists went to the WHO and were instrumental in that 
organization crafting a Revised Drug Strategy that emphasized the need to prioritize 
public health over commercial interests and mandated that the WHO monitor trade 
agreements for their affect on public health.171 The next year, Doctors Without Borders 
launched its Access to Essential Medicines Campaign and began closely collaborating 
with other NGOs such as Health Action International, the Consumer Project on 
Technology, and Oxfam International.172 Doctors Without Border then won the Nobel 
                                                
170 Ibid. p. 81.  
171 Devereaux, et. al. 2006. Case Studies in U.S. Trade Negotiations. p. 80-81. US negotiators were not 
happy that the WHO was now taking part in IP discussion, which they believed belong exclusively to the 
WTO. Ibid. The World Health Organization’s governing body has a rotating board and so every third year 
the U.S. is not on that board. 1998 was one of those off years. This is what allowed activists to sidestep the 
U.S. Sell and Prakash. 2004. “Using Ideas Strategically.” p. 163.  
172 Devereaux, et. al. 2006. Case Studies in U.S. Trade Negotiations. p. 85.   
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 246 
Peace Prize for its efforts and used the prize money toward boosting its Access to 
Essential Medicines Campaign.173 
 These activists also started to engage with key governments on a domestic basis. 
They get more involved in lobbying the U.S. government.174 Starting in 1996, the Indian 
Commerce Ministry set up a consultation process that involved industry representatives 
and NGOs.175 They repeatedly lobbied the USTR to take more relaxed positions on 
intellectual property regulations.176 USTR and European trade officials afterwards 
acknowledged that NGOs were crucial in bringing attention to the connection between IP 
and access to medicines.177 In June 1999, they stole the show at Al Gore’s announcement 
that he was running for president, and continued to dog his campaign.178 They also 
successfully lobbied key segments of the Democratic Party such as the Congressional 
Black Caucus.179 In May 2000, they successfully convinced the Clinton administration to 
back off threatened trade sanctions against South Africa.180   
 This chain of events provides further evidence against the disguised protectionism 
argument.181 The primary defenders of regulatory barriers throughout this time period 
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were not businesses looking for protectionism; they were NGOs trying to maintain policy 
space. The same would continue to be true in the WTO stalemate and India’s use of 
flexibilities examined below.   
 As activists and developing countries fought to broaden that policy space by 
increasingly IP regulatory differences while businesses and the U.S. government 
stridently resisted, the relationship between the players on each side continued to grow 
more and more acrimonious. NGOs portrayed the drug companies as death merchants.182 
Nkosozana Zuma, the South African Health Minister and the leading force behind the 
South African law, said of her critics “if they had their way, we would all die of 
AIDS.”183 For their part, the drug companies saw the South African law as a smokescreen 
for a WHO plot to eradicate patents, a move by Indian generics firms to increase market 
share, and an ideological crusade against Western businesses by the South African 
ANC.184 They also argued that corruption and poor governance, rather than high IP 
regulations, were the real facilitators of the AIDS crisis.185 
 This standoff built to a head in March 2001. The legal case between the drug 
firms and the South African government that had begun in 1998 had finally come before 
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the South African High Court.186 The opening of the case was accompanied by a wave of 
anti-industry protests.187 Access to medicine advocates kept up the pressure for the next 
several weeks.188 These raised the salience of the access to medicines issue and 
threatened to badly damage drug companies’ image. The WHO and the EU publicly sided 
with South Africa.189 In April 2001, before the PR damage could get any worse, the drug 
companies dropped their lawsuit and agreed to pay the South African government’s legal 
costs.190 Beyond the immediate costs on AIDS, the pharmaceutical firms worried that the 
issue could spill over into a broader discussion of drug pricing in developed states that 
could have potentially disastrous implications for them.191 For them, it was better to 
concede defeat here than continue fighting on terrain this disadvantageous.  
 The AIDS crisis was tailor made for activists’ victory. As Keck and Sikkink point 
out, activism is more effective on “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable 
individuals, especially when there is a short clear causal chain (or story) assigning 
responsibility.”192 The HIV crisis had all of those. AIDS is clearly bodily harm. Poor 
Africans are amongst the most vulnerable people anywhere. The story that activists told, 
that corporate greed was leading to needless death, provided a short clear causal chain 
assigning responsibility. Drug firms should have known that the public relations backlash 
against them would be intense. Somehow, they did not.  
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Activists Win A More Durable Victory at Doha 
 Drug firms dropping the lawsuit did not settle the matter though. Just because the 
pharmaceutical companies backed down this time did not mean that developing countries 
were free from worrying about being challenged in the future. What was and what was 
not TRIPS-compliant needed to be clarified and that was still a matter of considerable 
debate because Articles 30 and 31 of TRIPS, which covered exceptions to patent rights, 
were ambiguous and vague in terms of the conditions under which a compulsory license 
would be considered TRIPS-compliant.193 Developed country governments, and the Bush 
Administration in particular, had been pushing for a new trade round.194 With respect to 
IP, the most important issue demanding attention was under what circumstances 
compulsory licenses could be issued. Was AIDS sui generis and the sole permissible 
exception to strict patentability or did all diseases merit such consideration? Who got to 
choose which diseases made the lists, each national government, the WTO, the WHO, or 
would it be some independently negotiated text? The upcoming ministerial meeting 
seemed to be the arena at which these matters could get decided. 
 Several factors led developing states to punch harder and more effectively than 
they had during the original TRIPS negotiation. First, whereas they were in many ways in 
the dark about the connection between IP and access to medicine during the Uruguay 
Round, by 2000, they were quite aware of that connection. The AIDS crisis and the 
pharmaceutical companies’ suit against South Africa had ensured that. Every year 
starting in 1998, the G-77 developing countries issued a statement arguing for expanding 
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TRIPS flexibilities.195 Second, the year 2000 had been a deadline for many developing 
countries to become TRIPS compliant and so they were fully aware of how much policy 
adjustment TRIPS was requiring.196 Third, the benefits they were supposed to receive in 
exchange for TRIPS had been slow in coming. The concessions in textiles and agriculture 
were weaker and more delayed than anticipated.197 Fourth, though it was implied that 
TRIPS would lead to a reduction of America’s use of 301 and other unilateral measures, 
the United States had actually used them more after TRIPS than before it.198 
 Access to medicine advocates augmented these developing countries’ efforts.199  
These activists were much more well-organized at this point than they had been in the 
TRIPS negotiations.200 They worked directly with those countries’ governments to 
strengthen their negotiating performance.201 They encouraged developing countries to not 
limit their demands to AIDS in particular but to public health more broadly.202  
 Developing states, led by India, had several policy demands. First, they wanted a 
new declaration that stated that TRIPS “does not in any way undermine the legitimate 
rights of WTO Members to formulate their own public health policies.”203 They wanted a 
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text focused on public health, which was broader than just access to medicines.204 
Second, they wanted governments to have the right to decide what constituted a national 
emergency, which was important because it is only under conditions of national 
emergency that a state can issue compulsory licenses without prior consultation with the 
patent holder.205 Third, they wanted a moratorium on disputes against access to medicines 
policies.206 Fourth, they wanted developed countries, (i.e., the United States) to be 
prohibited from basing unilateral trade preferences on IP (i.e. 301).207 Finally, they 
wanted TRIPS flexibilities to cover as many diseases as possible, not just AIDS.208 
 Developed countries, led by the United States, had several concerns. First, they 
worried that developing countries would use compulsory licenses to promote industrial 
and economic concerns, instead of just access to medicine.209 U.S. officials believed that 
India’s involvement in particular was really just a smokescreen for them advancing their 
generics industry.210 Second, given that the declaration language developing countries 
wanted could cover practically any policy, it would have effectively eradicated TRIPS 
altogether.211 Third, even if that language were narrowed, a moratorium on disputes and 
trade preference linkage would take the enforcement teeth out of TRIPS and give states 
de facto impunity to violate it. Fourth, they wanted the list of diseases covered by these 
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flexibilities to be an agreed-upon list narrowly tailored to HIV/AIDS and other 
epidemics, not just whatever a developing country government decided constituted an 
emergency.212 Finally, they wanted developing countries to implement policies designed 
to prevent re-importation, i.e. people buying drugs cheaply in a developing country and 
then sneaking them into a developed country where prices were higher.213 Once again, 
contra to the state-centric explanations, both developed and developing states’ 
negotiating positions was based mainly on the demands being made by societal actors. 
 In November 2001, these states agreed to the Doha Declaration. It was largely 
based on developing states’ proposals.214 It re-affirmed states’ rights to issue compulsory 
licenses under three conditions: 1) an attempt was made to obtain a voluntary license 
from the patent holder but was unsuccessful- this condition could be bypassed in a 
national emergency; 2) the patent holder was adequately compensated; and 3) it was 
predominately for the supply of the domestic market. It also said that states could 
determine for themselves what constitutes a national emergency.215 Developing states 
now had a confirmed right to institute different IP regulations that could amount to a 
regulatory trade barrier. The Doha Declaration made it much more difficult, legal and 
politically, to challenge a developing country’s use of a compulsory license.216 The side 
in favor of reducing regulatory barriers in IP by raising them to a high-level, which 
seemed so dominant during the TRIPS negotiation, had backed down. The U.S. 
government in particular had abandoned the maximalist positions it once held.  
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Why the United States Backed Down 
 Several factors led to this climb down. First, the relationship between the drug 
firms and the U.S. government had been damaged, albeit temporarily, by the South 
African episode. U.S. officials were greatly annoyed with drug representatives’ refusal to 
recognize that high drug prices were at least partially exacerbating the AIDS crisis in 
South Africa.217 Several Democratic Congressmen were not pleased with them either. 
After an amendment that would have prevented the U.S. from challenging sub-Saharan 
African countries’ access to medicine policies was stripped from a trade bill, Dianne 
Feinstein and Russ Feingold threatened to filibuster that bill.218  
 Second, after anthrax was sent via mail shortly after 9/11, both Canada and the 
United States threatened Bayer with a compulsory license for the anthrax drug Cipro to 
get Bayer to lower its price.219 In other words, the U.S. had just threatened a company’s 
IP protection based on public health considerations. How could U.S. negotiators just a 
few months later at the Doha ministerial argue, with a straight face, that threatening IP to 
protect public health was inappropriate?  
 Third, after 9/11, the U.S. was determined to launch a new trade round at the 
Doha Ministerial to demonstrate its global leadership and wanted to attain that goal so 
badly that it was willing to accept language that developing countries were demanding to 
get that.220 Conversely, developing states prioritized public health over the start of a new 
round, especially since they were not entirely sure that the Uruguay Round had been 
good for them given the painfully slow implementation of the agricultural and textile 
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concessions that were supposed to benefit them. This shows that market power 
considerations, while important, can be overridden if the non-economic policy goals 
prioritized by activists have enough salience. It also implicitly critiques the bicycle theory 
of trade which argues that for trade liberalization to be maintain, there must constantly be 
forward momentum (i.e. a new round on the agenda); otherwise those actors opposed to 
trade can more easily promote protectionism.221 At this point, there was a new round on 
the agenda and that still was not enough to counter the power of activists’ lobbying. 
 Fourth, given the greater salience of the IP-medicine cost connection, a greater 
array of U.S. government agencies had taken interest in the subject and they often had a 
different perspective than the USTR.222 This is a reminder that just as trade increasingly 
impacting regulation brings more societal actors into trade politics, especially those with 
normative concerns related to those regulations, it also means that government agencies 
that are primarily interested in those regulations also take a greater interest in trade. If 
they generally side with those activists, then the USTR and other agencies that frequently 
side with businesses may find their control over trade policymaking greatly diluted.  
 If the TRIPS negotiation was a lesson in what happens when activists do not show 
up for a policy fight, the passage of the Doha Declaration is a lesson in the extent to 
which it actually is possible for a rag-tag crew of activists to beat some of the world’s 
most powerful corporations.  
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Stalemate And Constructive Ambiguity at the WTO 
 The Doha Declaration was a big victory for access to medicine advocates and 
developing countries but it did not settle three issues: 1) which diseases a compulsory 
license could be issued for, 2) what kind of exceptions to make for states that did not 
have production capacity, and 3) whether non-violation complaints could move forward. 
On which diseases to cover, the language in Doha was never clarified to either side’s 
benefit. On states’ without production capacity, the same but no greater flexibilities were 
granted to them as to other states. On non-violation complaints, there has been a rolling 
temporary moratorium. In sum, the regulatory barriers on these issues remained static 
through a mix of constructive ambiguity and stalemate. 
Three Outstanding Issues Left Over From Doha 
 While the Doha Declaration had affirmed developing states’ right to institute IP 
regulations that differed from what developed states wanted, several important details 
remained deeply contested. These details were the crux of the political wrangling over the 
next few years. On one level, they were deeply legalistic and technical, but on another 
level they were entirely political. They determined the extent to which less stringent IP 
regulations could get used and thus the extent to which different states’ use of these 
regulatory vehicles could constitute a barrier to trade. In other words, they were a fight 
over a potential regulatory trade barrier that had the power to determine the relative 
prioritization of commercial interests and public health. 
 The first and second issues related to compulsory licenses. The definition of a 
national emergency was of critical importance because it facilitated the issuance of 
compulsory licenses. Paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration reads “Each Member has 
the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of 
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extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”223 The first clause seemed to 
give states a great deal of leeway but the second clause implies that states cannot just 
label anything a national emergency and hints at criteria but does not specifically 
enumerate what is a national emergency and what is not.  
 The first major vector of this wrangling was over which diseases counted as a 
national emergency.224 Activists wanted it to cover as broad of a disease spectrum as 
possible.225 Developing countries also held that the reference to AIDS in the Doha 
Declaration was non-exhaustive; they wanted no limits on the diseases covered.226  
 Drug companies had politically lost on AIDS and wanted to limit their loss to just 
that disease.227 AIDS was undoubtedly an enormous crisis and if it were the only 
exception to TRIPS rules, they could live with that. At the very least, they had the public 
relations acumen to not try again to challenge a developing state as they had with South 
Africa. But if seemingly any disease could be labeled an emergency, that would quickly 
undermine drug companies’ overseas profit, and that was unacceptable.228 Letters from 
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the U.S. Congress to the USTR on limiting diseases that could get TRIPS exceptions 
essentially repeated pharmaceutical industry talking points.229  The U.S. later 
somewhat expanded its list of acceptable diseases, even saying that it might consider all 
infectious diseases acceptable, but it still wanted a defined list.230 That was not good 
enough for developing countries.231 The EU tried to float a compromise but that too was 
shot down by African countries.232 The two sides have never resolved this disagreement. 
The United States refused to countenance developing countries’ position but did state that 
it would forgo pursuing disputes against states that were attempting to combat AIDS or 
other epidemics.233 The United States has never pursued a dispute against another state’s 
IP regulations based on the target disease and thus developing countries have never had 
the opportunity to challenge that dispute being brought forth. A dispute could lead the 
issue to be clarified but neither side can be sure it will not be clarified in ways that benefit 
the other side. Better to have a murky disagreement than a clear loss. 
 The second vector had to do with states that did not possess the domestic 
capability to make drugs.234 The original TRIPS Agreement had conditioned a state 
issuing a compulsory license on that license being primarily for the supply of the 
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domestic market. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration recognized that this condition 
meant that states without the domestic wherewithal to manufacture generic medicines 
would have difficulty using a compulsory license as no other state would be able to make 
it for them since that would violate that condition.235  
 Until January of 2005, this did not in effect constitute much of a problem because 
it was not until that date that India had to abide by the terms of the TRIPS Agreement.236 
Until that date it could supply these drugs for states without domestic manufacturing 
capacity, but that date was approaching quickly and India would be in clear violation of 
the letter of the TRIPS Agreement if it continued supplying those drugs after that date. 
Developing countries wanted a resolution to this issue before that January 2005 deadline.  
 Activists argued that developing countries without domestic manufacturing 
capacity should be allowed to issue compulsory licenses and then import that drug from 
another state, most likely India.237 The Doha Declaration also mandated that states find a 
negotiated solution over this issue in order to help disease-stricken developing countries.  
 Western pharmaceutical companies wanted to ensure that developing countries’ 
use of compulsory licenses did not undermine patent protections in richer countries. They 
were especially wary of two problems. First, they were concerned that drugs made for 
developing countries would get diverted away from those countries and into richer states 
where, given their significantly lower costs, they would undermine drug companies’ 
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profits.238 In order to reduce the chance of this happening, the United States wanted 
developing countries using this system to make the compulsory licensed drugs easily 
distinguishable by packaging and coloring. Given that this kind of packaging and 
distribution could increase the cost of producing and distributing those drugs, developing 
countries initially did not want to do this.239 Second, the pharmaceutical firms were 
worried that richer developing countries would also try to use the system even though 
they could better afford patent-protected medicines than the least developed countries.240 
 The United States very much wanted to revive the flagging Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations at a Ministerial Meeting in Cancun scheduled for September 2003. The 
standoff over IP regulations and pharmaceuticals threatened to block that. As September 
2003 got closer and closer, the United States became more and more willing to cut a deal 
while developing countries perceived that now was their best opportunity to exert 
leverage. Just two weeks before that meeting was scheduled to begin, WTO members 
agreed on a buy-out. Countries without domestic manufacturing capacity would be given 
a waiver from TRIPS rules to use compulsory licenses in much the same way as other 
developing countries, but to prevent diversion into richer countries, they had to 
implement “reasonable measures within their means proportionate to their administrative 
capacities.”241 This was another example of constructive ambiguity in this period. 
Additionally, 44 developed and richer developing states agreed to forgo their use of this 
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system or limit it only to serious epidemics.242 This waiver was made official in 2005 and 
has been renewed every two years since 2007 with the most recent renewal coming in 
December 2015.243  
 Interestingly, this case contradicts what the California Effect would have 
predicted and suggests a possible caveat to it. Here, the United States, a rich country, 
wanted higher standards and was not able to use a trade agreement to raise other 
countries standards. It was not able to do so because it wanted a trade agreement much 
more eagerly than its negotiating partners. Given the relative size of the respective 
markets, it is presumed that the smaller country benefits from increased access to the 
larger market more than the other way round and this gives the country with the larger 
market the market power to leverage increases in the other states’ level of regulatory 
protection. But as we have seen in this chapter and the other cases, market power is far 
from the only factor at play. If those other factors lead the state with the larger market to 
more desperately want the trade deal than the country with the smaller market, the market 
leverage that it would normally enjoy evaporates. In those circumstances, the California 
Effect is much more likely to break down. 
 The third area of disagreement centered on non-violation complaints. These 
complaints basically argue that a member state has denied another state market access 
benefits even though its behavior is not outside the letter of the agreement. In October 
2002, developing countries pushed for a prohibition on non-violation disputes.244 The 
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United States did not want a permanent prohibition but was willing to agree to a 
moratorium on those complaints. Thereafter, the moratorium was renewed every two 
years with little disagreement until 2014. In that year, after American businesses 
continually complained about India’s IP policies (discussed below), the U.S. began 
opposing extending the moratorium on non-violation complaints.245 The TRIPS Council 
nevertheless extended the moratorium again in November 2015.246 Given that 
Switzerland is the only country that supports the U.S. in opposing the extension of this 
moratorium, it is likely to continue to be extended for the foreseeable future.247 
 2015 was also notable for another development as well. The Sustainable 
Development Goals, the UN’s follow on efforts that aim to build upon the Millennium 
Development Goals, affirmed states’ right to use TRIPS flexibilities to promote access to 
medicines. Once again, developed countries led by the United States and developing 
countries led by India have not been able to agree to specifics and so the language has 
been left vague. On all of the details in this period, the result of negotiations at the WTO 
level was either an exercise in constructive ambiguity or a compromise. Now that both 
sides knew the stakes of the fight and were eager to show up, it was difficult for either to 
gain the upper hand.  
Legal Creativity: India’s Interpretation and Use of TRIPS Flexibilities 
 Under the provisions of TRIPS, India had to implement TRIPS-compliant IP 
regulations beginning in 2005. India has creatively found a number of policy means to 
relax their IP regulations. They used a narrow set of patentability requirements and 
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greater policy access for patent opponents and so limited which drugs could get patented. 
They also employed novel injunction policies and compulsory licenses to control drug 
prices. All of these measures made India’s IP regulations differ significantly from the 
high IP standards that the United States wanted. All of these measures were also 
technically TRIPS-compliant. Still, India has been judicious in its use of these measures, 
employing them much less than they otherwise could have in order to maintain amicable 
relations with U.S. drug firms and U.S. businesses more generally. 
Flexibilities in India’s 2005 Patent Act 
 The Indian government used administrative delays in the 1990s to lessen TRIPS’ 
impact.248 Still, by 2005, India would have to make its IP regulations TRIPS-compliant. 
The cost of patented drugs was a looming challenge. This was especially the case because 
drugs are a much larger share of health expenditures in India (44%) than in the United 
States (12%).249 To make matters worse, the paucity of health insurance in India means 
that the costs of drugs are borne almost entirely by the consumer in a manner that is much 
more salient than when the bill is being paid by an insurance company or the state.250 
Even the tiny fraction of citizens that have health insurance have to pay for drugs 
themselves because health insurance in India does not cover drugs.251 70 percent of 
Indian healthcare expenses are paid out of pocket.252 As discussed earlier, since the 1970s 
India had not allowed patents on drugs at all. The Indian government was also able to 
issue compulsory licenses for those drugs made and sold in India prior to 2005.253  
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 In 2005, in order to comply with TRIPS, the Indian government revised its IP 
regulations to allow for pharmaceutical patents as well as for the 20-year patent term and 
other TRIPS provisions. Drug cost concerns remained ever-present however and TRIPS 
was not as airtight of an agreement as its Western proponents believed. A number of the 
terms in TRIPS are quite vague such as that governments undertake ‘reasonable’ efforts 
to work with patent holders.254 What exactly counts as reasonable? Rather than reject 
TRIPS outright or seek an international dispute, India instead chose to interpret these 
provisions in highly creative ways.255 They primarily did this in three areas: patentability, 
injunctions, and compulsory licenses.  
 While TRIPS undeniably forced many states to strengthen their IP regulations, 
which was exactly the point, it did leave a number of patent-related matters firmly in the 
hands of national government officials. For an applicant to receive a patent, their 
invention must be new, non-obvious, and useful; TRIPS gives national patent offices the 
power to define what exactly those terms mean and to determine what information must 
be disclosed in a patent application.256 
 During the domestic negotiation over India’s 2005 Patent Act, activists such as 
the Delhi Network of Positive People opposed the expansion of drug patents.257 Doctors 
Without Borders also opposed granting patents to new forms of known drugs, rather than 
an entirely new class of drug, and wanted extensive opportunities for opposition to the 
granting of patents in the approval process.258 Officials in the Indian Parliament cited 
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these activists in their arguments in the debate over the bill.259 The 2005 Patents Act 
reflected a number of these activists’ concerns. 
 First, the Indian government has, since the passage of the 2005 Patents Act, 
implemented a number of limitations on what subject matter can and cannot be 
patented.260 Second, India’s definition of what counts as non-obvious is also 
exceptionally high.261 Third, the biggest curtailment of patentable products is section 3(d) 
of the law which is aimed at preventing what is known as evergreening, which is when 
drug firms keep the cost of a drug high by making small changes to the product and re-
patenting it.262  
 To prevent this, Section 3(d) says that to receive a patent, new forms of known 
drugs must enhance the drug’s efficacy, which is defined as healing effectiveness.263 This 
is in stark contrast to other states’ IP regulations. In the United States, a new chemical 
compound may receive a patent by being easier to store or being more easily absorbed by 
the body.264 That is not only a more forgiving standard; it is also a lot easier to prove. 
Proving therapeutic effectiveness is difficult and costly. Relatedly, India also does not 
allow patenting of combinations of known drugs.265 In the United States, even if drug A 
and drug B are not patented, a combination of them, drug AB, can be patented. That 
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cannot be done in India. India also does not grant data exclusivity.266 All of these 
exceptions can mean that India can make a drug that is patented in other states subject to 
generic competition without needing to issue a compulsory license.267 Importantly, none 
of these maneuvers to relax IP standards violate the letter of TRIPS.268  
 It is not just the content of India’s IP regulations that limit patentability; it is also 
the procedure by which patenting decisions get made that helps activists and curtails drug 
firms. The opponents of a patent have three opportunities to make their case before the 
government: 1) at a pre-grant stage in front of the patent office or, 2) at a post-grant 
proceeding at the patent office or, 3) through revocation proceedings before India’s 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board.269  
 The pre-grant stage is particularly important. In this stage, the Indian patent office 
allows activist organizations and generic drug makers to review pending patent 
applications to decide which ones they want to oppose.270 At this stage, any individual or 
activist organization, not just rival companies, may oppose a patent being granted.271 
Indeed, NGOs have filed many of the pre-grant oppositions.272 Once again, this stands in 
marked contrast to the United States and other high-IP states that often have no 
mechanism whatsoever for pre-grant opposition.273  
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 Once put in place, it did not take long for Western pharmaceutical companies to 
start to feel the bite of these less-friendly IP regulations. In 2006, despite protests from 
activists, Novartis filed for a patent in India on its new leukemia drug Glivec.274 Access 
to medicine activists immediately protested, pointing to Glivec as an example of 
evergreening.275  The Indian government denied that patent application because Glivec 
was a modification of an earlier drug (imatinib); the only change was that it was put into 
a salt format which Novartis claims makes it a patentable improvement since the salt 
form can be absorbed by the body 30% more easily.276 Novartis could not prove that 
Glivec had greater therapeutic efficacy and thus could not prove that it met the Indian 
patent office’s definitions of ‘new’ and ‘useful.’  
 To the delight of access to medicine advocates, this decision set the precedent for 
using therapeutic efficacy as a key criterion for patentability. In 2012, the Indian 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board appeared to uphold this standard when it revoked 
the patents on drugs made by Pfizer, Merck, and Roche because they were not 
sufficiently innovative over existing drugs.277 The Glivec case went to the Indian 
Supreme Court, which upheld the decision to not grant it a patent, further bolstering the 
precedent.278 The Indian government has also recently rejected a patent for Sovaldi- the 
hepatitis C cure that sells in the U.S. for $84,000- on similar grounds and thus has been 
able to keep the price of the drug at around $900, a roughly 99 percent discount!279 
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 The Indian government has also begun using compulsory licenses to lower drug 
prices.280 One of the advantages of a compulsory license is that it requires relatively few 
technical resources.281 India issued its first compulsory license in March 2012 for Bayer’s 
drug Nexavar, which is used to treat kidney and liver cancers.282 Bayer charged $5,500 
per month for Nexavar; Natco, an Indian generics firm, sold a copy for $173 a month 
after the compulsory license was issued.283 The Nexavar compulsory license opened the 
possibility for India to issue compulsory licenses for at least four other patented drugs.284 
There likely would have been more compulsory licenses issued had it not been for the 
fact that some drug companies, faced with imminent compulsory licensing decisions, 
have cut deals to allow local producers to make generic versions of their drugs.285 Given 
the very high costs of many cancer medicines and given that the number of cancer cases 
in India is expected to double in the next two decades, it is possible that the Indian 
government will increase its use of compulsory licenses.286 
 In addition to tight patentability requirements, a patent-granting process open to 
activists, and compulsory licenses, the Indian government also developed new policy 
measures related to injunctions, and ironically, received a major boost in this effort from 
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the U.S. Supreme Court. Over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, more and more 
companies found themselves being sued for patent infringement by shell firms that filed 
patents but never did anything with them. These shell companies were basically just 
waiting for someone else to infringe the patent so they could sue them and profit from 
settling out of court. These shell companies came to be known as patent trolls. This was 
especially a problem in the United States. In 2006 a case involving one of these patent 
trolls and eBay came before the U.S. Supreme Court.287  
 When a plaintiff argued that their patent was being infringed, courts up to this 
point had generally issued injunctions, which forced the firm accused of infringing the 
patent to cease the activities involving the patent unless there was some sort of 
extraordinary circumstance. In their decision on this case, eBay v. MercExchange, the 
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that this automatic injunction was unwarranted and 
instead argued that a more balanced approach should be taken.288 According to the 
Supreme Court’s decision, for an injunction to be granted, the plaintiff (i.e. the patent 
holder) must show that 1) it suffered irreparable injury, 2) it could not be fairly 
compensated, 3) the balance of hardship between the two parties merits an injunction and 
4) the public interest would not be disserved.289 This unanimous decision constitutes a 
powerful change to how patent infringement should be handled by the courts and by 
extension, the regulatory standards that dictate how much protection IP should receive if 
and when that intellectual property affects a tangible aspect of the public interest.  
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 When Clarence Thomas was writing this opinion, and when the other eight 
justices were joining, they may or may not have been considering how it would affect the 
Indian government’s treatment of drugs, but their decision nevertheless handed the Indian 
government a powerful new legal justification for refusing to force a generic drug maker 
to cease making copies of patented drugs. This is exactly what they did. Shortly 
thereafter, the Indian Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court decision numerous times to 
defend its decision to not issue an injunction that would have forced Cipla (a generics 
firm) to stop making copies of a drug that Hoffman-La Roche held the patent to.290  
 In other words, an Indian court found against a foreign pharmaceuticals firm and 
based its decision on the U.S. Supreme Court. This was really clever. How could U.S. 
government officials in the USTR and Congress insist that the Indian court’s actions in 
denying injunctions were illegitimate and a denial of due process when they rested on 
legal foundations constructed by the U.S. Supreme Court? The U.S. Supreme Court has 
given the Indian government the legal means to grant patents but then selectively refuse 
to enforce those patents if they lead to higher prices, which is exactly what patents do. In 
fact, the non-use of injunctions may be an even more robust check on drug firms’ market 
exclusivity than compulsory licenses because they are less vulnerable to unilateral 
retaliation given the political insulation that judges often enjoy.291 
 The pharmaceutical company representatives and government officials that were 
the primary authors of TRIPS never anticipated this kind of attack on stringent IP 
regulations via new injunction standards. TRIPS thus says absolutely nothing about this. 
No one foresaw this series of events. India thus has a TRIPS-compliant means of 
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indirectly invalidating any patent it issues. Article 44.1 of TRIPS only gives judiciaries 
the authority to issue injunction.292 It never says that they must. This was not the only gap 
in TRIPS. 
 While TRIPS seemed to be a blowout victory for business supporters of stringent 
IP regulations, it was actually full of little holes that India has been able to exploit. These 
holes were not intentional. They were the result of a certain amount of sloppiness and 
lack of legal imagination on the part of the officials that negotiated TRIPS. Emory 
Simon, the director for IP at the USTR at the time, said that “the reality is that we do not 
spend a lot of time thinking about legal issues when we negotiate agreements in the 
GATT…the concerns that we have are with the commercial results of what a negotiated 
agreement is, rather than with the legal niceties of it.”293 If anyone should have been 
obsessed with the legal niceties of TRIPS, it should have been the director of IP at the 
USTR, but even he was not all that interested in the details. For whatever reason, Emory 
Simon and the other TRIPS negotiators simply did not appreciate the simple truth that 
details are sacred things that should never be ignored simply because big ideas are sexier.  
 In addition to the small but critical distinction that national judicial bodies could 
but did not have to issue injunctions,  the TRIPS language on pharmaceuticals only 
covered small-molecule drugs and so enabled countries to deny patents on biologics.294 
The TRIPS Agreement also never defines inventive step and that too gives India 
considerable leeway.295 States are also allowed to employ patent exemptions for non-
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commercial use such as second use and what are referred to as Bolar exemptions.296 India 
has taken advantage of both of these exemptions.297 Finally, the TRIPS dispute settlement 
process does not allow for retroactive sanctions and so that means there is an incentive 
for developing countries to push the boundaries as far as they can.298  
The Checks on These Flexibilities 
 Despite what appear to be robust opportunities for India to implement IP 
regulations that would be far lower than those envisioned by TRIPS, the Indian 
government has been quite temperate in its use of these flexibilities. As Shri Anand 
Sharma, the Indian Commerce Minister has pointed out, the Indian government has still 
been granting many patents to Western pharmaceutical companies; the Glivec decision is 
not representative of the majority of cases.299 
On compulsory licenses, the Indian government has been careful to issue them only when 
necessary to further public health and to not issue them when it might violate 
international rules.300 There are number of factors behind this policy temperance. 
 First, many Indian generics firms have developed increasingly tight connections 
with Western research-based firms.301 Relatedly, TRIPS and the attendant reduction in IP 
regulatory barriers has led many of the largest Indian drug companies to make more of 
their money abroad than at home.302 For many of these companies, licensing foreign 
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intellectual property, rather than copying it, is the more profitable route, but Western 
firms want effective IP protection to agree to giving a license to a firm based in a 
developing country.303 Western firms such as AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline, Eli Lilly, 
Pfizer, and Novartis, and have also increasingly partnered with Indian firms to conduct 
clinical testing as this can achieve cost savings of 40-60 percent.304  
 This means that Indian firms’ competitiveness would suffer if India were to 
become perceived as a pariah on protecting IP. This incentivizes the Indian government 
to loosen IP regulations where it can but not go so far as to make foreign investors 
skittish. Once again, the disguised protectionism argument would fail to correctly explain 
the source of this regulatory difference. Here too, it was activists, not businesses, that 
were clamoring for regulatory differences that could impede trade.   
 Second, rather than focusing exclusively on generics production, many Indian 
firms are increasingly involved in research and development, either on their own or in a 
partnership with foreign firms.305 India has a significant talent pool in chemistry and 
chemical engineering, two building blocks of pharmaceuticals research; 122,000 Indians 
annually graduate from Indian universities with degrees in those two subjects, and they 
work cheap.306 With research and development costs that are one-eighth of those in 
Western countries, India is highly competitive in this subfield.307 That R&D requires IP 
protection though. When Western companies believe that protection is not high enough, 
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they pull their investments. After initiating new investments in rural India in 2008, 
Novartis announced after the Indian Supreme Court’s Glivec decision in 2013 that it 
would no longer make any research and development investments in India.308 
 Additionally, because the point of compulsory licensing is to bring down drug 
prices and because those licenses come with considerable scrutiny, many India firms 
increasingly perceive producing compulsory licensed drugs as not very profitable.309 
Thus, Indian firms are much less enthusiastic about loose IP regulations than might first 
be assumed. India also has the world’s largest film industry and a sizeable software 
industry, both of which want strong copyright protection, which only adds to the volume 
of domestic voices calling for higher IP regulations.310 
 Third, India does not want a WTO ruling against it and thus has been careful not 
to use these flexibilities in a potentially disadvantageous case. For example, it rejected a 
generic firm’s application for a compulsory license on AstraZeneca’s drug Saxagliptin, a 
diabetes medication, because substitutes are readily available and the generic firm was 
only going to be able to deliver relatively little cost savings given the already fairly low 
price of Saxagliptin.311 The Indian government knows that if it stretches the TRIPS 
Agreement to the point of clearly violating it, it would invite a dispute with a developed 
country, probably the United States. A WTO ruling against it could greatly constrain its 
space for policy flexibility.312 On the other hand, the United States may have lost a WTO 
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dispute panel over Nexavar had such a dispute materialized, and so the U.S. too is a bit 
gun-shy about starting WTO cases that could go against it and thus put India’s IP 
regulations on firmer legal grounds.313 As with the WTO stalemates discussed earlier, for 
both sides it is better to have a murky non-resolution than risk a clear loss. 
 Fourth, the United States has direct and indirect means of pressuring India to not 
go too far in its creativity. U.S. officials can employ Special 301, and under pressure 
from business, they came close to doing so after the Nexavar decision.314 The American 
drug market is the world’s largest and so the Indian government views friendly 
cooperation with the United States, and the FDA in particular, as crucial towards 
protecting the export performance of its pharmaceuticals sector.315 The Indian patent 
authorities have relatively few resources to push back against this pressure and at the 
same time their patent examiners generally receive their training in Western states and 
rely on their Western counterparts for guidance.316 
 Finally, the new government headed by Narendra Modi that assumed power in 
May 2014 has been especially keen to attract foreign direct investment from 
multinational corporations and so has been careful not to implement IP regulations that 
would make these businesses wary of investing in India. Modi has even suggested that he 
would like to see India change its IP laws to more closely match other states’ higher 
standards saying, "If we don't work towards bringing our intellectual property rights at 
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par with global parameters, then the world will not keep relations with us. If we give 
confidence to the world on IPR, then we can become a destination globally for their 
creative work."317 Modi has disbanded a cabinet-level subcommittee that was making 
compulsory licenses more likely to be approved, to the delight of international drug 
companies.318 He also set up a six-person think tank to review India’s IP regulations; of 
those six members, four were connected with large businesses that have an interest in 
raising India’s level of IP protection and none of them were from academia or access to 
medicine advocates.319  
 In sum then, the Indian position on IP-regulations has been a compromise. It has 
patentability regulations that are much more restrictive than developed countries like the 
U.S. would prefer. It has procedures that allow NGOs to challenge patents at multiple 
stages. It has new, U.S. Supreme Court-backed policies related to injunctions. It has 
begun issuing compulsory licenses. All of these mean that India could have given an 
across the board resounding victory to access to medicine advocates. It instead opted for 
a middle ground approach. It did so for several reasons. Its drug firms often have close 
relationships with international drug companies and are increasingly involved in research 
and development. Also, firms in other industries want IP protection. Additionally, it is 
wary of a WTO ruling against it and is pressured by the U.S. government. Finally, its 
prime minister has prioritized attracting foreign direct investment.    
 Still, even taking into account Modi’s position and the other checks on India’s 
creative use of TRIPS flexibilities, India’s IP regulations stand as a model for other 
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developing countries that want to maintain different regulations than those espoused by 
those states with high IP regulations. The Philippines in 2008 for example, added a 
patentability provision to their patent law that is modeled after India’s Section 3(d).320  
Conclusion 
 Intellectual property, especially as it pertains to pharmaceuticals, is often held up 
as an exemplar of big business getting its way politically, and indeed the TRIPS 
agreement did largely reflect the wishes of IP-intensive firms. And yet the TRIPS 
negotiation is the only case analyzed here in which businesses were able to secure their 
preferences and even here, they were able to get their way only because they were able to 
link their policy requests with broader concerns about competitiveness and because 
NGOs did not take the field. In the negotiation of the Doha Declaration, access to 
medicine politically snookered pharmaceutical companies and won significant legal 
reinforcement for differing IP policies. In the latter two cases, businesses did not suffer 
resounding defeats but, because of the opposition of NGOs and developing country 
officials, neither were they able to fully achieve their policy preferences. Far from 
demonstrating business’ political power, the negotiations over intellectual property 
regulations and trade show just how contingent and limited business’ political power 
actually is.  
 These negotiations also demonstrate how important not knowing can be. Access 
to medicine activists did not get engaged in the TRIPS negotiation in the 1980s and early 
1990s because they did not yet understand how significant IP regulations were to their 
overall goals. In the negotiation over the Doha Declaration in 2001, pharmaceuticals 
companies walked into a policy fight they had no chance of winning because they had no 
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idea just how fierce the public relations backlash against them was going to be. India’s 
creative use of TRIPS flexibilities only happened because the original authors of the 
TRIPS Agreement did not understand how important the legal details were and did not 
anticipate the extent to which clever, oppositional interpretations could exploit the holes 
they left behind. When it comes to regulatory trade barriers, what you do not know will 
hurt you.  
 One thing we do know is that people will continue to get sick. Some will get very 
sick. Between 130 and 150 million people have hepatitis C.321 Cardiovascular disease 
killed 17 million people in 2012.322 Close to ten percent of all adults now have 
diabetes.323 The biggest challenge of all is cancer. Cancer has been called the emperor of 
all maladies with good reason.324 14 million new cases are diagnosed every year and the 
number of new cases is expected to increase by 70 percent over the next twenty years.325 
The political fight over how best to help those dying from these diseases, and how to pay 
for that help, is just starting. Trade-related intellectual property regulations, as dry and 
technical as they may sound, are at the very center of that fight. 
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Chapter 7- Conclusion: Regulation and Trade Politics in the 21st Century 
 The intersection of trade and national regulations has significant consequences for 
our contemporary world and is likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. In 
this chapter, I discuss the theoretical implications this work has for IPE scholarship. I 
then offer political recommendations for the businesses, NGOs, and government officials 
examined in this work. I finally discuss how lessons from these industries may apply to 
other industries as well.  
Theoretical Implications for IPE Scholarship 
 This book has seven implications for IPE scholarship on trade. It calls for a more 
critical questioning of cleavage-based explanations. It qualifies the California Effect. It 
highlights the growing importance of national courts in international trade politics. It 
helps explain the rise of regionalism. It clarifies the trade policy options that developing 
countries have moving forward. It underscores activists’ political power. Finally, it points 
to emerging vectors in the U.S.-China relationship. 
Questioning Cleavage-Based Explanations 
 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the increasing extent to which international trade 
negotiations involve national domestic regulations has fundamentally altered the politics 
of trade by bringing in activists that previously were uninterested in trade negotiations. 
As I pointed out repeatedly in all three case studies, the involvement of these actors and 
the importance of government officials’ stance on these regulatory trade barriers mean 
that the cleavage-based explanations of trade politics are no longer sufficient. In 
European emissions standards, the division was not between economic winners and losers 
but between a sector (automakers) that had an economic stake and a sector 
(environmentalists) that wanted to prioritize non-economic public policy goals. The same 
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was true for Japanese consumer organizations versus American beef producers and 
access to medicine advocates versus pharmaceutical companies.   
 Given the centrality of those explanations to our understanding of trade politics, 
that presents a major challenge but also a significant opportunity. It is a challenge 
because if those giant shoulders can no longer be stood upon, then new theories of trade 
politics must be constructed to take their place. It is an opportunity because it allows 
future researchers to critically question many of the assumptions made in 20th century 
scholarship and ask whether they still hold today.  
 For example, Rogowski divided society into three groups based on which factor 
of production they possessed: landowners, capital holders, and laborers. Hiscox then 
sharpened Rogowski’s work by adding another economic factor, asset specificity into the 
mix. As we’ve seen though, regulation brings whole new non-economic factors into play 
in trade politics. Given that, is this division based solely on economic factor endowments 
still the most useful way to conceptualize groups in society? It certainly continues to have 
some leverage and I do not mean to suggest otherwise (owners of mobile capital still 
have quite different interests from relatively immobile laborers), but perhaps regulation 
means we need to rethink how we conceptually divide society. In this work, I have 
divided in one particular way- businesses, activists, and government officials- but that is 
certainly not the only way actors in trade politics may be thought of.  
 Given the rise of the populist right in Europe and the United States that have 
propelled the Le Pen’s and Donald Trump and the political divisions that has highlighted, 
perhaps it may be useful to also think about society in terms of how people feel about the 
different fundamental components of trade. Trade, in its most basic sense, is business 
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conducted with foreigners under a set of international rules. Society then could be divided 
into four groups based on how they feel on the one hand about big businesses, which are 
the firms most closely associated with international trade and on the other hand how they 
feel about foreigners and international institutions.  
 The first group would be nationalists who mistrust big businesses as well as 
foreigners and international institutions. The second group would be leftists who mistrust 
big business but are more accepting of foreigners and international governance. The third 
group would be corporatists who mistrust foreigners and international governance. The 
fourth group would be globalists who support big business as well as foreigners and 
international governance. The division in the Republican Party over trade is in many 
ways a divide between the nationalists and the corporatists in that party. Conversely, the 
division in the Democratic Party may be thought of as a division between the leftists and 
the globalists. This is obviously somewhat speculative but what I mean to point out is that 
given the extent to which trade politics now touches upon a huge array of non-economic 
policies, our conceptualization of societal groups’ trade preferences also should take into 
account non-economic motivations. 
Qualifying the California Effect 
 This work also offers qualifications to the California Effect.1 The cases analyzed 
in this work suggest three conditions under which the California Effect is more or less 
likely. First, the smaller state in the trade negotiation has to actually want the agreement 
more than the larger state. The key causal mechanism in the California Effect is market 
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size. The state with the larger market is able to use the potentially lucrative access to that 
market as leverage in the trade negotiation. Market size however is not the only potential 
political leverage that may exist. If the state with the smaller market is less eager to seal 
the agreement than the larger state, that smaller state has much more relative leverage. In 
the pharmaceuticals case, during the negotiations over the issues leftover from the Doha 
Declaration, developing countries were much less eager to revive the flagging Doha 
Round talks than the United States was. This resulted in the United States being less able 
to use its market size as leverage to raise intellectual property regulations and so short-
circuited the market power causal mechanism that can create a California Effect.  
 Second, a California Effect is less likely to happen if the firms whose market 
access is being impeded by regulatory trade barriers believe they can get the state with 
the higher standards to lower those regulations. If that is the case, those firms may choose 
not to accept and then promote higher standards, but instead fight against them. This 
occurred in the beef case when U.S. producers believed that they could get the United 
States Trade Representative to pressure Japanese regulators to reduce Japan’s anti-mad 
cow regulations that were inhibiting their exports.  
 Third, a California Effect is less likely if narratives of access dominate narratives 
of protection. Calls for more stringent regulation generally flow from a desire to use 
those regulations to protect consumers from risky products. However, when consumers 
are more concerned with promoting access to a good, those who would normally be the 
most enthusiastic pursuers of higher regulations, consumer advocates, do not do so. It is 
because narratives of access predominated among Mexican automobile purchasers that 
there has not been a California Effect in consumer safety regulations in Mexico to match 
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U.S. safety standards. Narratives of access have also predominated in developing 
countries on intellectual property and so have served to bolster resistance to higher IP 
regulations there as well.  
The Growing Importance of National Courts in International Trade Politics 
 A third noteworthy implication for IPE scholars is the significance of national 
courts. Now that international trade negotiations involve national regulations, national 
courts, by affecting those regulations, can have indirect but nevertheless powerful effects 
on trade. In the beef chapter, the reduced ability of Japanese consumers to seek redress 
and recompense through their national courts relative to their American counterparts 
made them much more eager for strict regulations. That eagerness was the foundation of 
the resilience of the regulatory barriers that impeded imports of American beef. In the 
auto case, the inability of the NHTSA to use a type-approval system was rooted in the 
American tradition of adversarial legalism in the courts. This led to the NHTSA setting 
up a recall system. The differences between the European Union’s type approval systems 
and the United State’s recall system is the foundation of many of the consumer safety 
differences in automobiles between them. In the pharmaceuticals case, it was a United 
States Supreme Court cases on patent injunctions that bolstered India’s policy space to 
implement less stringent intellectual property regulations. So long as trade politics 
involves regulations, it de facto involves courts.  
 The upshot of this is that courts may be required to increasingly think about how 
other states have adjudicated a particular issue and about what effect their ruling may 
have on foreign jurisdictions.2  Indeed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer has 
                                                
2 For a look at the use of foreign law in the U.S. Supreme Court, see Parrish, Austen. “Storm in a Teacup: 
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recently argued that given the increasingly interconnected world in which we live and the 
centrality of national courts to juridical structure of that world, those jurists must now be 
constitutional diplomats, carefully weighing how international politics affect their 
decisions and how their decisions affect international politics.3  
 Courts, however, must be careful in this endeavor both not to over-involve 
themselves in international matters as that could both add to their already stuffed dockets 
and invite heightened international tensions. They must also be wary of their potential to 
be perceived as illegitimate lawmakers. Citizens already do not appreciate judiciaries 
behaving like activists judges; that would likely only grow worse if that activist judge 
operates from a foreign court.      
The Rise of Regionalism 
 In the post-Cold War era, regional trade agreements have proliferated at a 
remarkable rate.4 Economists have generally been skeptical of these agreements and have 
argued that the growth of regionalism is both inferior to multilateral liberalization and 
undermines multilateralism.5 As Greg Anderson points out, it is non-economic reasons 
that account for why regional trade liberalization is growing despite its inferiority to 
multilateralism in terms of efficiency.6 Anderson lists geopolitical imperatives, the desire 
to solidify partner states’ economic reforms, the desire to help developing countries and 
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the increasing difficulty of collective action problems as negotiating groups grow larger 
as motivations that drive states to liberalize trade regionally.7  
 To that list, we can add the ascending importance of regulatory trade barriers. In 
principle, it is almost always the case in any international negotiation that it is easier to 
reach agreement among a smaller group of states, but the greater sensitivity of regulation 
as opposed to tariffs, and the inclusion of once excluded domestic actors, make this an 
even more acute obstacle than would otherwise be the case. Exhibit A on this dynamic is 
the Doha Round. As I explained in Chapter 2, since the mid-2000s, it has been quite clear 
that the round would not result in substantive trade liberalization in the regulatory trade 
barriers that developed states would like to target. Thus, those developed states have 
pursued trade liberalization at the bilateral and regional levels. In other words, one of the 
central trends in international trade, the rise of regionalism, can be traced to the 
increasing importance of regulatory trade barriers and to the politics that surround them.  
 This work also suggests that it is unlikely that the trend toward regionalism, rather 
than multilateralism, is likely to reverse itself. As I argued throughout this book, 
businesses are at their most effective in seeking reduced regulatory trade barriers when 
they can connect their pursuit of that goal with broader concerns about competitiveness. 
That is more difficult to do at the multilateral level. The argument that a regional trade 
deal makes the states within that region more competitive vis-à-vis states outside the 
region has a certain intuitive appeal. It becomes much more difficult to make that 
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argument if the deal is at the WTO level as such an agreement would include nearly all 
countries. Everyone cannot simultaneously become more competitive.8  
 Developing Countries’ Options 
 In exchange for making further concessions on agriculture and textiles, developed 
states are likely to insist on greater regulatory constraints on developing countries. This 
was the basic exchange that developed states asked for in the Doha Round when they 
pushed for regulatory trade barrier reduction in the four Singapore Issues- investment, 
competition, government procurement, and trade facilitation. Once they could not get 
regulatory trade barrier reduction in those areas, developed states, and especially the 
European Union and Japan, refused to offer further concessions on agriculture and 
textiles. This has also been the basic bargain in regional trade deals. In the TPP, Malaysia 
and Vietnam are gaining greater market access in Japanese and North American 
agriculture and textile markets in exchange for agreeing to greater regulatory constraints 
in intellectual property, competition rules, investment, human rights enforcement, labor 
standards, environmental protection, and health and safety standards. 
 This means that for developing countries to achieve the agricultural liberalization 
they want, they have three basic options moving forward. First, they can continue to push 
for greater liberalization in agriculture and textiles through the WTO and accept 
movement on the Singapore Issues. That seems unlikely. The second option is to accept 
inclusion into regional trade deals involving developed states like the TPP. The third 
option would for developing countries, be to construct a new trade agreement amongst 
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themselves. Tariffs between developing countries remain much higher than between 
developed and developing countries. Much of the direct gains from trade liberalization 
are the result of tariff reductions. As they become more prosperous and more populous, 
the gains from trade between developing countries is likely to continue increasing.9 
Additionally, reducing tariffs can promote economic growth in developing countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by helping those countries engage in greater intra-
industry trade and global supply chains.10 
  Furthermore, a Trade Agreement of the Global South (TAGS) that focused on 
tariff reduction would mean that developing countries could benefit from trade 
liberalization without having to undermine their regulatory flexibility. Importantly, the 
second and third options are not mutually exclusive. Developing countries could continue 
to join regional trade agreements when and where they choose, and at the same time, 
work toward greater trade liberalization between each other.  
Activists’ Political Power 
 This work underscores just how much political power activists actually have. In 
popular conceptions of political lobbying, it is often presumed that well-financed 
business interests are the powerhouses and activists the underdogs. This book suggests 
that activists’ succeed in their opposition to business more often than that popular 
conception would imply.  
 In cars, European environmentalists were able to win major increases in emissions 
standards. In North America, they won significant environmental improvements in 
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Mexico via NAFTA. Consumer safety advocates were successful at raising the safety 
standards of Mexican trucks and at blocking transatlantic regulatory trade barrier 
reductions they opposed. 
 In beef, Japanese consumer safety advocates were able to promote strict anti-BSE 
countermeasures such as universal testing over 20 months and specified risk material 
removal on all cattle and were able defend those measure even against considerable 
diplomatic pressure from the United States. It is a testament to their strength that it was 
only when they were satisfied that regulatory barriers were reduced. 
 In pharmaceuticals, access to medicine activists achieved a sweeping success in 
the Doha Declaration, which clarified and bolstered states’ ability to use intellectual 
property regulatory flexibilities such as compulsory licenses to promote public health. 
They have successfully resisted attempts by drug companies to limit which diseases count 
as a national emergency and to use non-violation complaints. They have also effectively 
promoted creative, TRIPS-compliant regulatory flexibilities that have in effect relaxed 
intellectual property regulations in developing countries such as India.     
 Out of all 23 sub-cases analyzed in this book, only in the domestic-content 
regulations in the North American auto industry and the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement in pharmaceuticals did businesses dominate. Everywhere else, activists’ had a 
meaningful amount of political power and at least some success at advancing their goals.    
 Perhaps this can be of comfort to both sides. Activists’ may take heart that their 
odds of success are not as long as they may fear. Activists are not the political weaklings 
that they are sometimes presumed to be. Businesses may find it useful to show that in 
reality they do not dominate the policy process anywhere nearly as much as is commonly 
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believed. Multinational corporations are not the evil overlords of global capitalism that 
they are sometimes depicted as.  
The U.S.-China Relationship 
 The economic relationship between the United States and China is likely to be 
one of the most important dynamics in global politics for the next several decades. The 
scope and trajectory of that relationship could obviously be a whole series of books unto 
itself and I will not try to encapsulate all facets of it here, but the political negotiations 
over regulatory barriers in each of the three industries analyzed in this book points to a 
significant aspect of that relationship.  
Cars 
 The auto industry highlights the potential rewards for successfully entering the 
Chinese market.11 The Chinese auto market is now the largest in the world.12 From 2004 
to 2014, the Chinese auto industry averaged 11.4 percent annual growth versus growth in 
North America, Europe, and Japan of 0.9, 1.4, and -0.5 percent respectively.13 While 
China’s economic growth has slowed somewhat over the last year, the Chinese market is 
expected to grow another twenty percent to 30 million cars by 2020, which represents a 
significant portion of overall global growth.14 China is where the expansion opportunity 
for automakers is. 
 The opportunity though comes with challenges, particularly in relation to 
differences in consumer tastes, and in the difficulties created by China’s regulations. In 
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consumer tastes, in addition to the obvious differences such as Chinese car buyers’ 
greater preference for sub-compact cars, there are other less obvious differences that 
automakers should remain vigilant about. For example, surveys have shown that Chinese 
consumers are much more particular than their American counterparts about what smell 
fabrics and other interior materials in a new car should have.15 Recall that significant 
differences in consumer tastes were one of the key factors that undermined automakers 
desire to pursue regulatory convergence in safety standards between the United States 
and Europe. Here too, automakers may want to consider not pursuing regulatory 
convergence for the same reason.  
 Given the increasing number of cars on Chinese roads and the concomitant 
deterioration of air quality in Chinese cities, China’s emission regulations are likely to 
become much tougher, very soon. In fact, Ford CEO Mark Fields believes that at some 
point in the next five years China’s environmental regulations on cars will be the strictest 
in the world.16 Here automakers would do well to not resist an increase in emissions 
standards but instead simply ask for standards to be set in high, uniform way. If and when 
China does raise its emissions standards, that could be an excellent opportunity to 
promote a mega-sized California Effect.   
 These potential rewards and challenges can be seen in other industries as well. It 
is of course not just the auto industry that has grown. The wealth and size of the Chinese 
middle class is expanding quickly. In fact, there are now more people considered middle 
class in China than in the United States.17  The disposable income of urban Chinese 
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consumers is expected to grow from $4,000 to $8,000 dollars from 2010 to 2020.18 And it 
is not just urban consumers in coastal China that global firms can reach. The share of the 
Chinese middle class that lives in inland China is expected to triple from 13% to 39% 
from 2010 to 2020.19 These consumers are a key target market for businesses selling 
everything from laptops to laundry softener.20 One of the major challenges for these 
companies however is China’s slough of regulatory barriers that at times impede 
companies’ ability to reach that market.21  
 In other words, the single biggest commercial opportunity for countless firms 
boils down to the movement of regulatory trade barriers. As I have argued throughout 
this book, linking a reduction of regulatory barriers with economic competitiveness has 
been the most consistently successful means of winning a reduction in those barriers. 
Joint ventures between multinational corporations and Chinese firms as well as other 
means of more tightly intertwining the Chinese economy with the global economy may 
be the best way to portray reductions of those regulatory barriers as boosting Chinese 
competitiveness and thus may be the best way to convince Chinese leaders to reduce 
those barriers.22   
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Beef 
 The trade in beef between the United States and China underscores how difficult 
it will be for the United States to impose its preferences on China. In December 2003, 
when the first case of mad-cow disease was discovered in the United States, China closed 
its market to imports of U.S. beef, just as Japan did. The difference is that whereas the 
Japanese market was gradually reopened to U.S. beef, the Chinese market was not. China 
refuses to end that prohibition until the United States puts in place a traceability system 
and as we saw in the Japan case, U.S. beef producers refuse put that kind of a system in 
place.23 The reduction in mad-cow cases and the relaxation of Japanese consumers was 
crucial to the reopening of the Japanese market but another important factor was that 
Japanese businesses were concerned about losing competitiveness in the American 
market relative to their Korean rivals and the United States was able to use that market 
power and the lure of the TPP to get those businesses to lobby for a reduction in those 
regulatory barriers in beef. 
 Should the TPP get ratified and should the Chinese government decide that it 
wants to join that agreement, the United States may gain leverage to convince Beijing to 
readmit American beef but at least for now it does not have that kind of leverage over the 
Chinese government. To the contrary, the fact that China’s rapidly increasing demand for 
beef gives it market leverage of U.S. beef producers. As a result of that market leverage, 
China has a much greater ability to set regulatory standards that differ from other states 
and still get businesses to comply. Australian beef producers for instance have been 
happy to abide by Chinese regulations to order to gain access to such a large and lucrative 
                                                
23 Inside U.S. Trade. “China Signals It Will Speed Review of Biotech Traits, Continue Beef Talks.” 
November 27, 2015.  
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market.24 This trend can be seen in other sectors as well.25 Traditionally, the United 
States and the European Union have been the global powerhouses in regulation and trade. 
China is quickly becoming a third pole.  
Drugs  
 The pharmaceuticals trade, and intellectual property more generally points to the 
tension between the two states being in competition with each other while also having 
some shared interests. In June 2012, the Chinese government amended the country’s IP 
regulations to facilitate a greater use of compulsory licenses, but only in cases of 
epidemics like SARS and Ebola, and has not actually issued a single compulsory license 
to date.26 China is determined to become a global leader in pharmaceuticals research; 
from 2004 to 2012, their annual research and development spending in pharmaceuticals 
increased ten-fold to 1.1 billion dollars.27 That is still quite small by Western standards 
and the Chinese pharmaceuticals industry still mostly specializes in drug ingredients 
rather than new medicines, but over the near and medium term futures China’s 
investments in pharmaceutical R&D is likely to grow even more and its companies will 
start to become more oriented toward advanced research and patented drugs. This means 
that Chinese firms will be the direct competitors of Western firms but it also means that 
they will want intellectual property protected and so China’s stance on IP is likely to 
increasingly complement rather than contradict America’s IP preferences. 
                                                
24 Australia’s dominance of the Chinese beef market is likely to further increase as a result of a recently 
signed free trade agreement between the two states. Inside U.S. Trade. “China Signals It Will Speed 
Review of Biotech Traits, Continue Beef Talks.” November 27, 2015. 
25 For an examination of this trend in cotton for example see Quark, Amy. 2013. Global Rivalries: 
Standards Wars and the Transnational Cotton Trade. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.  
26 Yu, Zhang. “Pricey Pills.” Global Times (China). January 8, 2015.  
27 Huang, Yanzhong. “Chinese Pharma: A Global Health Game Changer.” Council on Foreign Relations. 
March 31, 2015.  
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 That is of course not the only area in which China is trying to catch up to the 
United States as quickly as possible. In 2012, a group of Chinese national employed by 
agricultural companies in China was arrested as they tried to smuggle cutting edge 
genetically modified corn seeds being developed by Monsanto and DuPont out of the 
United States.28 They were attempting to steal those companies intellectual property, with 
the complicity of the Chinese government, so that China could increase its corn 
production without having to either compensate those American companies for the use of 
their technology or invest millions in research the way that Monsanto and DuPont had.29 
On the one hand, surely China and the United States both have an interest in the use of 
these hybrid seeds increasing so that China and other countries can more efficiently feed 
their growing populations. On the other hand, this was blatant corporate espionage.  
 Chinese companies haven’t just stolen American companies’ technology, they 
have also in many instances attempted to steal their branding. Nike and Apple, as well as 
many other firms, have had their branding copied by Chinese imitators.30 China’s firms 
that are imitating this intellectual property are in direct competition with the Western 
firms that want their IP rights upheld. This kind of competitive clash is also occurring in 
the automotive sector. The United States and China, via Tesla and BYD, are locked in 
fierce competition establish a market share edge in the fast growing, and potentially 
                                                
28 Genoways, Ted. “Corn Wars.” The New Republic. August 16, 2015. 
29 Genoways, Ted. “Corn Wars.” The New Republic. August 16, 2015. 
30 Sullivan, Becky. “The Trademark Woes of Michael Jordan (And Many Others) in China.” National 
Public Radio. August 16, 2015. Lee, Yimou. “China’s ‘Fake’ Apple Stores Thrive Ahead of new iPhone 
Launch.” Reuters. September 23, 2015.  
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revolutionary, electric vehicle market.31 Across these and other areas, businesses in China 
and the United States- and by extension the two countries- are in direct competition. 
 Despite that competitive aspect however, China and the United States often have 
more in common in terms of intellectual property than is commonly assumed. Not very 
long ago, China was a capital-poor country that specialized in making cheap imitations of 
other countries’ innovation. That depiction becomes less accurate by the day; China is 
increasingly a hotbed of technological innovation in its own right.32 This not only 
increases the quality and performance of goods exported to other countries, it also is 
making it easier for entrepreneurs, programmers, and engineers to go work in China.33 As 
China become more innovation-centric rather than imitation-centric, its desire to protect 
intellectual property will become more aligned with the IP preferences of the United 
States. China and the United States are likely to be the two most economically and 
politically powerful states in the 21st century. They may never be close allies but they 
both have an interest in a stable Middle East, a prosperous Africa, calm financial markets, 
and alleviating climate change to name just a few areas. How they handle intellectual 
property regulations and trade may be a good bellwether of how well they can handle 
other issue areas in which their interests somewhat, but do not entirely, overlap.   
Examining Cases Not Covered in This Book 
 There are of course a number of other cases of international negotiations over 
regulatory trade barriers. The findings from the three industries analyzed in this work 
may help explain the outcomes in those negotiations. One of the first high-profile 
                                                
31 Tilleman, Levi. 2015. The Great Race: The Global Quest for the Car of the Future. Simon and Schuster: 
New York. See especially p. 237-254. China Daily. “Tesla’s Success Sparks China’s e-Car Race.” April 
26, 2016. 
32 Thompson, Clive. “How A Nation of Tech Copycats Became a Hub for Innovation.” Wired. December 
29, 2015.  
33 Thompson, Clive. “How A Nation of Tech Copycats Became a Hub for Innovation.” Wired. December 
29, 2015. 
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negotiations over a regulatory trade barrier concerned hormones in beef. The controversy 
started when Italian officials noticed heightened levels of developmental abnormalities in 
babies and linked that to hormones given to livestock that the babies then ate.34 That link 
would later be discredited but at the time European consumers believed that banning 
hormones in beef protected children. Additionally, banning hormones would not make 
European beef more competitive because Europe already had a surplus of beef.35  
 Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have been banned in the EU but allowed 
in the United States.36 Activists pushed for that regulatory barrier because it came on the 
heels of a number of food safety crises including dioxin in Belgian meat and chocolate, 
contaminated Coca-Cola (again beginning in Belgium), and most seriously the peak of 
the mad-cow crisis.37 As I mentioned in Chapter 2, that crisis badly discredited the notion 
that regulatory harmonization combined with trade liberalization would improve 
Europeans’ quality of life. European consumers believed that the deaths that resulted 
from the mad-cow crisis were preventable and believed that a new expansion of trade in 
an agricultural product they were suspicious was another disaster waiting to happen; as 
David Vogel points out, “although there was no link between GNOs and the BSE crisis, 
European consumers connected the two.”38  
                                                
34 Vogel, David. 1995. Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy. 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge. p. 154.  
35 Vogel. 1995. Trading Up. p. 156.  
36 On the politics of GMOs, see Pollack, Mark, and Gregory Shaffer. 2009. When Cooperation Fails: The 
International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods. Oxford University Press: Oxford.  
37 Vogel, David. 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe and 
the United States. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 65, 76.  
38 Vogel. 2012. The Politics of Precaution. p. 75. Pollack and Shaffer. 2009. When Cooperation Fails. p. 
65. 
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 Moreover, the business most interested in trading in GMOs, Monsanto, was an 
American company and could not make a competitiveness-based argument.39 
Furthermore, if GMOs raised agricultural productivity, the subsidies given to farmers 
under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy would also have increased; EU officials did 
not want that.40 Interestingly and not coincidentally, the three areas where EU authorities 
made exceptions to their anti-GMO stance were in three internationally competitive 
European industries that wanted to use genetically modified enzymes, the cheese, wine, 
and beer industries.41 
 In shipping, firms in states with high standards were able to significantly raise 
international shipping standards by arguing to government officials in those states that 
raised, uniform standards would created a balanced playing field in which their 
competitiveness would not be undermined by more unscrupulous shippers.42 Businesses 
have used similar arguments to reduce regulatory barriers in telecommunications.43 
Applying the Lessons From This Work to A Different Industry: The Case of Toys 
 The dynamics surrounding the political negotiations over regulatory trade barriers 
discussed in this book hold lessons for other industries as well including but not limited 
to chemicals, textiles, coffee, diamonds, cocoa, minerals, gold, wood, cosmetics, 
electronics, and toys. Rather than discuss how this work applies to all of those, I will 
instead focus on just the last industry, toys.  
                                                
39 Ansell, Christopher, Rahsaan Maxwell, and Daniela Sicurelli. 2006. “Protesting Food: NGOs and 
Political Mobilization in Europe” in What’s the Beef? The Contested Governance of European Food Safety. 
Christopher Ansell and David Vogel (ed.) MIT Press: Cambridge. p. 104-105. 
40 Drezner, Daniel. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Princeton 
University Press: Princeton. p. 155. 
41 The Economist. “GM Food and Trade: More Trouble.” July 3, 2003.  
42 DeSombre, Elizabeth. 2000. Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, 
Environmentalists, and U.S. Power. MIT Press: Cambridge.  
43 Braithwaite, John and Peter Drahos. 2000. Global Business Regulation. Cambridge University Press. p. 
350. 
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 The toy industry depends on economies of scale and product differentiation and is 
hampered by regulatory trade barriers that impede toymakers’ market access or raise their 
production costs. Lego’s CEO has spoken of his firm as “operating globally, on a vertical 
integration from basic manufacturing to global distribution” and that his firm wants “to 
see the world in three vertical regions: the Americas, Europe/the Middle East/Africa, and 
then obviously Asia so we’re looking to have a manufacturing hub in each of the three 
regions.”44 He is not alone in this. The U.S. Toy Industry Association is eager to pursue 
regulatory trade barrier reduction in the TTIP.45 Small firms in the industry are also likely 
to be concerned with regulatory barriers because the cost of complying with regulations 
often comprises a greater percentage of their overall costs. This is why, when the U.S. 
government created greater regulatory trade barriers in toys with the Consumer Product 
Safety Improvement Act of 2008, some smaller foreign toymakers were forced to pull out 
of the United States completely.46   
 If toymakers want to reduce these regulatory barriers then they must engage their 
respective trade representative to negotiate those reductions, and the most effective 
rhetorical strategy that they are likely to have is that foreign regulatory barriers are 
making them uncompetitive globally. They should take care though to ensure that the 
reductions they call for cannot be construed to endanger child safety. Greenpeace was 
able to increase regulatory stringency in Europe on phthalates (chemicals that make 
                                                
44 “Brick By Brick: Inside Lego.” Video Documentary. Bloomberg News. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/4a56e664-4427-49fc-82fb-2d5e4a6f4502 (Accessed May 1, 
2016) 
45 Toy Industry Association Statement for the Record: “U.S.–EU Free Trade Agreement: Tipping Over the 
Regulatory Barriers” House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade. July 23, 2013. 
46 Layton, Lyndsey and Annys Shin. “Toymakers Assail Cost of New Law.” The Washington Post. 
December 21, 2008. 
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plastic toys softer), which in turn created regulatory barriers in the toy trade between the 
United States and Europe, by emphasizing the safety risks phthalates posed to children.47  
 Given the understandable sensitivity parents have regarding the safety of their 
little ones, if the toy industry wants to reduce regulatory trade barriers, it must be 
indisputable that reducing those barriers will have no negative consequences on 
children’s safety. This is likely to be especially important for firms such as Mattel that 
conduct much of their production in countries like China that have spotty records in 
safety standards.48 Additionally, it seems unlikely that government officials would 
marginalize consumer groups in toys to the extent that North American officials ignored 
labor unions in the auto industry case. Therefore, if toymakers want to reduce regulatory 
barriers, they must accommodate consumer groups in the manner that automakers in 
Europe and North America accommodated environmentalists.49  
 For consumer advocates, one lesson would be that whatever they do, they should 
not refuse to participate in negotiations. That strategy did Canadian labor groups no 
favors in NAFTA. They should also remain uncommitted to a trade deal rather than 
implacably opposed. Being uncommitted helped American environmentalists get what 
they wanted in NAFTA. Being resolutely opposed contributed to labor getting ignored. 
These lessons transfer to other industries as well. 
 
 
Recommendations to Businesses, Activists, and Government Officials 
                                                
47 Vogel. 2012. The Politics of Precaution: Regulating Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks in Europe 
and the United States. Princeton University Press: Princeton. p. 203-207. 
48 Barboza, David and Louise Story. “Toymaking in China, Mattel’s Way” New York Times. July 26, 2007. 
49 Accommodating consumers was also critical in the beef case as well. In that case, regulatory barriers 
were reduced only after Japanese consumer groups were satisfied with the safety of American beef. 
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 In this book, I have analyzed the political behavior of businesses, activists, and 
government officials in three industries. In this section, I offer advice to each of these 
groups based on the research and analysis that I have undertaken.  
Cars 
Automakers 
 Automakers had perhaps the most unalloyed victory anywhere in this work when 
they convinced North American government officials to reduce domestic content 
regulatory trade barriers. They did that by connecting their interests to broader concerns 
about competitiveness. That is their strongest rhetorical tool. This kind of rhetoric could 
be effectively deployed on monetary rules to prevent currency manipulation and in fact, 
this is what the American Automotive Policy Council’s statement on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership focuses on.50 The language of the side agreement on currency that came 
along with the TPP language does not make currency policy subject to any sort of dispute 
settlement mechanism and does not threaten tariff benefit suspension, but it does have 
some quite robust requirements in terms of data reporting and transparency.51 As small 
potatoes as that sounds, it may actually help prevent the most egregious attempts at 
currency manipulation.52 In any event, while accusing America’s TPP partners of 
currency manipulation might be rhetorically useful, it was never likely that America’s 
negotiating partners were going to agree to tightly limit their policy flexibility on 
something so central to national sovereignty as currency.  
                                                
50 American Automotive Policy Council. “Trans-Pacific Partnership.” http://americanautocouncil.org/TPP 
Accessed April 1, 2016. 
51 Joint Declaration of the Macroeconomic Authorities of Trans-Pacific Partnership Countries. 
52 Lundsager, Meg. “How the TPP Could Prevent Currency Manipulation.” The Diplomat. November 18, 
2015. Bergsten, Fred and Jeffrey Schott. “TPP and Exchange Rates.” Petersen Institute for International 
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 Still, there are a number of other policy areas where other state’s differing 
regulations could be portrayed as unfairly harming U.S. automakers’ and by extension 
U.S. competitiveness. As the AAPC has pointed out, Japan has historically maintained an 
array of investment and distribution regulations that have made Japan the most closed 
auto market in the OECD.53 While the currency side deal does not match automakers’ 
previous proposals, the side agreement between Japan and the United States does give 
U.S. automakers the ability to challenge those non-tariff barriers that have kept the 
Japanese auto industry closed to them.  
 That agreement contains a tariff delay mechanism that allows the United States to 
delay phasing out its 25 percent tariff on trucks and 2.5 percent tariff on cars from Japan 
if a dispute settlement body finds that Japan is imposing a discriminatory non-tariff 
barrier, which is exactly what Japan’s investment and distribution regulations are.54 
Moreover, this mechanism, unlike other similar trade provisions before it, allows the 
United States to retaliate at levels greater than the damage caused by that non-tariff 
barrier and is linked to the size of allowable retaliation to the size of the U.S. trade deficit 
in vehicles.55 This means that the United States under the TPP would have a powerful 
new lever with which to pry open the Japanese market to U.S. exports.  
 Portraying those investment and distribution regulations as curbs on 
competitiveness can be an especially effective way to make that happen. Targeting these 
distribution and investment regulations also has the added advantage that those 
                                                
53 American Automotive Policy Council. “How Japan Has Maintained the Most Protected and Closed Auto 
Market in the Industrialized World.“ 
americanautocouncil.org/.../Japans%2BProtected%2BAuto%2BMarket.pdf. Accessed April 1, 2016.  
54 Trans-Pacific Partnership. Chapter 2. Annex 2-D, Tariff Commitments. Appendix D-1. “Between Japan 
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regulations cannot easily be portrayed as savings lives and protecting consumers. 
Japanese activists are unlikely to consider these issues salient and thus unlikely to fight 
U.S. automakers attempt at reducing these regulatory barriers.  
 However, automakers should beware challenging Japan’s consumer safety 
regulations as non-tariff measures. It would be very easy for a Japanese consumer group 
to portray those regulations as preventing needless death. As this book’s beef chapter 
demonstrated, Japanese consumer safety advocates can be highly effective at defending 
regulatory barriers in these kinds of scenarios. That would put U.S. automakers on the 
back foot, forcing them to pre-emptively prove that the regulatory changes they seek will 
not harm anyone, which they cannot definitively prove at the outset. Of all of the 
regulatory barriers hampering their access to the Japanese market, these should be the 
very last ones automakers challenge, if they challenge them at all. 
Consumer Safety Advocates 
 Conversely, consumer safety advocates, if they want to defend regulatory trade 
barriers such as those that exist between the United States and the European Union, must 
emphasize sovereignty concerns and the extent to which those regulatory differences save 
lives. In a few auto parts such as seat belt anchors, in which equivalency between U.S.-
regulated parts and EU-regulated parts has been proven, there is no safety cost associated 
with mutual recognition or regulatory harmonization.56 However, in many other parts, 
there is not sufficient evidence to prove equivalency. In fact, tests done by a team of 
research centers based in the United States and the EU have shown that European-
regulated vehicles are safer in side and front collisions but that U.S.-regulated vehicles 
                                                
56 Equivalency means that parts made under different regulatory regimes have been shown to be equally 
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are safer in rollovers.57 It would not be difficult for European consumer groups to argue 
that reducing transatlantic regulatory barriers would endanger European drivers in 
collisions while American consumer groups argued that reducing those barriers would 
endanger Americans in rollover crashes.58    
Environmentalists 
 When environmentalists advocate raising some regulatory standard to promote 
environmental protection, they present automakers with a trade-off: compliance costs 
versus reputation. If that new regulatory standard comes with high compliance costs and 
you the environmentalists cannot convince automakers that opposing a new standard will 
significantly hurt their reputations, as happened with emissions regulations in Europe 
from 1983 to 1988, those automakers oppose it. If compliance is cheap and the 
reputational consequences severe, as they were in 1989 and 1990 in the European case, 
they accept the new standard and abide by it.  
 Environmentalists should not focus solely on the reputation half of that equation. 
Naming and shaming has been an effective strategy for environmentalists in a number of 
policy areas ranging from deforestation to global warming. However, naming and 
shaming is not the only effective strategy. Environmental activists have also been able to 
design and promote specific regulations.59 This gives them the ability to choose from a 
wide menu of different regulatory options. There is actually a great deal of evidence that 
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when they have designed standards that are cheaper to comply with, they have been much 
more effective at eliciting cooperation from businesses and thus protecting the 
environment.60  
 Environmentalists can also work to not only undermine arguments made by some 
businesses that compliance with environmental regulations makes them uncompetitive 
but also to steal the competitiveness frame altogether. Michael Porter has argued that 
businesses and the countries that they are based in can become more competitive if those 
businesses are pressured to innovate.61 Environmental regulations can do exactly that. By 
pressuring firms to innovate to meet higher standards, environmental regulations actually 
make those companies more internationally competitive, not less. This argument can be 
bolstered by the fact that overall environmental regulations can create more wealth than 
compliance of them costs. For example, by preventing millions of lost work and school 
days, by preventing premature deaths, and by reducing the amount that must be spent on 
maladies from bronchitis to asthma, the Clean Air Act is estimated to have created 12 
trillion dollars in net economic benefits from 1990 to 2020.62  
Labor Unions 
 The first recommendation for labor unions is in regards to which rhetorical 
strategy is most likely to bear policy fruit. The most politically powerful argument in 
defense of regulatory trade barriers, that their reduction would lead to needless death, is 
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really not available to labor unions. Therefore, unions’ best strategy is a defensive one: 
undermine the competitiveness arguments made by businesses seeking to reduce those 
regulatory barriers. Automakers were successful in reducing domestic content regulatory 
barriers, which unions prized, because they successfully linked that reduction with larger 
societal concerns about competitiveness. To protect their interests, unions must be able to 
fight against arguments that suggest that they make firms uncompetitive. They can do this 
by emphasizing that there is strong evidence that worker involvement in decision-making 
through unions and works council boosts plant-level productivity and enhances the 
competitiveness of that plant and the company as a whole.63  
 The second implication for labor unions is that personnel decisions are policy 
decisions. Which government officials are involved in trade negotiations has a significant 
impact on the trajectory those negotiations take. Here, labor unions could learn from 
several of the turns in the beef chapter. In 2004 and 2005, the resilience of Japan’s 
position on BSE regulations was reinforced by the fact that the universal testing policy 
was overseen by the Food Safety Commission (an independent, politically insulated panel 
of experts) rather than by the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Health, both of 
which could more easily have been pressured to relent to U.S. demands. Later, one of the 
factors that promoted a reduction in the BSE-related regulatory barriers was that 
negotiations over those barriers became linked to other trade issues and so the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MITI), which is pro-liberalization, was in charge of the trade 
negotiations rather than the Ministry of Agriculture, which is more protectionist.  
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 Labor unions can learn from this by being strategically creative in terms of 
promoting differing jurisdictional understandings, specifically by getting the Department 
of Labor involved in trade negotiations. This would not be a totally unprecedented 
maneuver. A recent decision by the Department of Labor suggests a possible route that 
labor unions might take. For decades, financial advisers were not required to put their 
clients interests first when giving them financial advice and could instead guide them 
toward financial products based on incentives like bonuses and trips that were offered to 
those advisers. Consumer advocates pushed for a rule known as the fiduciary standard 
that financial advisers be required to give advice based on what is best for the client. The 
financial industry opposed this rule and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which traditionally has had a relatively close relationship with the financial services 
industry, refused to move forward. Recently the Department of Labor, which does not 
have that kind of cozy relationship with the financial industry, asserted that it too had 
jurisdiction on this matter and so instituted a fiduciary standard rule.64  
 Labor unions, as they are usually protectionist, typically do not find a favorable 
hearing before the United States Trade Representative, as it is pro-trade. If labor unions 
can convince the Department of Labor to insert itself into trade negotiations based on the 
idea that trade involves its jurisdictional prerogatives, then perhaps labor unions will have 
an ally in those trade negotiations. In politics, if you are not at the table, you are on the 
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menu. If labor unions cannot find someone currently at the table who will fight for them, 
they need to find a way to change who sits at the table.  
Government officials in the NHTSA and Europe 
 For regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, this work suggests that automakers 
will likely continue to request greater regulatory cooperation between the two polities but 
mutual recognition or regulatory harmonization will be a tough sell given the concerns of 
consumer safety advocates and the power of the rhetoric surrounding preventing needless 
death. The major implication of this is that part-by-part negotiations seem the best way 
forward. The current collaboration over the two part types where equivalency has been 
proven, seat belt anchors and visibility equipment, provide a model for the painstaking 
way in which regulatory cooperation should proceed.  
Beef 
Activists Concerned About Food 
 The biggest implication of this work for consumer advocates in food pertains to 
what they should focus on. In short, they need to stop concentrating on genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) and instead focus on three other regulation-related aspects 
of the food industry: heart disease, climate change, and the exploitation of workers. First, 
consumer advocates need to get off GMOs. There is no scientific evidence that GMOs 
are harmful to humans.65 None.66 The idea that GMOs are dangerous to consume has no 
more basis in reality than climate change denial or refusing to vaccinate ones’ children. 
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Not all opinions are equally valid. Opposition to GMOs is a sincerely held and well-
intentioned viewpoint, but that does not change the fact that it is objectively misinformed.    
 Not only is opposition to GMOs factually wrong-headed, it also undermines the 
political effectiveness of the consumer food movement as a whole. The facts are not on 
their side, which makes it difficult to build a persuasive case and convince regulators to 
take their side. Relatedly, it is difficult to show a tangible way in which GMOs have 
actually hurt anyone. The reason that preventing unnecessary death is such a powerful 
rhetorical tool is that death is highly tangible and motivates risk aversion. All of the 
alleged risks associated with GMOs are hypothetical.  
 A focus on GMO opposition has unnecessarily narrowed the political appeal of 
the food consumer movement. GMO opposition springs from an instinctive mistrust of 
multinational corporations like Monsanto and is often tied to anti-commercialism, 
environmentalism, and vegetarianism, all of which are popularly associated with a certain 
kind of neo-hippie political liberalism. Conservatives see the types of liberals who form 
the core of GMO opposition and conclude that the food consumer movement does not 
reflect them or their interests. Re-orienting the food consumer movement to a less purely 
liberal political orientation could broaden the appeal of that movement and thereby 
strengthen it.   
 The first issue area that would provide the food consumer movement a more 
favorable opportunity to push for better regulation is in the connection between meat, 
especially beef, and public health. Meat consumption is directly connected with heart 
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disease, the number one killer globally.67 The causal chain between using regulations to 
reduce meat consumption and preventing needless death is clear and direct.  
 The second issue that consumer advocates should focus on is the connection 
between meat, again especially beef, and climate change. Livestock is responsible for 
fifteen percent of all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, equivalent to the emissions of 
all vehicles combined.68 Beef is especially carbon intensive.69 Doing something about 
climate change is broadly supported in the United States and abroad.70 Environmental 
groups are wary that appearing to dictate people’s personal consumption might elicit 
backlash, but at the same time poll, respondents appear less reluctant to address climate 
change if businesses appear to be the ones bearing the costs.71 Pushing for regulations 
that require meat producers to minimize their carbon footprint could thus not only be 
good policy, but also good politics. 
 Third, the consumer food movement can raise public awareness of the extent to 
which the meat industry is built on systemic exploitation of vulnerable workers. To quote 
from a Human Rights Watch Report: 
“Employers put workers at predictable risk of serious physical injury even 
though the means to avoid such injury are known and feasible. They 
frustrate workers' efforts to obtain compensation for workplace injuries 
when they occur. They crush workers' self-organizing efforts and rights of 
association. They exploit the perceived vulnerability of a predominantly 
immigrant labor force in many of their work sites. These are not 
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occasional lapses by employers paying insufficient attention to modern 
human resources management policies. These are systematic human rights 
violations embedded in meat and poultry industry employment.”72 
 For food activists, stories are more likely to be effective than statistics. At 
Hormel-subsidiary factories in Minnesota and Texas, undocumented employees were 
forced to work brain-removal devices at such speeds that it badly compromised basic 
sanitation needs and workers’ health- I will spare the reader the stomach-churning 
details.73 When those workers got so ill that they suffered long-term neurological 
damage, Hormel’s subsidiary fired them.74 This is but one example of the ways in which 
meat industry employees are mistreated. More examples of deplorable, abusive, and 
intimidating treatment can be found here,75 and here,76 and here,77 and here,78 and here,79 
and here.80 And I could keep going, but you get the picture. 
 Because they are often undocumented immigrants, these workers have little 
ability to seek redress over this systemic exploitation. They cannot go to the police 
because they fear deportation. If they complain to management or push for better 
conditions, management calls the local law enforcement authorities and informs them of 
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the location of illegal immigrants, who had to give management their address in order to 
work in the first place. 
 Farmers too get taken advantage of. The poultry industry is built on a contract 
farming system in which large poultry producers A) own the chickens, B) mandate the 
conditions under which the chickens are to be raised, and C) foist the costs of facility 
upgrades on to farmers by refusing to bring them new chickens or cutting their payments, 
which would force them into default on their loans and off of their farms.81 This contract 
farming system is rife with power asymmetries, indebtedness, fraud, and legalized 
brutality; it is sharecropping by another name.  
 If you are looking for the face of greed-driven corporate villainy, it is not the 
pharmaceutical companies; it is these guys, the meat industry corporations that, in an 
effort to squeeze every last penny of profit from the production process, have based their 
business model on abuse and intimidation. This is what exploitation in 21st-century 
America looks like.  
 Targeting these firms on a one-by-one basis may be activists’ most effective 
option. As I mentioned earlier, some activists have a reasonable concern that if they are 
perceived to be telling people what to do, they may face significant backlash.82 The best 
way around that is not to tell consumers that they should refrain from purchasing meat, 
but instead that they should refrain from purchasing meat from one or two particular 
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companies. Tyson would be a good place to start as they are both visible and engaged in 
some of the most egregious abuses. What will likely help is that there are a number of 
meat industry firms, like Creekstone Farms discussed in Chapter 5, that are willing to 
implement higher standards in the production process than those currently used by much 
of the industry.  
 Activists will have difficulty making large numbers of people feel guilty for 
eating meat, but they can make large numbers of people feel virtuous for forgoing Tyson 
chicken. When that company has improved its production practices, activists can target a 
different company that is continuing with the abuse. Activists have gained traction in 
pushing firms to sell products devoid of antibiotics and hormones; they can succeed at 
pushing firms to sell products devoid of abuse. This strategy is also more likely to be 
successful because it includes a narrative of protection, i.e. that farmers and workers need 
to be protected from abuse, but is not vulnerable to a narrative of access because 
consumers will not lose the ability to purchase meat. 
 Once a critical mass of ‘clean’ firms has been reached, activists can also call for 
new labor standards as a requirement for the sale of meat products in the United States. 
That is likely to create regulatory trade barriers, and that may lead to a WTO dispute with 
a developing country and the United States may lose that dispute. Food activists are not 
likely to care, nor should they. Trade liberalization as a whole is a positive thing, but it 
cannot be allowed to override every other societal concern. Wealth creation is important, 
but so is protecting the vulnerable.   
 All three of these issues can be made politically salient for broad groups more 
easily than GMOs. In all three of them, the facts are on the consumer advocates’ side, the 
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consequences are direct and clear, and the policy victory is both attainable and prosperity 
enhancing. In sum, the consumer food movement can be a broad-based, politically 
powerful force for social good that promotes public health, alleviates environmental 
degradation, and protects workers, but in order to do that it first it has to stop focusing so 
much of its attention on GMO opposition. 
Meat Industry 
 Just over a century ago, the meat industry, by allowing repellant and abusive 
conditions to flourish in its midst, brought down upon itself the most comprehensive and 
most onerous set of regulations the U.S. government had issued to any industry to that 
point. That can happen again. If they want to avoid a new set of regulations, meat 
industry firms must improve the labor practices they use, the environmental impacts they 
have, and the policies they promote before the general public turns against them. If their 
abuses become more widely known and if consumers’ interest in how the products they 
consume are made continues to grow, meat companies will have no choice in whether to 
clean up their act; they will be compelled to do so by government regulation, and 
deservedly so.  
USDA 
 If the USDA wants to promote meat industry sales, as is their mandate, they need 
to help the meat industry institute the reforms discussed above. They should also adopt a 
more flexible position toward firms like Creekstone that want to institute standards that 
exceed federal requirements. Finally, they should also adopt a more consumer-centric 
perspective. Their stance on carbon monoxide in beef packaging is a good example of a 
policy that needs to change. 
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 For years, American meat producers were losing a significant amount of sales 
because consumers were bypassing meat that, though still safe to eat, had lost its bright 
red color that people associate with freshness.83 One way to alleviate this problem was to 
inject the meat with carbon monoxide. In 2002, the use of carbon monoxide in beef for 
this purpose was approved.84 There are no requirements that packages of meat be labeled 
as being treated with carbon monoxide.85   
 Carbon monoxide does not actually preserve the meat’s freshness, only its color; 
in fact, carbon monoxide may actually accelerate bacteria growth in the event that the 
meat is stored improperly.86 Carbon monoxide helps beef maintain its appetizing, bright 
red color for significantly longer than it would be able to hold that color otherwise.87 
When ingested by humans in this way, carbon monoxide is not harmful in the way that it 
can be when it is inhaled; it will not cause cancer and does not, by itself, make the 
consumer ill.88  However, because the carbon monoxide will keep the meat appearing 
fresh even after it has spoiled, consumer groups fear that it may lead some buyers to eat 
spoiled beef, and that can make them very ill.89  Meat producers have responded that 
consumers will not inadvertently eat spoiled meat even if it is still red because they will 
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abide by sell-by dates and that in any event, consumers are unlikely to care if the meat 
they purchase is treated with carbon monoxide.90 That is a dubious claim. 
 Even if it does not contribute to making people sick, and that’s an open question, 
the use of carbon monoxide in this manner is a deceptive business practice. It fools 
consumers into thinking meat is fresh when in fact it may not be. It is for this very reason 
that some retailers such as Wegman’s, Publix, Meijer, and Wal-Mart refuse to sell meat 
treated with carbon monoxide.91 While it is relieving that at least some businesses are 
forgoing this marketing sleight of hand, that abstention is not nearly as extensive as the 
USDA prohibiting the use of carbon monoxide on beef would be.  
 This also creates an unnecessary regulatory difference between the United States 
and Japan as well as the European Union. Japan and the EU ban this practice because it 
deceives consumers while the United States allows the practice because it protects 
industry profits.92 This is a policy in which the United States government can, in one 
stroke, adopt a more consumer-friendly position and reduce a regulatory trade barrier. 
Drugs 
Pharmaceutical Companies 
 This work suggests how pharmaceutical companies can more effectively defend 
high intellectual property regulations to the general public. Drug firms have a lot of work 
to do on this. If there were gold medals awarded for worst corporate public relations 
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performance, the pharmaceuticals industry would have no competition. They did not have 
to gain the reputation they did. Cigarette companies profit from products that kill people. 
Drug companies make products that save lives. There was no preordained reason why 
pharmaceutical companies had to gain a villainous image. That happened as a result of a 
series of major strategic blunders. To reverse that, the pharmaceuticals industry should 
shift how it justifies high intellectual property regulations, emphasize the high-paying 
jobs it creates, highlight the cost savings it delivers, and police itself more thoroughly. 
 First, drug companies should justify their preference for high intellectual property 
regulations not through statistics and abstract logic regarding incentives to innovate but 
instead through personal stories. The preventing needless death argument works because 
it makes an issue clear and salient. This argument was used by access to medicine 
advocates to fight for lower IP regulations but it can also be used by pharmaceutical 
companies to defend higher IP regulations. Stories sell. Access to medicine advocates 
were able to paint drug companies as villainous because they were able to tell a story of 
drug company greed costing lives. To reverse that, drug companies need to be able to tell 
a story of their actions saving lives. The best way for them to do this is an advertising 
campaign featuring real people who would have died without that company’s drug and 
then assert that without stringent IP regulations, they would not have been able to invent 
those drugs and save those lives.  
 Second, the pharmaceuticals industry should emphasize the number of high-
paying jobs and foreign direct investment that the industry brings to states. The reason 
that the competitiveness argument is so effective is that it comes with an implied promise 
of jobs and prosperity. No government official in the United States, India, or Europe 
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wants to be held responsible for costing their constituency lucrative jobs. All of them 
want to be able to brag about bringing in those jobs. The competitiveness argument was 
key to drug firms’ ability to defend their interest in the pharmaceuticals chapter. That is 
likely to remain the case. In 2008, the CEO of Pfizer encapsulated this kind of sales pitch 
to Washington in three short sentences: “the protection of intellectual property equals 
innovation. Innovation equals competitiveness. Competitiveness equals jobs.”93 Based on 
the cases studied in this book, that is a message that works and one that it is in the best 
interests of the pharmaceutical companies to keep repeating. 
 Third, the pharmaceuticals industry should also emphasize the amount of money 
it saves the healthcare industry and thus the overall economy. Prescription drugs account 
for just nine percent of all healthcare spending in the United States.94 By contrast, 
hospital care accounts for 32 percent.95 By preventing more expensive procedures such as 
transplants and extended hospital stays, drug companies actually save the overall system 
a great deal of money. 
 Relatedly, the pharmaceuticals industry should emphasize the extent to which it, 
not the access to medicine advocates or other NGOs, has built a storehouse of wonder 
drugs. One observer reckons that today, at very cheap generic-level prices, a person can 
buy a set of drugs that have more medical utility than all drugs, patented or generic, that 
existed in 1995.96 Did drug companies do that out of profit-driven rather than altruistic 
motives? Of course they did, but their motivations are irrelevant. The relevant fact is that 
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they did it at all. Capitalism is a means of harnessing greed for social good. Perhaps no 
industry demonstrates how effective it can be at doing just that better than the 
pharmaceuticals industry.97  
 Fourth, the pharmaceuticals industry needs to police itself much more robustly 
than it has thus far. When pharmaceutical executives like Martin Shkreli radically 
increase the price of a monopoly-controlled generic drug like Daraprim, that makes the 
entire industry look bad.98 He is only the most visible example. Questcor Pharmaceuticals 
raised the price of a drug for multiple sclerosis from $40 to $28,000, a seventy thousand 
percent increase!99 Valeant Pharmaceuticals has engaged in similar behavior.100 When 
drug firms adopt transparently anti-competitive strategies like pay-for-delay schemes, 
that too hurts the entire industry’s image.101 When drug companies engage in these 
behaviors they undermine public confidence in the high intellectual property regulations 
that are the source of their profit. As Ian Read, the CEO of Pfizer, put it in 2014, “unless 
we’re respected by society, unless we’re seen as good stewards of our resources, then we 
run the risk of losing both patents and losing the ability to price our medications.”102 
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 To clamp down on these kinds of actions, the pharmaceutical industry needs to 
create a mechanism to enforce good practices on all pharmaceutical manufacturers. In 
this matter, drug firms could learn from the legal profession and create a pharmaceutical 
equivalent of the bar. If a lawyer behaves in ways that violate what the bar has decided is 
acceptable practice, that lawyer can lose their ability to practice. This mechanism benefits 
the entire legal profession. Likewise, drug companies could form a pharmaceuticals bar 
association, and with the help of government, compel all drug firms to abide by a set of 
good practices including but not limited to no pay-for-delay schemes and no sudden price 
increases for generic drugs that have no substitute. 
 If the pharmaceuticals industry does not police itself better, at some point it will 
find that it loses even more esteem in the eyes of the public and rightly so. That esteem 
can only fall so far before the public stops believing that the intellectual property 
regulations that create drug industry profits are good for society rather than just a handout 
to a well connected but morally bankrupt industry. Should that happen, pharmaceutical 
companies may find that their ability to set prices becomes as constrained in the United 
States as it is in other developed countries.103 
Access to Medicine Advocates 
 First, if access to medicine advocates want to reduce the stringency of intellectual 
property regulations, they must be able to demonstrate that new breakthrough medicines 
can be developed and guided through the entire approval process without the patent-
based system the pharmaceuticals industry is built on. Through whatever means they 
choose, be it university funded basic research followed by prize pools for applied 
research followed by NGO leadership through the approval process or some other 
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process, these advocates must be able to show that a non-patent based system can 
promote just as much innovation as the current system. Until they can do that, they will 
consistently run into the concern that reducing intellectual property regulations, as these 
activists want to do, will slow medical innovation and ultimately cost lives.   
 Second, access to medicine advocates may be successful in promoting a reduction 
of IP regulations on pharmaceuticals if they are able to drive a wedge between other 
businesses and pharmaceutical companies on drug costs.104 The average business’ annual 
contribution to a family health insurance plan now total $12,591.105 That is a major 
expense. If access to medicine advocates can convince businesses that the high cost of 
health insurance is at least in part due to the high cost of patented medicines, they may 
gain powerful political allies. They are likely to have even more success if they are able 
to paint high health insurance costs as undermining American businesses’ international 
competitiveness. The pharmaceutical companies’ most powerful rhetorical tool is that 
high IP regulations on drugs make American business more competitive. Access to 
medicine advocates are more likely to win if they can destroy the power of that narrative.   
Officials in the USTR 
 The United States Trade Representative should make its policymaking processes 
more transparent and more inclusive. This means having a more diverse set of individuals 
as cleared advisers and means making negotiating texts public during those negotiations. 
As I discussed in Chapter 3, cleared advisers are people who are allowed to view 
confidential negotiating documents. Firms have had many of their representatives named 
                                                
104 Indeed, there is already a brewing conflict between drug firms and insurance companies over high drug 
costs. Johnson, Carolyn. “Secret Rebates, Coupons, and Exclusions: How The Battle Over High Drug 
Prices is Really Being Fought.” The Washington Post. May 12, 2016. 
105 Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Education Trust. 2015. “Employer Health Benefits, 
2015 Annual Survey.” p. 1. They spend on average $5,179 for individual plans. Ibid. p. 2. 
Winslett. Competitiveness and Death: Trade and Politics in Cars, Beef, and Drugs 320 
cleared advisers; however, when asked about cleared advisers from non-business groups, 
a USTR spokesperson could not name a single cleared adviser from a public interest 
group or activist NGO.106 Even to someone who accepts the need for strong intellectual 
property protection, the current revolving door between IP-intensive firms and the USTR 
reeks of cronyism. 
 That needs to change. The concern is that allowing activists to see negotiating 
texts would jeopardize trade talks because those activists cannot be trusted to not release 
those documents to the public. That concern can be alleviated by choosing cleared 
advisers from more moderate, less anti-business NGOs such as the National Resource 
Defense Council instead of Friends of the Earth. In IP, Doctors Without Borders is also 
fairly moderate. The Access to Essential Medicines Campaign leader Ellen ‘t Hoen has 
said that Doctors Without Borders “is not against patents and not against patent 
legislation. True innovation deserves to be protected and to be awarded. We advocate a 
balanced IP regulation.”107  
 Excluding these groups makes enemies unnecessarily. Bringing them into the 
process could win them over and so dilute the opposition to trade deals. That is what 
happened with environmentalists in NAFTA. Allowing them access resulted in stricter 
environmental provisions in the agreement but won the support of some more moderate 
environmentalist organizations, which gave Democrats greater political cover to vote for 
NAFTA.108 
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 Bringing in activist groups might also help the reputation of the USTR by 
showing that the USTR often does take a balanced approach. For example, during the 
TPP negotiations, the USTR took the most pro-environment stance of any negotiating 
team.109 The reason that there are not more environmental provisions in the TPP is not 
because the USTR betrayed environmentalists; it is because developing countries such as 
Vietnam and Malaysia opposed those provisions.110  
 Furthermore, the current secrecy and exclusivity surrounding negotiating 
positions and negotiating texts are not helping. They have led many observers, including 
Congressmen, to believe that the secrecy of the negotiations is meant to shroud nefarious 
intent.111 If the Trans-Pacific Partnership really is as good as U.S. Trade Representative 
Froman says it is, then why all the secrecy? Furthermore the public now expects much 
more transparency than it once did. The days of secrecy being tolerated are over. To 
alleviate this problem, the United States Trade Representative should make negotiating 
texts publicly available during trade negotiations. As Susan Aaronson has pointed out, 
there is no clear evidence that secrecy actually strengthens one’s negotiating position.112 
In fact, transparency might be used to credibly signal that a government cannot abandon a 
hardline position without being hammered domestically.  
 There are actually some examples of transparency upgrades in other trade 
negotiation institutions. The World Intellectual Property Organization conducts its 
negotiations in full view of webcasts that are publicly available online and has given a 
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wide variety of stakeholders unprecedented access.113 The European Union has published 
drafts of its negotiating positions in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership.114 Negotiating in broad daylight would certainly be different from the way 
things have traditionally been done but that does not mean it would be impossible.   
 Even if a given trade agreement does have net benefits, the USTR should only 
agree to and push for that trade agreement if it has broad societal buy-in and the 
legitimacy that comes with that. Including activists groups in trade negotiations and 
making those negotiations more accessible and transparent might make trade deals more 
difficult to conclude but it would make them more legitimate and more likely to be 
ratified.   
Concluding Remarks- Hidden in Plain Sight 
 As states’ economies grow more interconnected, regulatory trade barriers cannot 
help but grow in importance. The political negotiations that surround those regulatory 
trade barriers affect how safe the products we buy are and how much they cost. They 
affect how much we can export and so how many export-oriented jobs there are. They 
affect the extent to which trade helps or hurts the environment. They affect how workers 
get treated. All of these issues are hugely consequential and all of them are greatly 
affected by the politics of regulatory barriers. 
 At the beginning of this book, I mentioned the regulatory trade barriers that 
influence air bags, the U.S.-China pork trade, and PD1 inhibitors. These regulatory 
barriers affect the quality and affordability of the meat a Chinese family puts on its table. 
In the United States and Europe, they affect the health outcome of car crashes that 
                                                
113 Flynn, Sean. “WIPO Treaty for the Blind Shows That Transparency Can Work (And Is Necessary).” 
Infojustice.org. June 26, 2013. http://infojustice.org/archives/30027 Accessed April 20, 2016.  
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involve air bag deployment. Around the world, they affect how quickly new cancer 
medicines can be created and how costly they will be. These regulatory trade barriers 
affect whether you personally survive a car crash or cancer. Regulatory trade barriers are 
everywhere around us, and once they stop being abstract and technical, once it becomes 
clear the central role they play in the global economy and in nearly everyone’s daily life, 
their significance becomes inescapable.  
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